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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation argues that women on the African continent experience moments of internal 
exclusion in higher education discourses. Although women are statistically represented in higher 
education discourses, they remain subjected to internal exclusion on the grounds that their 
contributions are evidently unsubstantive. Through a conceptual analysis of women’s experiences 
of African higher education, the study reveals that internal exclusion can be attributed to patriarchy, 
male chauvinism, authoritarianism and a gendered view of equality, mostly generated in people’s 
social, political and cultural practices. I contend that a ‘non-gendered’ ethics of care can undermine 
the debilitating effects caused by the internal exclusion of women in higher education discourses. 
By examining the implications of a reconstituted ethics of care for teaching and learning at higher 
education institutions on the continent, the study offers some ways in which exclusionary higher 
education practices can be remedied. This dissertation contends that, if higher education in Africa 
were to halt the dilemma of internal exclusion and move towards engendering a reconstituted 
ethics of care, both conceptually and pragmatically, then it stands an authentic chance of 
cultivating compassionate, imaginative and responsible citizens who can reason, not only for 
themselves, but for humanity as well.   
 
Keywords: Africa, higher education, women, exclusion, equality, ethics of care 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie proefskrif argumenteer dat vrouens op die vasteland van Afrika momente van interne 
uitsluiting ondervind. Alhoewel vrouens statisties goed verteenwoordig is in hoër onderwys 
diskoerse, bly hulle steeds onderhewig aan interne uitsluiting op grond daarvan dat hulle bydrae 
nie genoegsaam geag word nie. Gegrond op 'n konseptuele analise van die wedervaringe van 
vrouens in hoër onderwys in Afrika, bevind hierdie studie dat interne uitsluiting van vrouens 
toegeskryf kan word aan patriargie, manlike chauvinisme, outoritarisme, en 'n geslagsblik van 
gelykheid wat meestal aanslag vind in mense se sosiale, politieke en kulturele praktyke. Ek voer 
aan dat 'n nie-geslagtelike etiek van sorg die verlammende effekte van interne uitsluiting van vroue 
in hoër onderwysdiskoerse kan ondermyn. Die studie stel maniere voor hoe uitsluitende hoër 
onderwys praktyke beredder kan word deur 'n ondersoek van die implikasies van 'n rekonstruksie 
van 'n etiek van sorg aan hoër onderwys instansies op die vasteland. Hierdie proefskrif voer aan 
dat as hoër onderwys in Afrika die dilemma van interne uitsluiting wil stuit en dan konseptueel en 
pragmaties wil beweeg na 'n rekonstruksie van 'n etiek van sorg, daar dan 'n outentieke kans kan 
bestaan om verantwoordbare burgers te kweek wat deernisvol is, wat verbeeldingryk is, en wat nie 
alleen vir hulleself kan redeneer nie, maar ook vir die mensdom. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Afrika, hoër onderwys, vrouens, uitsluiting, gelykheid, etiek van sorg 
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PREFACE 
To preface this study, I wish to proceed from a Socratic note, which is that “an unexamined life is 
not worthy of living”. As the author of this dissertation, my life has been influenced by various 
events and encounters that have characterised my assumptions and the arguments that ensue. 
The discussion centres on my experiences, shaped by my upbringing, schooling, higher education 
(HE) and work. I was born and spent most of my life in one of the remotest areas of Namibia, 
called Okalongo, which is approximately seven kilometres from the border between Namibia and 
Angola. I am the daughter of a housewife who, unlike her brothers and younger sister, never went 
to school. At the age of two, I was taken to my maternal grandmother, who, despite being a 
“political widow” – whose husband left for exile in search of freedom and who died in the Cassinga 
Massacre, Angola, 4 May 1978 – managed to care for many children, both biological and adopted. 
Our schooling was dependent on farming, as we were required to work hard and sell some of our 
products, such as Mahangu1, beans, chickens, goats, cows, and so forth. My Oshiwambo 
(Mbadja2) traditional culture aims to nurture hardworking but submissive women who are 
marriageable. This simply means that marriage lies at the heart of social life. As a result, the 
education of girls/females is secondary to that of their male counterparts.  
Nonetheless, my grandmother succeeded in sending me to school. Through my grandmother’s 
sense of commitment, fortitude, faith and hope I was inspired to complete my schooling. 
Afterwards, I was admitted to a teachers’ college of education, which afforded me the opportunity 
to become a teacher. Despite being in the teaching profession, I struggled to comprehend my 
identity as a young African woman who was born out of wedlock (never having experienced a 
father’s care, except from uncles), and became a single mother. As in many African traditional 
societies, single mothers among the Ovambadja are not really shown respect, since they are 
presumed to have broken the cultural norm of “no baby before marriage”. One can only imagine 
the low status of a girl-child, born out of wedlock in such a community, who also becomes a single 
mother, despite being a dedicated public servant. A woman’s achievement is questionable and 
mostly measured by her sexual relationships with men (either single or married).  
                                            
1
 A locally grown Namibian food products, known scientifically as pearl millet and locally called Mahangu. Mahangu is grown mainly in 
the north of the country, where it is the staple food, and it usually is made into a porridge called “oshifima” or “oshithima”, or fermented 
to make a drink called “oshikundu” or “ontaku” (Centre for Research Information Action in Africa, 2001: 18).  
2
 One of the eight Ovawambo traditional communities in Northern Namibia, with origins that date to the immigration of the Ovawambo 
ethnic groups into Northern Namibia after their long march from the Great Lakes of Africa. Ovambadja royalty extends through 
matrilineage. Like the other Oshiwambo-speaking communities, this traditional community occupies a demarcated communal area 
known as Okalongo. There about 75 000 inhabitants in Okalongo. It forms part of Ombadja, which is situated in Angola and was cut off 
Namibia during colonial rule. During the colonial era, the Ovambadja in Namibia were placed under the leadership of the Oukwanyama 
traditional authority, and they were only recognised as a separate authority in 2002. In Okalongo, especially among the Ovambadja, 
polygamous marriages are still the order of the day, despite the influence of Christianity (Anyolo, 2008: 86-87). 
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In other words, women's successes are undervalued and no one believes that women can do 
something worthwhile without men's help. Some people (both women and men) tend to use their 
powerful roles to demand intimate relations, which provokes continuous harassment, silencing and 
offending remarks. Many, like me, struggle to acquire higher leadership positions, and this often 
stirs frustration and uncertainty about one’s capabilities. Even though I tend to work hard, which is 
recognised by some fellows, it is sometimes a disheartening excursion to attain what one is 
passionate about. For many women in my society, the primary goal is to get married and have 
children as a way of acceptance by and recognition in society and the workplace. With this goal in 
mind, the status of a woman who is seen to have failed to fulfil the prescribed patriarchal “universal 
marriage” norm leaves much to be desired. These attitudes and practices that scuttle women's 
dreams and plans to acquire leadership positions are not peculiar only to the home, but also to 
public enterprises. As a woman who could not fulfil the universal expectation to be married, I 
grappled with apprehension and insecurity about who I am and who I should become in order to be 
accorded the kind of respect and acceptance every human being deserves. Thus I have found 
solace in the pursuit of knowledge with the hope that it would earn me respect, not only from my 
family and community, but also in the church and workplace, which I earnestly miss. This 
expectation connects profoundly with the common saying that “knowledge is power”.  
Although the choice to study at a university that was regarded as the “architect of the apartheid 
machinery” was received with cynicism in my society, this never hindered my mission. The 
admission brought me joy, but my first impression of the institution was depressing and challenging 
– academically, socially and financially. Coming from a poor family, it was difficult to sustain 
myself, my son and my siblings with the salary I received from the government. However, with 
additional support from the Dean's office, I managed to complete my greatly needed Honours 
degree (see Shanyanana, 2011). Though my initial goal was to obtain the Honours degree and 
return to work, my exposure to philosophy of education, which I regarded as difficult initially, led me 
to decide to pursue more knowledge. I continued with my M.Ed. degree under a dedicated scholar 
who introduced me to crucial schools of thought. This study exposed me to the intrinsic interest of 
pursuing knowledge not for its own sake, but for the public good. The exploration in my thesis, 
Education for democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism: The case of the Republic of Namibia 
revealed that HE lacked inclusion of girls in its policies and practices, which does not match the 
ideals of deliberative democracy. In part, this is because girls/women, especially those from 
traditional African society and from poor backgrounds (as I was), are brought up to be passive, 
subservient and refrain from speaking at the same pace as their male counterparts. Nevertheless, 
such girls and women are expected to participate actively in educational processes as a way of 
expressing their democratic rights without recognising their incapacities.  
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After challenging but rewarding encounters in the area of research, the acquisition of a M.Ed. 
degree (cum laude) drove my passion to study towards a doctorate. Although my employers 
demanded that I return to work after three consecutive years of study, my thirst for knowledge 
prompted my resignation. One of my uncles approved my resignation because of my exceptional 
performance, according to the power that tradition vested on him as a man. My supervisor’s 
encouraging words, “You had better be an unemployed PhD candidate than an employed Master’s 
holder. Just persevere a little longer and reap the fruits later”, remained my inspiration and helped 
me to endure amidst all odds in the hunt for scarce knowledge. More significantly, I learned 
profoundly from my Master’s study, especially in relation to the use of the pragmatic and post-
structural paradigms, which opened my eyes to the appalling level of women's representation and 
participation in HE. This observation was complemented by experiences gained from attending and 
presenting papers at various conferences, namely the Education Students’ Regional Research 
Conference (ESRRC) and the KENTON Education Association Conference, as well as serving as 
a member of the ESRRC students’ conference organising committee. Despite the fact that many 
women were responsible for organising these conferences, their inputs as students and members 
of staff were scarcely acknowledged. I began to wonder and ask myself questions: Why are 
women less represented at these conferences? Why do only a few female postgraduate students 
participate in these conferences, despite the great number of female students in universities? 
These encounters and the search for answers prompted an enthusiasm in me to embark on this 
study. 
To sum up this narrative, I recognise my limited educational background (defined both by apartheid 
and post-colonial structures) that deprived me of critical thinking and an ability to express myself 
freely and eloquently like my male counterparts. However, I profoundly acknowledge the 
foundation in philosophy of education that emerged during my Master’s research, which led to the 
call for a minimalist-deliberative democracy in Namibian basic education that could advance 
towards a maximalist-deliberative democracy. I argued that, when learners are cultivated to 
engage in minimal (less) deliberative democracy, they will gradually grow in knowledge and 
assertiveness to deliberate in the maximal, desired form of democracy. Taking into account my 
encounters as a rural African girl and as a female student and woman, my interest in the inclusion 
of women in African higher education (AHE) becomes inescapable. As a result, I chose to embark 
on the project, “Examining the potential of an ethics of care for inclusion of women in African higher 
education discourses”. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONTESTING THE SPACE OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: SETTING THE 
AGENDA 
 
1.1 Introduction to research - setting the agenda  
In this dissertation I embark on a philosophical study regarding the inclusion of women in higher 
education (HE) in Africa. The first intention is to enhance my own understanding of how women are 
being included on the continent through the education discourses in social institutions. Secondly, I 
want to examine the underlying conditions that perpetuate women’s exclusion. And thirdly, I 
envisage exploring appropriate means of addressing exclusion in African higher education (AHE). 
The critical analysis of the conceptions of inclusion, equality and an ethics of care will be sought 
specifically in relation to identifying possibilities to assist HE in Africa to address exclusion, both 
conceptually and pragmatically. 
Different democratic initiatives were spearheaded by the World Declarations and the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to promote a democratic society in which all 
people live equally and justly. In 2000, the United Nations promulgated the MDGs, with the aim of 
achieving the following eight fundamental goals: 1) eradicate poverty and hunger; 2) achieve 
universal primary education; 3) promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce child 
mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) 
ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) develop a global partnership for development by 2015 
(MDGs, 2005: v). The idea of gender equality and women’s empowerment is at the heart of the 
MDGs, and all countries are expected to achieve 50% representation of women in decision making 
at various levels of society by the targeted period. In this regard, African countries introduced the 
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD, 2002), a project with a vision to achieve the 
MDGs at all levels of society, especially in the area of women’s inclusion and gender equality in all 
educational institutions in order to foster social and economic development (UNESCO, 2000: 
Article 7). Regarding educational institutions, Dunne and Pendlebury (2003: 208) state that (higher) 
education is required to play the role of cultivating special dimensions of character and special 
virtues that are necessary for the sustainability of a democratic regime. Gutmann and Thompson 
(2004: 35) affirm that the school system is one of the central places in any democracy where the 
preparation for future free and equal citizens can appropriately be done.  
They also argue that public schools (including higher education) constitute the best arenas for the 
promotion of democratic virtues such as inclusion. Consequently, if public schools are not 
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democratic, this situation is less likely to exist in other institutions of society. It can be conceived 
that the practices of HE ought to operate effectively if such practices are conducted within an 
inclusive and democratic environment in which everyone’s interest is considered in education 
practices, irrespective of colour, race and gender. However, there is a disparity in terms of 
representation and inclusion in HE in Africa, in spite of its claim of being a democratic institution. 
The disparity is evident in the different statistics on gender at the HE level in Africa, which exhibit a 
lack of inclusion particularly of women in higher education practices, especially in governance. One 
may conclude that exclusion seems to be/is an underlying factor that perpetuates the disparity in 
women’s representation in HE, and this may thwart the continent’s envisaged MDG aim of attaining 
50% female representation by 2015.  
To elucidate the concept of exclusion, Young (2000: 52-53) delineates two approaches – (i) 
internal exclusion and (ii) external exclusion. The first approach involves individuals or groups 
being formally represented in social institutions, but being excluded from the discussion and 
decision-making process by means of a specific style of expression, the use of language that is 
difficult to understand, and the dismissal of the participation of some people as being out of order. 
The second approach occurs when some members are kept out of the democratic community and 
its debates or decision-making processes, that is, such people (e.g. women) are not involved in a 
community of engagement and in public discourses due to their status in the society (Young, 2000: 
52-53). Presumably, HE seems to advance external exclusion, as it denies women’s access and 
contributions to higher education practices. An example of external exclusion is found when 
women are not admitted to higher institutions at all, while the few with access to HE are internally 
excluded by being denied space to contribute to debates or decision-making processes. Teferra 
and Altbach (2004: 21) point out that the challenges experienced by female students include a lack 
of access to HE, as well as the problem of gender inequality amongst students and academic staff 
in many African universities.  
According to Assié-Lumumba (2007: 472), there is evidence of a severe lack of female access to 
HE. It is stated that no African country has achieved the goal of universal primary education, much 
less the goal of ensuring access to HE for women. I contend that, in Africa, exclusion and gender 
inequality are underlying factors that stir a lack of access of women to HE as both students and 
staff members. On the notion of access, Morrow (2007: 39) identifies two types, (i) formal access 
and (ii) epistemological access. Formal access deals with admission to institutions of HE in terms 
of the number of students, whereas epistemological access entails how many institutions provide 
access to the goods it distributes to those it formally admits, that is, the knowledge shared system.  
For instance, formal access takes place when more women (as students or staff members) are 
given special entry to HE, but epistemological access is enabled when women who gained formal 
access to HE are offered spaces to share their knowledge by means of research outputs at 
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conferences and in publications, and to make contributions to policy changes. Formal access can 
be exemplified by the number of women at HE institutions, while epistemological access manifests 
when those who are formally granted access to HE are afforded opportunities to contribute to 
decision making and share their knowledge in policy formation. So, Morrow (2007: 39) has rightly 
noted that, if we promise our students (in this case women) spaces in HE by offering them formal 
access, but break our promise by not offering them adequate epistemological access, we not only 
betray their personal aspirations, but also undermine some of the central ideals of HE. The point is 
that women are excluded; therefore they lack formal and epistemological access.  
 
1.2 The exploration for inclusion of women in higher education in Africa: a snapshot 
Accessing HE formally should not be the only target; rather, it is necessary to widen 
epistemological access, which cannot be achieved if only few women gain access to HE. 
Moreover, HE is deprived of the contributions of women as role models, mentors and other 
examples of good practices, such as connecting with “the other”, engaging with the differences of 
others and sharing their commonalities (Benhabib, 2002: 162). This claim can be verified by the 
low number of female students and staff members in institutions of HE on the African continent. A 
study of 32 universities in 16 African countries showed that a larger proportion of university 
dropouts consist of female students (Leathwood & Read, 2009: 3). This implies that women are not 
only underrepresented numerically, but they are also at a higher risk of non-completion and 
dropping out. With many student groups still underrepresented, HE continues to be criticised for 
being elite-based rather than for the masses. The idea that HE limits women’s equal access to its 
practices seems to say that there is no space for them, thus confirming a kind of exclusion.  
A study conducted by the London Institute of Education (2005: 10) shows that the percentage of 
female enrolment in HE in Africa is low. Nigeria has 39.9%, Tanzania 24% and Uganda 34%, while 
Lesotho 50% and South Africa are the only countries with 53% female enrolment. Many of the 
female students in HE institutions are clustered at the undergraduate level, and more are studying 
for certificates and diplomas, while fewer females are found at the master’s and doctoral levels. It 
is evident that women are not only under-represented as students at universities, but also as staff 
members. Undoubtedly, such a selection of data on HE on the continent reveals a sizeable gender 
gap, the cause of which needs to be investigated.  
From the number of women appointed as heads of higher education institutions – as rectors, vice-
rectors, chancellors and deans of faculties, it is evident that universities in Africa promote women’s 
exclusion and gender inequality in staff membership. Onokala and Onah (1998: 10-12) revealed 
that African universities had produced at least five female vice-chancellors from different 
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disciplines. It is observed that African universities in the twenty-first century need to strive to 
become places where the pursuit of knowledge is indeed freely and equally available to all citizens, 
irrespective of age, religion, sex and race. A research study conducted by the London Institute of 
Education (2005: 5) shows that there is also a sizeable gender gap in staff employment, 
particularly at higher decision-making levels. Out of the four Commonwealth African universities 
examined, the percentage of women at professor, associate professor and senior lecturer levels 
was decidedly lower than that of men. Even at the lowest level of academic opportunities, such as 
assistant lecturers, the percentage was surprisingly low, indicating that women are deprived of 
contributions as role models and mentors in HE. Statistics of positions of professor held by women 
at the four universities show that Ibadan University had 12.5%; the University of Cape Town 7%; 
Dar es Salam University 5.2%; and Makerere University 6.1%. Positions of associate professor 
held by women constituted 17% in Cape Town; 14.8% in Dar es Salam; and 20% in Makerere 
(London Institute of Education, 2005: 5).  
In addition, statistics of women as rectors, vice-chancellors, deputy chancellors, registrars, 
executive directors and deans of faculties showed that, in 2006, in the overall gender proportion of 
the 92 African universities, only four countries attained 30%, namely Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia 
and Swaziland. Countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda and Botswana had 28%, 
while the rest had between 0 and 24% representation of women (HERS-SA, 2008: 2). The 
foregoing statistics are indicative of women’s exclusion and gender inequality, which seem to 
prevail not only in higher education, but also at other levels of society. The concept of gender 
equality is viewed by King and Mason (2001: 34-35) in terms of equality under law, equality of 
opportunity, including equality of access to HE, knowledge production and human capital as well 
as other productive resources, and equality of rewards for work and equality of voice (see MDGs, 
2005: 3). It seems that women as students and staff members do not have enough access to and 
experience in HE in Africa. This would therefore validate the claim in this study that there is a lack 
of both formal and epistemological access, as well as inequality of women in HE, in addition to 
them being deprived of making a contribution to education discourses in Africa. Mutume (2005) 
has rightly noted that, without access to HE, women may find it difficult to engage in debate and 
contribute to political and economic activities of any sort.  
 
Therefore, this study will attempt to investigate the predicament of women that results in their lack 
of access to higher education, which prevents them from playing their roles as equal members in 
HE as well as in the wider society. The same understanding is expressed in the MDGs (2005: v), 
namely that “there can be no development, and no lasting peace on the planet, if women continue 
to be relegated to subservient and often dangerous and back-breaking roles in higher education 
and the entire society”. In relation to the question on why HE is the focus of this study, the view of 
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Frank and Meyer (2007: 287) is relevant. They affirm that the public mission of the modern 
university is to help solve social problems by improving business organisations and capital 
investments, protecting the natural environment, preserving human rights and cultural diversity, 
resolving crises of governance, and promoting democracy. This study seeks to analyse women’s 
exclusion and inequality in AHE, and its deprivation of women as role models, mentors and other 
examples of good practice. Firstly, the study examines HE in Africa with reference to some of the 
practices at various universities, particularly the roles of women in such institutions. The historical 
background and nature of AHE are fundamental to the study, as well as the efforts of the 
institutions (universities) to educate women for the contemporary world. In addition, the study tries 
to determine what aspects of knowledge are considered important to the development of the ailing 
African society.  
Secondly, the study focuses on theories that shape AHE, in particular those theories connected to 
the production of knowledge(s). Thirdly, the implications of exclusion, of women in particular, and 
their involvement in higher education in Africa are examined. Fourthly, the study determines how 
exclusion and gender inequality within an indigenous concept of Ubuntu as inclusion/exclusion can 
be remedied by focusing on the educational implications of a universal ethics of care. Stressing my 
call for a link between African and Western thought,  Wiredu (2004) points out the significance of 
connecting African to Western knowledge systems, especially when these arrangements are to the 
advantage of African people, particularly disadvantaged groups (i.e. women). Hence, my decision 
to reconceptualise an indigenous notion of Ubuntu as inclusion from the Western liberal 
perspectives of an ethics of care, that could possibly enhance and guide the post-colonial AHE 
system towards desirable democratisation and transformation. To substantiate the claim that 
exclusion exacerbates women’s lack of access to HE, a brief historical background of AHE is 
provided. To a considerable extent, HE has come to occupy an integral part of modern society. 
The institutions of HE (i.e. universities, which are the focus of this study) are the largest 
repositories of certified knowledge and accommodate the concentration of those certified as 
experts, and who possess the specialised skills and knowledge that societies need for their 
advancement and development (Okolie, 2003: 238-239).  
Likewise, Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 18) points out that the contemporary institutions of higher 
learning in Africa have originated from a colonial or neo-colonial framework, and the idea and 
reality of HE were alien to the African context before colonisation. Most of Africa’s political leaders, 
bureaucrats and scholars were educated according to such theories. Unsurprisingly, such theories 
have caused HE practices to apply the same mechanism of exclusion of women in institutions of 
higher learning and in leadership. Okolie (2003: 239) asserts that such ideas of modernisation 
continue to shape the current AHE negatively, particularly its attitudes towards women, which has 
had a deep impact on women’s involvement in decision making and equal access. Naidoo (2003: 
249) states that governments have tended to use “globalisation” as a rationale for HE reform. He 
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therefore highlights “the attempt by governments to harness public universities in a relatively 
unmediated manner to economic productivity and to reposition higher education as a global 
commodity”. It is argued that, if Africa is to succeed economically, culturally and politically, it must 
have a strong post-secondary education sector, because academic institutions are central to its 
future (Teferra & Altbach, 2004: 22-42).  
 
In addition, although there are more than 54 universities on the African continent, globalisation as 
neoliberal economic policies pose the biggest challenge to HE in Africa. Problematising 
globalisation, various scholars agreed that the concepts neoliberalism and globalisation cannot be 
used interchangeably. The works of Michael Peters, one of the foremost philosophers of education 
in the modern world offers a clear analysis. In his view on the aspect of neoliberalism as an 
ideology, he claims that neoliberalism is a “framework within which ideas about social, institutional 
and cultural life are expected to operate” (Peters & Roberts, 2008; 1). That entails the 
implementation of policies namely corporatisation, marketisation, and privatisation across the 
globe. As a multifaceted process of neoliberal economic policies, globalisation engenders creativity 
of economic interaction that embraces international communities.  
 
In that regard, globalisation, seen as a project of neo-liberalism, in Africa has been “articulated 
primarily through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and that globalization throughout its 
projects has accelerated the corporation of unitary management, commercialization of learning and 
commoditization of knowledge” (Zeleza, 2004: 42). Hence, knowledge has been increasingly 
commodified as it is packaged into smaller marketable units in an industrialised curriculum 
(Leathwood & Read, 2009: 2). The project of neo-liberalism has also transformed the nature, 
governance, identity of scholarly discourse and pedagogical practices of universities in Africa. In 
other words, globalisation has turned HE institutions into an economic investment rather than a 
common good that would afford everyone (especially marginalised groups – in these instances, 
women and the poor) access to institutions of HE and to be fully included. One may possibly 
conclude that HE in Africa is not only considered as a manufacturer of technicians, but also as a 
space for the elites and privileged, rather than for all eligible citizens (include women) on the 
continent. Based on the above view, university practices, as shaped by the ideology of 
globalisation, spawn exclusion and deny women access to HE. Since the concept of globalisation 
appears to be complex and contested; there is a need for a deeper exploration of its impact on 
women’s exclusion in AHE in this study. In the following section I motivate the study and provide 
some justification for why this investigation is worthwhile pursuing. I also explicate aspects of the 
methodologies and methods associated with Philosophy of Education as an approach that informs 
this study. The chapter concludes with an outline of the programme of study, showing how the 
dissertation will unfold.  
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1.3 Motivation for the study  
One can assume that, since most African states are democratic nations, then HE institutions that 
are considered as hubs of knowledge ought to cultivate a democratic citizenry who could not only 
compete in the world market economy, but also assist in addressing local predicaments on the 
continent. Thus, the mission of the public university should be to educate students to acquire 
knowledge and skills that will enable them to engage in debate and offer possible solutions to 
burning issues facing the continent today. Nevertheless, studies have shown that women have 
been and still are being excluded from higher education (Assié-Lumumba, 2007; Kiamba, 2008; 
Kwesiga, 2002: 152). Despite the fact that different conferences and studies have proposed ways 
of inclusion, such as MDG projects that aim to address exclusion and gender inequality, the 
dilemmas that continue to prevail in HE in Africa provoked my interest to embark on this study.  
In addition, my personal experiences as a woman studying for Honours degree (B.Ed Honours) in 
education contributed to my interest in the topic. I found it difficult to engage in classroom practices 
because of my lack of eloquence, and I questioned my ability due to a poor educational 
background and upbringing, which expected girls/women not to speak at the same level with 
boys/men, as alluded to in the preface of the dissertation. In such an HE environment I felt deeply 
excluded. Moreover, almost 90% of the lecturers were male, compared to only a few female 
lecturers. Attending various conferences where male presenters seemed to be more representative 
than women also raised questions as to why female scholars were not visible and did not present 
papers. These personal experiences suggested that female students appear not to have access to 
epistemological spaces to grow and acquire cognitive abilities that would enable them to contribute 
to knowledge production. Listening to some female doctorate holders as they shared their 
difficulties/challenges in accessing higher education and obtaining their doctorate confirmed my 
observations. In particular, married women are often faced with the choice of giving up their studies 
or losing their marriage. Jacobs (1996: 155) confirms that women lag behind as far as the 
achievement of a PhD qualification is concerned. The low representation of women in HE 
institutions on the continent triggered my desire to conduct this study.  
 
Furthermore, despite the fact that studies on girls’ and women’s access to education and gender 
equality on the African continent abound, not much change has taken place in the status of women 
in higher education and society. Likewise, there are no tangible conceptual studies on Ubuntu as 
inclusion/exclusion of women in/from AHE practices in relation to the notion of an ethics of care – 
an important virtue that (as I shall argue for later in the dissertation) can enhance women’s access 
to HE. I acknowledge that an ethics of care is not comprehensive and there are other approaches 
to address exclusion like Foucault’s work on the ancient care of the self and knowing oneself. 
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However, I find the ideas of Aristotle, Noddings and Slote (if reconstituted) more feasible in 
engendering inclusion in AHE. In line with the above reconstruction on the universal ethics of care 
concept, is the link between an indigenous concept of Ubuntu as inclusion with a specific focus to 
the equalisation of voice rather than gender, an approach which is explored in chapter 4 of this 
study.  
With the same sentiment on gender research, Jacobs (1996: 178) confirms that educational 
research focuses on individuals and leads to a de-emphasis of the role of the institutional setting. 
She notes that the main challenge facing research on gender in education is to go beyond 
documenting specific gender effects to developing a more theoretically motivated account of the 
status of women in the education system. Consequently, my intention is to explore HE ideology 
and practices in relation to women inclusion and gender equality are understood and practised. 
The idea of gender inclusion is being examined more specifically in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this 
study. Although few women who hold leadership positions in HE can be role models and mentors 
for female students, studies have shown that, in some cases, women have been reluctant to 
assume leadership positions themselves in other levels of society. This situation is also 
exacerbated by the fact that HE seems to be dominated by men. Nzomo notes that women have 
been barred because men monopolise the decision-making structures and are in the majority, 
while the university remains a man’s world and a male-dominated institution (cited in Kiamba, 
2008: 10). It is evident that women seem not only to be excluded from HE, but also face challenges 
that impede their opportunities to attain high positions. I contend that only by facilitating the 
genuine entry of more women into leadership positions in higher education and other levels of 
society will young people have mentors and role models for their future and their careers (HERS-
SA, 2008: 2). If women are not educated, their ability to build strong families and societies may be 
hampered.  
Improving the status of women in higher education would also have a positive impact on the overall 
status of women at all levels of society. Research indicates that, since many African societies are 
shaped by a patriarchal system, women should not allow only men to continue to dominate and 
lead the society (Kwesiga, 2002; Onokala & Onah, 1998). It is clear that society remains unequal, 
and if we do not have a society in which women are educated, contribute to higher education 
discourses and are placed at the level of governance and decision making, it will not be the kind of 
democratic society that citizens desire. Moreover, the benefits of a democratic society may not be 
achieved in the absence of educated women who could act as significant role models and mentors 
to girls. In a sense, HE offers the means through which women and other historically 
disadvantaged groups can attain positions of leadership and increase their economic welfare, 
thereby having a long-term impact on the overall productivity and the idea of equal opportunity 
(Adetude & Akensina, 2008: 339). It is apparent that women appear not only to be denied their 
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rights as equal human beings, but their opportunities are curtailed and their voices are silenced. 
This may be related to discriminatory activities against them in HE as both students and staff 
members.  
I argue that by denying women both formal and epistemological access (a way of exclusion), they 
are deprived of opportunities in the institutions that would have contributed so much more to their 
upliftment, empowerment and self-esteem. They would also have been equipped with cognitive 
ability, become more critical and be afforded critical tools to address societal problems, all things 
that HE ought to do. Hence, the practices in AHE institutions seem to suggest that women should 
not access education practices, which is a way of promoting exclusion, a problem that may then 
further impede gender equality between women and men in the universities. In this regard, the 
practices of higher education institutions can be considered to operate effectively only if such 
practices are conducted within a democratic, inclusive HE environment. I argue that the bleak 
situation of the exclusion of women from HE in Africa requires collective and concerted efforts that 
engender inclusive and equal institutions if credible knowledge production and development are to 
be advanced and protected. The university, which is the focus of this study, rests on fundamental 
ideals as delineated by Von Humboldt (cited in Smeyers, 2011: 5), which are that (a) teaching and 
research are linked within the individual; (b) by education through research the university nourishes 
the public debate and enhances the development of an enlightened civic culture; (c) through the 
arts and sciences men and women can cultivate their potentialities; and (d) the university raises 
those individuals’ capacities beyond economics and politics.  
From the above ideals of the Von Humboldtian University, and how exclusion and gender 
inequality permeate African higher education institutions, it is questionable whether the current 
African university can cultivate an enlightened civic culture devoid of gender exclusion. This issue 
is raised here because some women are excluded and treated unequally. At the same time, 
women are expected to engage in various levels of economics and politics. Thus, I wish to 
investigate how inclusion is conceived in HE (universities) and how HE knowledge can engender 
an enlightened civic culture, irrespective of gender and differences, on the African continent. This 
is achievable (I hope) by means of an exploration of AHE and its conception of inclusion and 
gender equality as democratic virtues, which would propose a transformative framework for 
university practices in AHE.  
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1.4 Research questions 
The main research question for this study is the following: 
 Do exclusion and gender inequality undermine the pursuit of higher education in Africa?  
 
The sub-research questions are: 
 Can the production of knowledge be credible if higher education in Africa is permeated by 
patriarchal ideology, practices and gender inequality which perpetuate the exclusion women? 
 Would an ethics of care be a feasible notion for remedying exclusion, gender inequality and 
social injustices, which perpetuate women’s lack of access to higher education institutions in 
Africa?  
To answer the above questions, the methodology for this investigation will now be explored.  
 
1.5 Methodological considerations: Philosophical analysis  
This dissertation employs philosophical methodologies and methods to answer the aforementioned 
research questions. I attribute my use of the philosophical methods to numerous philosophers, 
ranging from Socrates, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and Russell, to Wittgenstein and Peters, as well 
as Warnick and Burbules, to mention just a few. Within this approach one begins to wonder, 
question and doubt the taken-for-granted narrative, accepted beliefs and their meanings in order to 
achieve a deeper understanding of the problems of the exclusion of women in HE. Central to 
philosophical methods are issues of argumentation and justification. Philosophy of education as an 
approach is used to answer the main question in this study as a way of gaining more clarity about 
the problem of women’s exclusion in HE.  
Conceptualising philosophy of education as an approach to research, Hirst and Peters (1998: 28) 
provide a definition of philosophy, which is rooted in the Greek words philos (love) and sophos 
(wisdom). Philosophy is viewed by them as an activity of the mind and is concerned with two 
distinctive types of concerns: Firstly, to make moral judgements for an action. Nevertheless, it is 
clarified that not all reflective, second-order questions are philosophical in nature. Hence, Hirst and 
Peters (1998: 28) pose the following question: “What then, distinguishes philosophy from reflective 
investigation?” They respond that philosophical reflection entails reflection about the concepts, and 
the kind of grounds, involved in making philosophical judgements. To put it succinctly, 
philosophical inquiry is concerned with questions of conceptual analysis and with questions about 
the grounds of knowledge, beliefs, actions and activities or practices. Thus, conceptual analysis 
and the grounds that AHE aims to educate while excluding women from its practices are of interest 
to this study.  
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Secondly, in terms of education, Richard Peters, a British philosopher of education, argues in his 
canonical book, Ethics and Education (1966), that it is difficult to give a precise meaning of the 
term. However, as his polemic contribution to the field of philosophy of education, Peters (1966) 
identified three criteria that distinguish it from other human pursuits. For him, the first criterion 
entails that something valuable or worthwhile is going on, in this case AHE. This implies that 
education is connected with learning rather than a mysterious process of maturation. What is clear 
here is that an educated person ought to have gone through some process of learning. The second 
criterion involves a normative aspect. Winch and Gingell (1999: 71), in illuminating Peters' criterion, 
state that the acquisition of a body of knowledge and understanding is that which surpasses a 
mere skill, know-how or the collection of information. In other words, the knowledge and 
understanding must encompass the principles that highlight skills, procedural knowledge and 
information, and must transform the life of the person being educated, both in terms of her or his 
general outlook, and in terms of her or his commitment to the standards implicit/subtle in the areas 
of her or his education. The third criterion focuses on the cognitive aspect of education, whereby 
the educated person will gain some understanding of what is being learnt and will be able to 
question the knowledge to a certain extent in the process of learning.  
Taking into account the aforementioned criteria, especially the second one, my intention is not 
merely to collect information, but rather to explore how AHE engages in the project of transforming 
its practice by including all people, specifically women and other excluded groups. Philosophy of 
education as an activity of the mind and way of thinking is employed to identify a major problem − 
exclusion from HE in Africa − in society and proposing ways to address this problem (Burbules & 
Warnick, 2003: 19). The problem of exclusion and gender inequality has been identified in HE in 
Africa, which invariably draws on a philosophical framework to ensure that it is addressed both 
conceptually and pragmatically. I used conceptual analysis, in which concepts are analysed by 
looking for the related concepts or meanings central to the identified problem and argument; in this 
instance, exploring what constitutes the concepts inclusion, equality and an ethics of care. To 
clarify the use of philosophy of education, I draw on Smeyers (2011: 1), who delineates some of 
the main issues with which philosophy of education is concerned: 
Firstly the analysis of concepts specific to education – such as ‘education’, 
‘teaching’, ‘training’, and ‘university’, and ‘school’ … Secondly, the application of 
ethics and social philosophy of education should be obvious enough. There are 
assumptions about the desirability of the procedures by means of which this is to be 
transmitted …  
Based on the aforementioned approach, the analysis of the concepts of education, the university in 
Africa, the nature of knowledge (which includes all categories of people), and accessing such 
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knowledge equally, and the desirability of procedures as well as the means by which knowledge is 
transmitted, are explored. Blake, Smeyers, Smith and Standish (2003: 3) stress that analytical 
philosophy of education rests on the analysis of the concepts – a matter of clarifying the rules or 
conditions under which such concepts are used or applied, borrowed from the Wittgensteinian 
notion of language as a rule-governed activity. The point is that philosophy of education explores 
what education might be or might become. Importantly, Hirst and Peters (1998: 37) state that 
philosophy of education is a field of applied philosophy that draws from the traditional fields of 
philosophy, namely ethics and epistemology, with the intention to address questions about 
education policy, human development and curriculum theory, amongst others. So, in this study, 
philosophy of education as a philosophical study using analytical inquiry engages in an exploration 
of the purpose, process, nature and ideals of higher education in relation to the exclusion of 
women in AHE.  
In addition, Smeyers (2011: 14-15) points out that philosophy of education as an inquiry aim at the 
formation of practical insights and judgments that can only come into play through engagement 
with practical higher education issues. Such a form of engagement includes looking for alternatives 
to the problems that make sense to everyone participating in such an inclusive discourse, in this 
case higher education practices in Africa. The practice of education takes different forms. Thus, the 
concept of education practice cannot make sense without a context in which one has learnt to 
apply it (in this case Africa). I agree with the above view that the conditions in which we find 
ourselves today, such as the demand for performativity in higher education contexts and practices 
(exclusion and gender inequality) cannot be ignored, but taken seriously. It is against this 
background that the study explores how the internal/local ideas and practices are connected to the 
external/global and thereby influence higher education practices in Africa. Thus, philosophy of 
education is used because it offers sufficient ways in which to ascertain the conditions that 
constitute the identified problem of women’s exclusion, and of gender inequality amongst women 
and others in AHE.  
 
1.5.1 Some methodological considerations 
The present study lies between the interpretive and critical, with a touch of the deconstructive 
flavour based on the questions the dissertation aims to address. Smeyers (2011: 8) posits that 
“there is no need for one single method nor to prioritise one; much depends on the problem that is 
studied, but also on the kind of theoretical interest one is pursuing”. Critical analysis of HE policy 
documents and other educational literatures, and their practices in relation to women, are also 
utilised, along with interpretive theory in order to probe deeper meanings and to understand the 
issues at hand. I have chosen this methodology because HE in Africa needs to be given meaning 
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within its historical context. Interpretive theory has in mind constructing understandings, meanings 
and interpretations of HE in Africa that involve the way we use words, and the recognition that we 
are using them in the right way, as if we were following a rule (Wittgenstein, 1958: 50). 
Interpretative theory is used not as a main methodology but, because I cannot begin to critique 
higher education practices and propositions without gaining a clear and more nuanced 
understanding of its history and what influenced and shaped AHE, I rely on interpretation.  
 
Another important methodology I rely on in this study is critical theory and its emancipatory 
potential, as mere interpretation of women’s exclusion is not enough. As the study shows, an 
amended ethics of care is used on the grounds of its critical orientation to counteract women 
exclusion and gender inequality in AHE. Habermas (1978) posits that critical educational theory 
should prioritise “human interests”, given that it seeks to liberate human beings from all forms and 
circumstances of repression. Thus, I make use of critical education theory as an action that could 
lead to the transformation, emancipation and empowerment of those excluded from HE in Africa, 
specifically women. Moreover, in a pragmatic way, my intention is to be a voice that contributes 
and proposes a defensible argument to address exclusion in AHE. It is only when I announce my 
presence through an equal voice in AHE as an emerging woman researcher, with my contribution 
to democratic processes and possibly disrupts the status quo through philosophy of education. 
 
Since my intention is to suggest apt ways of facilitating the higher education environment that may 
possibly enable women to emancipate themselves, I also rely on some aspects of deconstruction. 
Deconstruction is used, on the one hand, to expose the hidden or obscure meanings in the 
conception of higher education discourses – inclusion, equality and an ethics of care, and, on the 
other hand, gives an account of unstated assumptions that contribute to exclusion and gender 
inequality. As Derrida (1978: x) argues, deconstruction demands continuous questioning and 
dismantling of contained or unconcealed notions of presence, and focuses on meanings that are 
unstated. In his view, meanings are always somewhere else, never in the words we use; they are 
always “absent” (Derrida, 1978: 4). In the same way, Waghid (2008a: 14) concurs that 
deconstruction tries to open up the system in the name of that which cannot be thought of in terms 
of the system and yet makes the system possible, that is HE in Africa. In other words, since the 
university is an integral social institution that cultivates knowledgeable citizens, but which 
seemingly excludes women’s contribution from educational discourses, it is vital to explore how 
African higher education practices could become transformed. And this can be done if one 
uncovers those hidden meanings not always explicitly mentioned in relation to exclusion and 
gender inequality in AHE. 
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1.6. The outline of the dissertation 
Chapter 1 introduces and sets the agenda for the study. It contains a brief exploration of the 
concept of HE in Africa and the use of philosophy of education as a form of research inquiry to 
address the problem of exclusion and gender inequality. Chapter 2 examines some of the theories 
that shape AHE. The conceptions of HE in three epochs, a deeper understanding of what shapes 
university practices and the underlying theories of HE (university) policy frameworks, as well as the 
aspects that have an impact on its practices, are probed. In Chapter 3, the conception of inclusion 
and gender equality in AHE practices is linked to the discussion of internal/local practices (e.g. 
Ubuntu) and external/global practices (e.g. cosmopolitanism). The chapter shows why AHE 
practices and ideas of Ubuntu as inclusion cannot be divorced from local views and situations. 
Chapter 4 examines AHE discourses and their (in)commensurability with the idea of inclusion, 
based on a purposive sampling of some universities in which conceptual studies have been carried 
out and where data is readily available, as a justification of women’s experience of HE on the 
continent. Through a reference to selected cases, the study examines and develops a 
contemporary framework in order to uncover underlying conceptions of higher education in relation 
to inclusion and gender equality, especially the roles and experiences of women in such practices. 
The selection is motivated basically by the availability of research on HE in such countries and 
universities. Because not much seems to be written on higher education in some countries, using 
these countries as samples in this study would have proven problematic. Significantly, some of the 
African scholarly work on HE can be found in Teferra & Altbach (2003), Zeleza & Olukoshi (2004), 
Kwesiga (2002), Assié-Lumumba (2007) and others. Thus, I consider it vital to draw from countries 
where data is readily available to offer a general depiction and a representative sample of other 
AHE institutions in relation to women’s exclusion. Chapter 5 exposes the underlying issues 
perpetuating women’s exclusion in AHE and calls for a defensible form of HE that integrates 
inclusion and gender equality. Chapter 6 conceptualises an ethics of care with the intention to 
explore defensible meanings that may assist AHE to transform its pedagogical practices to 
emancipate excluded people.  
Chapter 7 shows the implications of a reconstituted ethics of care framework for university 
education in Africa, both conceptually (which is analytically) and pragmatically (which is a matter of 
practice and experientially), that is through teaching and learning as well as governance and 
management. It offers a reflection of my personal and epistemological journey in educational 
research. Similarly, the chapter responds to potential critiques as well as identifies possibilities for 
future studies. It is argued that, if African universities cultivate this framework whereby more 
women gain access to HE, contribute to decision making and have the opportunity to air their 
views, it will show that citizens have concern for others (ethics of care) and not exclude them. This 
may move the understanding of some universities on the African continent towards attenuation 
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with what is cosmopolitan. In such a society all people are considered, irrespective of differences 
and the otherness of others, while their rights and human dignity are appreciated by all. This is not 
an easy task, as this dissertation demonstrates in exploring the ideas of inclusion, equality and an 
ethics of care, and related meanings in the context of Africa. Hence, a need for understanding the 
current state of HE in relation to women’s exclusion, which can possibly result in their inclusion, 
seems to be the primary focus of this study. The ensuing Chapter 2 gives a historical account of 
AHE, spanning from antiquity to the contemporary era, to gain a deeper understanding of women’s 
involvement in education practices during different epochs. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN AFRICA AND THE 
INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN 
 
2.1 Introduction 
African countries have experienced a long period of colonialism imposed by most prominent 
Western colonial powers such as France, Belgium, Britain, Germany and Portugal, to mention just 
a few. Upon liberation, the assumption was that higher education institutions in these countries 
would be accessible to all people, irrespective of gender, race, status, ethnicity or religion, resulting 
in knowledge production relevant to the context and local interest. The idea of liberation in Africa 
was influenced extensively by the Brazilian philosopher, Paulo Freire’s (2004) “liberatory” 
perspectives on education, which entailed setting one free from all forms of domination and 
dependence. Thus, the recognition of the local aspirations and interests of all people as equal 
agents in education practice ought to be the epicentre of HE transformation in Africa. This chapter 
offers a historical account of HE in Africa, covering three periods, namely the a) pre-colonial, b) 
colonial and c) post-colonial periods, in relation to how women have been involved in such 
practices.  
Critical questions that gave impetus to this journey are: What are the underlying meanings 
associated with HE in Africa in different periods? What theories or dominant ideas drive HE in the 
different periods, by unpacking for whom, for what and why HE was designed at each period? Was 
or is there sufficient consideration of the interests of all people, especially women, in such 
practices? These questions are enthused by the notion that history helps to yield an understanding 
of how past events shape present systems; in this study, the current HE system in Africa. Hogan 
and Smith (2003: 166), using Rorty’s view, argue that public HE is not an autonomous practice, but 
rather a component of the whole system within a given society or government, either autocratic or 
democratic. This implies that, since HE is not an independent entity, it cannot be examined without 
touching on the politics embedded in its practices. As a consequence, this chapter traces the 
historical moments of HE on the African continent with the intention of demonstrating how women 
were marginalised in different eras. The second objective of the chapter is to expose how gender 
inequality unfolded during these stages. In other words, it is important to the dissertation as a 
whole to establish to what extent women have been involved, specifically in the post-colonial 
universities, where liberation seems to have been ingrained in their practices. At the outset, pre-
colonial HE in Africa will be described, with particular interest in the indigenous and Egyptian 
education systems. This is done in reaction to widespread contemporary and post-colonial type of 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
 
HE was pioneered by the Western colonial states (see Assié-Lumumba, 2006a; Divala, 2008; 
Lulat, 2005). Secondly, colonial HE will be investigated based on the different influences on the 
continent, namely Arab-Islamic, Anglophone, Francophone and other Western colonial powers. 
This succinct exploration is pertinent in order to gain a better and deeper understanding of existing 
HE on the continent. Thirdly, the post-colonial period, which is the focus of this, study is analysed 
in terms of the shift from colonial supremacy to democracy in relation to the participation of women. 
This analysis interrogates how the Neoliberalism project of globalisation pervaded and influenced 
the discourses of HE in Africa. It also shows the link between AHE knowledge production and the 
contribution of women.  
 
2.2 African higher education: tracing historical moments in relation to women  
This section explores an account of African higher education (AHE), tracing its three historical and 
political periods that shaped the contemporary university. Although this dissertation discusses HE 
in Africa (as tertiary education), Lulat (2005: 25) contends that history reflects that, in the absence 
of all other forms of HE in a society, HE may mean any post-primary level of education (such as at 
secondary level and teacher training). In other words, HE is an educational system that constitutes 
universities and any other degree-granting colleges. The same point is clarified by Abdalla (1977, 
as cited in Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 19), who expounds that: 
 
A university is but one of the institutions of higher education. It brings men and 
women to a high level of intellectual development in the arts and sciences, and in 
the traditional professional disciplines, and also promotes high level research. On 
the one hand, therefore, it is a community of persons engaged in study and 
research. On the other, it is a source of highly trained manpower (sic) for the 
professions. But it is not alone in this second role. There are other institutions of 
higher education which offer post-secondary education and training courses and 
programmes of instruction in technical and vocational subjects and practical fields of 
work, all geared to producing middle grade technicians. 
The above citation underscores the fact that institutions of higher learning can be categorised 
broadly on the basis of their mission and goal, their primary functions with regard to teaching and 
learning, research and service, the requisite qualifications of the faculties, the criteria for admission 
of students, the duration of the programmes they offer, and the types of degrees they confer 
(Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 19). It can be said that the terms “higher education” and “tertiary 
education”, which embody all forms of organised educational learning and training activities 
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beyond the secondary level, are often used interchangeably. These terms therefore may refer to 
either universities, polytechnics, training colleges or all forms of professional institutions. With this 
understanding, an investigation of HE in Africa during the pre-colonial period in relation to women 
is necessary. 
 
2.2.1 Pre-colonial period and women in African higher education  
In this section, African higher education is associated with the ancient African indigenous forms of 
learning before the colonial period. Various studies prove that HE was not a new practice in African 
society before the Western colonial influx. In their separate research, Ajayi, Lameck, Goma and 
Ampah (1996) and Lulat (2005) trace the inception of HE back to the ancient centres of civilisation 
on the African continent, such as Egyptian knowledge and the entire African indigenous ways of 
knowledge production at large. All studies recognise that HE in Africa was not initiated by 
European influences, but had been there before the colonial period. Although the existence of 
indigenous HE in Africa has been criticised and refuted by a number of scholars, many African 
researchers have defended its uniqueness and survival prior to colonial occupation. In his work 
entitled Contemporary Africa: Continent in transition, Wallbank stated that, in the pre-European 
period, some Western scholars were cynical about the significance of African indigenous cultural 
influences and argued that “Africa south of Sahara has always been poor and powerless” (1964: 
14-15). For this reason, African historians and publicists responded actively in their attempts to 
destroy the “myth” of Africa’s barren and primitive past.  
Likewise, Brown and Hiskett (1975: 19; 22) argue that HE in ancient Africa was characterised by 
initiation into the life of the adult community. This form of education was non-formal in nature, and 
children and young people were expected to imitate and emulate adult achievements through the 
inculcation of traditional wisdom in the form of folklore and modes of learning. One can construe 
that indigenous education in Africa existed, although not in a written form. Profoundly, Wallbank 
(1964: 16) underlines that the unique and admirable features of various elements in African 
indigenous culture, particularly those of art and music, were meant for boys and men, rather than 
for girls and women. Unfortunately, this prestigious education system favoured male over female 
and thus perpetuated gender inequality.  
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Reinforcing the existence of indigenous HE, Ajayi et al. (1996: 5) argue that:  
 
Indigenous higher education produced and transmitted new knowledge necessary 
for understanding the world, the nature of man, society, God and various divinities, 
the promotion of agriculture and health, literature and philosophy. 
This picture of HE in Africa as per the above authors was initially drawn from elements of African 
sagacity or knowledge.  
Nevertheless, Divala (2008) posits that, despite the fact that African societies lacked technological 
advancement, their form of education meant that their forms of knowledge superseded what an 
ordinary person needed to know in order to survive as a member of a particular society. Moreover, 
using Odera Oruka’s interpretation, Ajayi et al. (1996: 3-5) said that this kind of knowledge did not 
rely only on the repetition of traditional norms, but went further to provide rational explications for 
such bodies of knowledge, and provided justifications and refutations. Ajayi et al. (1996) then used 
some of Oruka’s findings on African sagacity to argue for the existence of philosophers or original 
thinkers in African indigenous cultures who created and nurtured forms of informal HE. In his view, 
the system of HE at that period remained “predominantly oral, eclectic and even esoteric” (Ajayi et 
al., 1996: 4). At the same time, such forms of knowledge could range from metaphysical to 
epistemological to social. Furthermore, specific individuals – mostly men – were rewarded with 
gifts and even pieces of land for certain forms of higher knowledge that were recognised and 
promoted by the society. Although it is evident that HE existed long before the colonial period, it 
was not in a written form, but rather oral for the benefit of the general well-being of the community.  
It is compelling to note that the distinctiveness of African forms of HE in which philosophic sagacity 
existed, regardless of the fact that there were operated outside the confines of the communal pool 
of knowledge, were highly treasured by the community and considered as part of the community 
(Divala, 2008: 37). Simply put, Oruka’s (1990) descriptions of philosophic sages give the idea that 
such individuals managed to offer explanations for things or events beyond the ordinary community 
pool of explanations presented. It is furthermore clear that, due to the nature of African traditional 
societies, that is their communal nature, such explanations were not recognised or considered as 
totally oppositional to the framework of the community, although in most cases they would be 
critical of community traditions (see Lulat, 2005; Oruka, 1992: 38). Apart from the given oral forms 
of indigenous HE in some parts of Africa, as emphasised above, there was a written form of HE 
that originated in Egypt. Lulat (2005: 3) argues that, long before the arrival of Western colonisation, 
some parts of Africa possessed institutions of higher learning, thus could boast of a tradition of HE 
in which the pursuit of knowledge was a worthy endeavour that any society would want to 
encourage. More importantly, Egypt piloted HE in the written form, which makes her one of the 
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world´s early great civilisations – the Egyptian civilisation. Evidently, the first examples of formal 
HE institutions3 in Africa can be traced to Ancient Egypt, where high arts, religious education, 
medical education and many other forms of education were enacted. This HE educational 
institution nurtured young generations as early as c. 2000 BC specifically their construction of the 
pyramids (Asante, 2011; Ashby, 1964: 96; Lulat, 2005: 44). Egypt completed the pyramids long 
before European HE had been initiated. As a result, the Bibliotheka Alexandrina4 is one of the early 
institutions of HE on the African continent. The nature of the HE offered was intended to satisfy the 
quest for knowledge, while taking into account the fulfilment of responsibilities relevant to the 
community and within a particular culture (Ajayi et al., 1966: 5). It is on these grounds that one can 
conclude that HE in Egypt strived to nurture knowledge in the people for the good of the 
community, while addressing daily issues. Riad, cited in Ajayi et al. (1996: 6), points out that: 
 
Scientists and men of letters lived in the [HE] institution. They were housed and fed 
and were able to give themselves up entirely to their research and students, with no 
menial duties to perform. Its organisation was similar to that of modern universities, 
except that the resident scholars were not required to give lectures. 
Considering the above analysis, African indigenous HE is diverse, not only in terms of the 
acquisition of knowledge (indigenous), but also in the degree of civilisation. As a result, African 
indigenous HE and Egyptian HE serve as forerunners of world civilisation, of which such an 
advanced knowledge was meant only for men. This education is justified as being of current 
significance and safeguarded by numerous African scholars, even in the 21st century. The 
foregoing affirms that African indigenous HE in the pre-colonial period emphasised high skills and 
knowledge to be imparted into boys and men for the well-being of the community. Girls and 
women, on the other hand, were assigned to inferior duties and unrecognised skills attributed to 
child bearing and rearing babies, looking after children, and caring for men and the elderly. This is 
one of the issues not interrogated in the marginalisation and keeping of women at the periphery of 
HE during that period. It could be summed up that women’s exclusion from AHE can be traced to 
pre-colonial times, and it is symbolic that women were not regarded as equal members of society 
in comparison with men, which clearly indicates how the pre-colonial period initiated a male-
dominated society. Considering the change from self-rule to Western colonial invasion, it is 
necessary to probe women’s involvement in AHE.  
 
                                            
3
 On the philosophical bases of an African university, Asante (2011) points out that, in the imposition of the Eurocentric worldview in HE, 
“there was a Greek at every corner’” but that the Greeks themselves “were but children to Africa, and to India and to China”.  
4
 This library became known as the greatest cultural repository of its time. It attracted all the leading scholars from the Egyptian, North 
African, Greek, Roman and Jewish worlds (Ajayi et al., 1996: 6). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
 
2.2.2 An account of the colonial period and women in higher education in Africa  
Africa has a long history of colonisation. The first wave was called ancient colonisation and began 
in Northern Africa from Europe and Western Asia as early as 570 to 526 BC, led particularly by the 
Greeks and Phoenicians (Lulat, 2005: 81). Since Islam started to spread in Africa in the middle of 
the 7th century, this is the period when Africa fell into the hands of Arabs, who brought the Islamic 
religion and Arabic language. Then came the early modern period, when the European states (the 
British, Dutch, French, German and others colonisers) engaged in the exploration of Africa, 
especially sub-Saharan Africa, in order to increase Western knowledge, to spread Christianity and 
to increase national esteem on the basis of colonisation. This period was followed by the famous 
phase referred to as the “Scramble for Africa” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One can infer 
that colonisation commenced in the period before the birth of Christ in different regions of the 
continent. In Wallbank’s (1964) analysis, colonisation of Africa stirred by a rapid change, tension 
and unrest that took place in the world in 1950s. These events led to a major political development 
in the Western world to invade the so-called “unchanging Dark continent” Africa (Wallbank, 1964: 
11). This is due to the fact that Africa appeared as a new factor in world affairs. It is said that the 
colonial rationale for increasing trade with Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, was that it 
promised an outlet for European capital and skills, would lead to a reduction in currency problems 
(especially the dollar shortage), provide access to valuable raw materials, and offer some 
possibility of an area for settling surplus population (Wallbank, 1964: 17). Taking the above into 
account, it is relevant to question the rationale for the introduction of European education in Africa 
and their objective to establish or not to HE on the continent. This reveals that the purpose was to 
fulfil the colonisers’ vision mainly to exploit the raw materials found on the continent for their 
benefit, while educating African men as their means of achieving their goal. 
Amongst the Western settlers who invaded the African continent were British, French, German, 
Italian, Belgian and Portuguese colonisers, and also some from East India, Arabs, Greeks and 
Syrians, who united to form a federation in different parts of the continent. In this way, Africa was 
demarcated and divided among some Western countries, as it was seen as a continent of potential 
resources. According to Wallbank (1964), Africa can claim to have one quarter of the earth’s 
potential cropland. It can be argued that the colonial states were more captivated by the richness 
of African natural resources, which were still raw and unexplored, than by the people and their 
development. In relation to HE, Ekong (in Rottenburg, 1986: 37) states that Western colonial 
powers had no interest in university education in their African dependencies. In spite of the above, 
some local colonial administrators initiated vocational training institutions to produce assistants to 
support the colonial ideologies in different countries in Africa.  
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2.2.2.1 Higher education in different Western colonial states in Africa 
Here I want discuss the education of the colonial states in different parts of the African continent, 
beginning with Afro-Arab Islam African colonial education. Since the Northern  part of Africa has 
been subjected to contested and complex scrutiny, primarily on whether it really is an African 
region, Lulat (2005: 107-108) points out that many Western writings on Africa tend to categorise 
the continent into Northern Africa and sub-Sahara (black) Africa, and question the Northern 
nations’ authentic position in Africa. Due to the combination of both the Western (Middle Eastern) 
Arabic language and African cultures, this part of Africa5, which is called Afro-Arab Islam, is 
legitimately African. The noticeable diversity in the different regions of the African continent can be 
attributed to the influences of the colonial invaders and traditions of the local people. Among the 
earliest manifestations of Western colonialism in Africa were colonial projects in Islamic education. 
In the Northern part of Africa, the west manifested itself in the form of religion, just as it did in other 
parts of the continent. These religions were Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which originated in the 
Middle Eastern desert and together hold sway over most of the globe today (Lulat, 2005: 60-72). It 
is worth mentioning that both Christian and Islamic-dominated regions developed vibrant centres of 
higher learning in Northern African countries. The development of Islamic HE, for instance, came in 
the form of madrasas, which means a school or university in Arabic. In Mali, a city called Timbuktu 
was home to one of the first places where a madrasa was situated. It is argued that, although the 
education might have been adequate for the needs of the people, it is viewed in terms of the 
transmission of ecclesiastical knowledge coupled with the production of mere religious 
administrative personnel for a modern era (Lulat, 2005: 60). This chapter begs the question: who 
attended HE the madrasas? Lulat (2005) is of the view that women and girls, unlike men and boys, 
were not necessarily regarded as being able to carry out the sophisticated task. Therefore, women 
were encouraged to learn basic skills related to their assigned place, which was the home, and 
their unrecognised gendered menial roles such as child bearing and rearing, taking care of their 
husbands and elderly.  
In relation to Anglophone colonial education in Africa, Ashby states that missionaries laid emphasis 
on British education. The British education system emphasised that “education should be adapted 
to the mental aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the various peoples, conserving as far as 
possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric of their society” (1964: 16-20). Ironically, 
regarding HE, the British education advisory committee did not give serious attention to universities 
in the colonies. Even so, the plea to offer HE was considered, but only a few institutions were 
established. Although various colonial governors expressed their satisfaction of the existing 
educational facilities, they feared that a sudden increase in facilities for HE would lead to an 
overproduction of graduates. The curriculum was fundamentally patterned in accordance with 
                                            
5
 Countries like Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sahrawi (west Sahara), Sudan, Tunisia and Egypt (Lulat, 2005: 108). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
23 
 
British civic universities in constitution, standards and curriculum. They demanded from their 
students, who were mostly men, the same entry standards as stipulated by London or Cambridge 
(Ashby, 1964: 20). Although there were few institutions of HE on the continent, all systems were 
prepared externally and transmitted to the few selected elite African male graduates, who were 
produced to serve the colonisers’ interests and sustain their ideologies. One can posit that HE in 
the British colonies, such as Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Malawi inherited an 
education system closely linked to the British one with the aim of fostering colonial ideology and 
maintaining male dominance. Ajayi et al. (1996: 37) confirms that English was used as the 
dominant mode of teaching and learning at universities in Africa, inspired and fashioned according 
to the British university tradition and knowledge. I construe from this is meaning that colonial 
universities in Africa were similar to those in England, which had the primary purpose of producing 
more men and few women with the standards of public and capacity for leadership that their 
colonisers required.  
In terms of Francophone colonial education, toward the end of formal colonial rule, HE was 
developed via France’s colonial mode of assimilation and association. The concept of association, 
according to Lulat (2005: 9-10), was a principle of indirect rule in which the indigenous rulers were 
not swept aside, but permitted to continue governing under the watchful eyes of the colonial power. 
Nonetheless, local values, practices and languages were totally discouraged in education, and the 
French language was used to assimilate people into the Western way of life and ensure that they 
discarded their indigenous languages and ways of life. Whereas French colonial rule sought to 
sustain the traditional madrasa system for the masses, it encouraged some degree of alternative 
secular education for a small group of the elite (Lulat, 2005: 10). Furthermore, Ajayi et al. (1996: 
38) stress that the purpose of French Western colonial education was the spread of their secular 
culture, with no interest in constructing HE for the African masses. Instead, they sent selected elite 
men to pursue their studies in France in order to feel at home there, rather than in Africa. These 
men were expected to become loyal upholders of French culture and colonial rule. In 
consequence, it is clear that the French colonial powers, unlike other Western colonisers, tried to 
assimilate the African people into their way of doing and encourage the natives to be like them. 
Above all, HE was not promoted in the French colonies, although general education was intended 
to educate Africans to be like their colonisers, although to remain inferior in all ways. Clearly, HE 
was discouraged and only a few elite male Africans were prepared to preserve the colonial 
ideology, which also advanced male domination.  
The influences of colonial states such as Belgium, Portugal, Germany and Italy on AHE can be 
traced in Africa – though for a short period – in comparison to other colonial states. According to 
Ajayi et al. (1996: 41-42), Belgian education focused more on elementary schools, meant solely for 
boys. The brightest and most obedient boys were selected to serve at mass and were sent for 
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training at one of the few established colleges. The content of such education, like that of other 
colonisers, had a strong emphasis on vocational, trade and technical education for the few who 
qualified for the priesthood. Mainly, boys were the only children who qualified for education and 
positions in priesthood during that period. The Belgian powers discouraged education that could 
lead to self-help, community involvement or HE. Like the Belgian powers, the Portuguese followed 
the same policy of cooperating with missionaries (Ajayi et al., 1996: 41). This simply meant that the 
Portuguese had less to invest in AHE and promoted limited elementary education. Such 
established elementary and few HE institutions were meant to cater for the needs of the children of 
Portuguese settlers, officials and a handful of the assimilados6. Clearly, the Portuguese had no 
interest in HE for African people, and particularly not for women. However, in a few African states 
like Somalia they cooperated with missionaries, while in Ethiopia they advocated a modernisation 
policy for the development of state-sponsored secular systems of education.  
 
In terms of Germany’s influences in Africa, Chapman (1995) posits that evidence of their colonial 
influence is expressed especially via the teaching of German in some of the South African and 
Namibian schools. This colonial state, like many others, was not interested in HE for the local 
people. Germany’s colonial power, spearheaded by Bismarck, was established to guide the 
acquisition of African territory. For instance, the invasion of Namibia met with resistance and revolt 
from the local people. It is worth mentioning that the earliest case of genocide in the 20th century 
was committed by the German government in Namibia (formerly called Germany South West 
Africa), where the Herero and Nama people were killed in August 1904 (Chapman, 1995). This 
event led to the demise of the German colonial regime in Africa. After the WWI, at the Treaty of 
Versailles, all German colonies in Africa were taken and redistributed among the European 
victorious allies, that to manage first as League of Nations Territories and under the trusteeship of 
the United Nations after WWII: Tanganyika, Western parts of both Cameroon and Togo for Great 
Britain; Eastern and largest part of both Cameroon and Togo for France; Rwanda and Burundi for 
Belgium; and Namibia for South Africa (Assié-Lumumba, 2006a). Thereafter, former South African 
colonial powers (descendants of the Dutch and Germans) called Afrikaners took over South Africa 
(SA) and the former South West Africa (SWA) Namibia from the Germany regime.  
 
Disconcertingly, these apartheid educational ideologies emphasised racial and segregated 
education for white, coloured, Indian and black Namibian and South African people. The education 
for black people focused more on post-primary education within what was called Bantu Education. 
This system focused more on industrial and agricultural as well as training institutions for teachers 
                                            
6
A term used to describe the African subjects of the Portuguese colonisers, while assimilation refers to a racist system that defined both 
progress and humanity as moving from that which was African to that which was European (Disney, 2010: 10). 
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and pastors (Ajayi et al., 1996: 31). Consequently, the aim of this education system was to train 
Bantu male youth to act as interpreters, evangelists and schoolmasters amongst their own people. 
Even so, there were Afrikaans-speaking universities and colleges that specifically barred the 
admission of non-Europeans. The reason for the reluctance to offer HE to Africans was that the 
colonisers feared that education would enable them to "swamp” the white communities, who were 
defending an island of European colonisation (Ajayi et al., 1996: 33, 53). Suffice to say that 
colonisation had a strong religious character and intended to brainwash the locals by imposing the 
colonisers’ ideology so as to weaken local knowledge and practices. 
 
2.2.2.2 Recounting colonial higher education and involvement of women in Africa 
 
AHE during the colonial period was highly structured to prepare people to serve as government 
machinery that maintained and promoted a colonial ideology in different regions and countries on 
the African continent. HE was neglected during the colonial era and was designed to fulfil the 
needs of the colonial powers, and thus was not suitable to serve the national development of the 
newly independent states (Magubushka, Schomburg & Teichler, 2007: 1). From the preceding 
discussion, I infer that religious and colonial education during the colonial period was basic and 
favoured men, rather than empowering all people, including girls and women. This colonial HE 
process had not only starved the African masses of education, but also sustained male domination, 
which has exacerbate the subjugation of women on the continent. From capturing the history, I 
recognise how African countries vary significantly from one another in ideology and features that 
influenced HE institutions. Different political and economic histories and geographical 
circumstances have created an array of situations in which such institutions function. At different 
periods, HE was used as a tool to discourage natives from ‘backward beliefs and practices’, and to 
assimilate them into Western colonial beliefs and trends of male domination. Also, despite the fact 
that colonial basic education was encouraged for the local people, specifically for males, HE was 
promoted only slightly but solely for the few, was highly elitist and irrelevant to the broader needs 
and contexts of Africa.  
 
So, I infer that African people were starved of education, specifically girls and women in 
comparison to men, which in a way promoted male domination on the continent. In sum, I have 
argued that both the pre-colonial and colonial education systems in Africa excluded girls and 
women from HE, which gave rise to a male-dominated society. This means that colonial education 
used mostly men to maintain colonial ideologies. The above portrayal of HE shows that a historical 
journey is required to have a deeper understanding of existing AHE. This makes sense, as Assié-
Lumumba (2006a: 15) cautions that studies of contemporary institutions require critical reflection 
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on the complexity and legacy that impede genuine transformation. Thus, it is necessary to trace 
the pedigrees of Western education systems and processes, and the agents of their transfer to 
Africa, to fully appreciate current achievements and make relevant suggestions. With this in mind, 
let me examine contemporary HE, paying attention to the continent’s transformative agenda. 
 
2.2.3 Post-colonial higher education in Africa and women’s involvement 
The notion of “post-colonial” can be explained in two ways: firstly, as a state that came after the 
colonial state; and secondly, as an ideology that a state uses to surpass or supplant colonial rule 
(Spencer, 2012). In this context, I will engage with both ideas, which underline the intention of 
liberation and independence on the African continent. At the time of independence, education, 
particularly HE, was expected to play a central role in the national project of social progress. 
However, “higher education is not the sole space but it is, without doubt, central to the acquisition 
and production of knowledge that shapes the contemporary world” (Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 9). In 
the period after independence, from the 1960s through the 1970s was regarded as a liberal and 
transformative period for the post-colonial society in Africa (Khelfaoui, 2009: 23). The first wave of 
creating African universities took place during the 1960s, which was declared by the United 
Nations as the “Development Decade”. Moreover, most independent African countries required 
concerted efforts to initiate substantial reforms. The theory of human capital was prominent in 
industrialised nation-states such as the United States of America (USA), where education was 
expected to be a powerful instrument for redressing the structural inequalities embedded in society 
(Assié-Lumumba, 2006b: 9). As a result, human capital theory became dominant in developing 
regions such as Africa. In spite of the continent’s struggle for political liberation, this theory of 
human capital was infused into the nationalist discourse and liberation agenda.  
The assumption of the theory is the creation of a linear and positive relationship between education 
and development, both at the individual and societal level, that is, the higher a person’s level of 
HE, the higher their productivity. For that reason, some African leaders such as Ghana’s Kwame 
Nkrumah, Senegal’s Leopold Senghor and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere thought it was imperative to 
transform education. Sawyerr (2002: 2) articulates the African idea of transformation as follows: 
  
Widespread university is essentially a postcolonial phenomenon … and only 18 out 
of 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa had universities or colleges before 1960. With 
the approach of political independence or immediately thereafter, many African 
countries regarded the establishment of local universities as a major part of the 
postcolonial national development projects. The new universities were to help the 
new nations build up their capacity to manage and develop their resources, alleviate 
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the poverty of the majority of their people, and close the gap between them and the 
developed world. 
This is illustrative of the way in which national leaders in Africa viewed and envisioned the 
transformation of HE on the continent. An example of a transformative agenda in African states 
incorporates the goals of post-colonial HE. During the conference of the Association of African 
Universities (AAU), held in Accra, Ghana in 1972 under the theme ‘Creating African Universities’, 
participants deliberated on the rising and increasing issues confronting African universities. At that 
conference, Rottenburg (1986: 52-54) asserts that participants agreed that, despite the fact that 
they had drawn their inspiration from the foreign Western HE institutions; it was essential to free 
themselves from intellectual domination and begin to derive incentives from their African 
environment and seek continuity with African tradition. Besides that, AAU tasked universities with 
“a commitment to active participation in social transformation, economic modernisation and the 
training and upgrading of the total human resources of the nation and not just small elite” (in 
Rottenburg, 1986: 52-54). Importantly, the AAU commitment appears to be a response to an 
urgent need for women’s inclusion and gender equality in AHE towards transformation. To achieve 
the above goal, African universities would have to adhere to fundamental roles7, of which the 
pursuit and dissemination of knowledge have to be locally motivated and orientated. Such 
fundamental roles, as prescribed by the AAU, demonstrate the African people’s aspirations and 
vision to break away from the colonial influences, and to include girls and women in HE. I am 
particularly fascinated by the AAU’s call for a transformative agenda towards the production of 
locally motivated knowledge that is relevant to local needs and aspirations.  
  
The foregoing roles have placed the university in a position as a conduit of transformation to 
educate manpower − specifically women. However, it is questionable to why AAU roles were 
silence regarding women’s access to HE, since they were side-lined in the pre-colonial and 
colonial epochs. In my view, the continent’s transformative commitment could not be realistic 
without an indication of the mechanism for the acceleration of women’s access to AHE. Providing a 
glaring image of women enrolment to HE in Africa, UNESCO-UIS (2009) showed that, globally, the 
enrolment ratios of women and men reached parity between 1970 and 2007. However, in Africa – 
                                            
7
“Research, fundamental and applied, priority being given to local problems to ameliorate the life of the ordinary person and especially 
the rural population; Provision of intellectual leadership to the population as well as to governments, industry and commerce, especially 
preparing and executing plans of economic and social development; Manpower development shifting its emphasis from academic to 
professional and practical, and participating in the planning, organization curriculum development and superintendence of institutions for 
training middle-level manpower; Promoting social and economic modernization through extension services to the small-scale 
entrepreneur, artisan and farmer, and itself setting an example in social cohesion and establishment and operation of democratic 
institutions; and Promoting inter-continental unity and international understanding, especially through its research and dissemination of 
knowledge contributing to the emancipation of the African continent from ignorance, and to the breakdown of barriers of artificial 
isolation imposed by colonialism as well as natural barriers of language and cultural separation; also identifying with and promoting the 
ideals of the Organization of African Unity for continent rapprochement and international understanding” (Rottenburg, 1986: 54-55).  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
 
taking Ethiopia and Mozambique as examples – a third or fewer tertiary graduates are female, in 
comparison with North America, Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and Central Asia, where 
female enrolment rates are higher than in Africa (UNESCO-UIS, 2009). The given statistics 
indicate that, internationally, the call for women’s access to HE had been made in the early 1970s, 
yet this appeal has not been given the priority it deserves in Africa. The point is that, although 
gender issues have drawn some attention in HE during these epochs, marginalisation along 
gender lines has been firmly identified throughout the African continent as constituting the most 
rampant expression of injustice in terms of access to and achievement based on educational 
opportunity.  
In the main, historical, cultural and economic factors have been identified that hindered women’s 
opportunities to access and derive benefits from formal education, and more so at tertiary level 
(UNESCO, 1998a). I echo Yesufu’s arguments that Africa adopted pro-Western liberal ideologies 
and capitalist systems, which conceived of HE as a fitting agent of development, imbedded in the 
notion of “development university”, with the mission to formulate relevant programmes and equip 
human resources with knowledge for the actualisation of the government’s project of national 
development (cited in Assié-Lumumba, 2004: 1). Given the above viewpoint, one can deduce that 
AHE is characterised by a systemic dependency and neo-colonial framework that represent 
agencies that do not necessarily take into account Africans’ perspectives and interests. On a 
similar note, Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 9) stressed that, in African states, HE institutions as social 
communities of higher learning are still being organised according to the parameters of the colonial 
legacy with regard to the nature of institutions, and the criteria for access to them. Even though 
AHE institutions have been mirrored after those of the former colonial powers, the African societal 
realities, needs, constraints and assets demand innovations that respond to local needs in search 
of transformation.  
Primarily, the postcolonial nationalist struggled for independence with the primary idea of having an 
equal right to have access to HE, with the aim of producing skilled manpower to run a modern 
government and economy, as well as for other areas of governance. The underlying assumption 
was that HE ought to be opened to all people in Africa, including girls and women. However, 
different studies argue that, if Africa was to succeed economically, culturally and politically, it must 
have a strong post-secondary/tertiary education sector, because academic institutions are central 
to the continent’s future (Assié-Lumumba, 2007; Teferra & Altbach, 2004; Waghid, 2011a). It is 
postulated that, although the state and trend of HE institutions in Northern Africa are considerably 
different from those in sub-Saharan Africa, which spurred diversity in terms of function and quality, 
there are common aspects such as financial resources, demand for access, the legacy of 
colonialism, and longstanding economic and social crises in many countries that affect their 
efficient functioning (Teferra & Altbach, 2004: 22-23). I agree that this backlog thwarts the 
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continent’s envisioned higher education commitment towards self-reliance. It also addresses the 
gender inequality that has been inherited from the previous epochs.  
Paradoxically, although AHE has risen to occupy an integral part of modern societies with the 
largest repository of certified knowledge focusing on the production of those certified as experts 
who possess the specialised skills and knowledge that societies need for their advancement and 
development, such experts were mostly men (Okolie, 2003: 238-239). One can argue that the 
focus on men to acquire such skills and knowledge, as it was in the colonial system, provoked 
male-dominated HE on the continent. Again, since AHE favoured men (just like the pre-colonial 
period) the post-colonial system has also failed to create an inclusive and equal environment for all 
people, including women. Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 18) says that, since most of Africa’s political 
leaders, bureaucrats and scholars are products of colonial education, this resulted in AHE 
institutions applying the same mechanism of excluding women from knowledge and leadership 
positions. One can say that AHE has largely passed colonial strategies and practices into the 
postcolonial education systems – a situation that deprives women of making valuable contributions 
to higher education. 
 Expressing a similar sentiment, UNESCO (1998b: 2) asserts that although there were no formal 
obstacles preventing women from reaching high positions in colleges and universities at the time, 
men still dominated at all levels of society. The above concern raises questions about why women 
are unable to obtain equal access, despite the fact that there are no explicit hindrances to such 
roles – therefore necessitating critical exploration. Sawyerr (2002) showed that, AHE policy has 
been shaped by international ideologies and events, specifically the neoliberal economic model 
that underlined increased application of market instruments in public management and a radical 
withdrawal of government funding. Taking into account the evolution of neoliberalism, I proceed to 
probe its influence on AHE. 
 
2.2.3.1 Neoliberalism and globalisation in higher education 
Conceptualising neoliberalist theory and its globalisation project, Novelli and Ferus-Comelo (2010) 
signify it as a hegemonic approach that perceives societies as functioning best when the market is 
left alone to determine distribution, production and consumption patterns. Neoliberalism represents 
a commitment to the primacy of markets and a belief that competition, both among businesses and 
in the provision of public services, best fosters growth and is the most efficient basis for social 
distribution (Novelli & Ferus-Comelo, 2010: 8-9). They further clarify that this theory emerged as a 
response by powerful factions of transnational capital supported by governments in the North to 
the economic recessions of the 1960s and early 1970s. So, the key elements of globalisation 
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comprise: a) the knowledge society; b) information and communication technologies; c) the market 
economy; d) trade liberalisation; and e) changes in governance structures across borders (Knight, 
2008: 5). To execute this ideology, policies were implemented, either voluntarily by national 
governments or through the disciplinary mechanisms of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) 
implemented in low-income countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as a condition for debt-ridden nations to receive access to 
international loans and grants. It is under these conditions that the World Bank drew up HE policies 
to implement the SAPs of neoliberalism. To get to grips with how this globalisation permeates 
AHE, it is vital to interrogate some of the World Bank HE policies in relation to women’s 
involvement.  
 
2.2.3.2 World Bank policies in African higher education in relation to women  
There are different themes that underscore neoliberal ideology and a call for the economic 
globalisation of HE in Africa. The idea was strongly imposed on higher educational policies across 
the developing countries by the World Bank’s SAPs in the 1980s (Ajayi et al., 1996). Because the 
World Bank is a main donor and leading agent, it introduced numerous major policies to support 
reform and implementation based on relevance, quality and efficiency. However, SAPs created a 
bottleneck for African states to achieve gender equality because of the permeation of globalisation 
in HE, which caused severe gender parity. This project created the assumption that exported 
industrial production inevitably would create possibilities for women’s inclusion in AHE, yet there 
were inherent predicaments.  
Firstly, lack of agency leads AHE to implement SAPs without contemplating their effects on its 
transformative agenda, specifically the promotion of gender equality and the inclusion of women. 
UNESCO (1998b: 1-3) maintains that, despite the fact that African countries have made efforts to 
implement various international policies and strategies to meet the challenges, is was unfortunate 
that such efforts have not sufficiently addressed both the needs of the people (inclusion of girls and 
women in HE) and the demands of a rapidly changing society. As a result, UNESCO elucidates the 
effect of globalisation on HE as follows: a) deterioration of working conditions and quality of 
academic staff and researchers; b) brain-drain; c) dwindling research and capacity; d) lack of 
teaching and research materials; e) decline in internal and external efficiency; and f) graduate 
unemployment, which affects the practices of HE and its focus on the needs of the people (1998b: 
3). Thus, these kinds of crises lead to strikes in some countries that are often countered with 
violence, resulting in damage to property and the closure of some universities. This portrayal in 
itself reveals how institutions of AHE, particularly universities, face difficulties in promoting 
educational development, which thwarts the attainment of women’s inclusion and gender equality. 
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Subsequent to some negative outcomes of this policy in Africa, the World Bank encouraged 
privatisation, coupled with careful planning and high standards of management in AHE. It is argued 
that, for public funding to play a more consistent role, students, institutions, business and 
philanthropy need to join hands. As a result, the World Bank (1994: 10) made a call for the optimal 
use of human and physical capital to encourage the development of new technologies for 
communication and the integration of developing countries into the global intellectual community. 
The World Bank stated that the financing of HE did not need to be limited to the public purse 
(1994: 11). For them, when HE is relying solely on public funding it leads to high dependency on 
government resources. This resulted in the call for private financing as a necessary possibility to 
alleviate the expenses of the governments. Ironically, this move prevented AHE from devoting 
resources to urgent needs, particularly responding to women’s access. One can argue that this 
introduction of private financing had negative effects on AHE advancing its initial goal of including 
girls and women in education.  
As a consequence, Jegede (2012), a Secretary General of the AAU, has indicated that, due to the 
economic SAPs, many governments cut public spending on HE, paving the way for the 
proliferation of private institutions. Currently, Africa has about 800 universities and more than 1 500 
tertiary institutions, but the proportion of private8 universities has risen radically, with a high 
concentration of private institutions demanding and backing marketable courses that out-compete 
the public universities regarding their high-earning programmes. One can conclude that HE in 
Africa is highly framed according to globalisation ideas of marketisation – impacting on the vital 
role of the public. It is on this basis that the establishment of private institutions of HE skyrocketed 
on the continent after the introduction of neoliberal policies. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether 
African countries will attain their national goal of democratisation and achieve the socioeconomic 
agenda, as this demands private financing of HE without considering the contextual needs of the 
people, especially access by women and other marginalised groups. If one looks at World Bank 
policy, there is a dominating voice for higher educational institutions to implement global economic 
policies as a condition for the provision of funding.  
I therefore agree with Amaral, Meek and Larsen’s claims that the World Bank seems to apply and 
enforce a “one model fits all” system, even in some impossible environments, in this case in Africa, 
where women are still gravely marginalised (2003: 14). More importantly, the above viewpoint 
demonstrates how the World Bank’s policies of structural development work against women’s 
access to HE. In my view, taking into account the African need to create space for the less 
                                            
8 Uganda has seven public and 27 private universities; in Somalia, all 40 universities are privately owned; Ethiopia has 22 public 
universities and more than 30 private institutions; South Africa has 23 public universities and 87 private institutions; Ghana has six 
public and 42 private universities; and Nigeria has 36 federal, 37 state and 45 private universities (Jegede, 2012). 
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privileged and marginalised groups, particularly women, requires special consideration. What is 
more, along with UNESCO, the World Bank convened a Task Force on Higher Education (TFHE), 
which brought together experts from thirteen countries to explore the future of tertiary education in 
developing countries. Their report, Higher education in developing countries: Peril and promise 
(TFHE, 2000), argued that HE is essential to developing countries if they are to prosper in a world 
economy in which knowledge has become a vital area of advantage. According to the TFHE (2000: 
32-33), this quality of knowledge “is becoming increasingly critical to national competitiveness”. 
One can clearly note how HE knowledge production is deeply embedded in the idea of becoming 
competitive in the world market, and ignores the local crises of gender inequality in AHE.  
A subsequent World Bank (2002) report, Constructing knowledge societies: New challenges for 
tertiary education, generated further momentum for HE. This report stressed the role of tertiary 
schooling in building technical and professional capacity and bolstering primary and secondary 
education. The Bank’s policy reiterated that the significance of universities rested in constructing 
knowledge societies in general, and in training a qualified and adaptable labour force, including-
high level scientists, professionals, technicians and teachers. Vital questions pertaining to the 
generation of new knowledge were to address the use and personal interest thereof. It is stated 
that HE should receive no more than 20 per cent of a country’s total education budget, but also 
argued that the state should create enabling frameworks to encourage tertiary education 
institutions (see Bloom, Canning and Chan, 2005). In this report, the World Bank explained why 
continuing public support for HE was necessary, while addressing the appropriate role of the state, 
as well as how to diminish the adverse effects of reforms. It had promised its support to tertiary 
education institutions in developing countries, and emphasised a comprehensive approach rather 
than the previous area approaches: 
 
Through effective partnerships with other multilateral institutions, national 
governments, NGOs, and the private sector, the World Bank aspires to apply its 
financial resources and extensive knowledge base toward increased efforts in the 
tertiary education and science and technology sectors, which will help create the 
foundations of democratic, knowledge-based economies and societies (World Bank, 
2002: 99). 
The foregoing quotation leads to the conclusion that, in order to minimise disputes within the 
institution, the Bank favours consensus building and solutions adapted to each society through 
effective management and financial modalities. In contrast, many countries in Africa were reported 
to be struggling to fulfil the agreement. As an example of challenging the World Bank policy on 
financial modalities, Malawi University academics and students were asking questions about why 
they had to be forced to get loans which they had not applied for (Brock-Utne, 2003). Among some 
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of the commitments and implementations of the World Bank globalisation policy by African states, 
it was evident in and attested to by various countries’ initiatives to implement the Bank’s advocacy 
in expansion, favouring the science and technology field over other fields (such as fine arts, social 
sciences as well as humanities) in HE (Bloom et al., 2005: 7-8). Noticeably, African states tried to 
adopt the Bank’s call to increase HE in promoting faster technological skills as a way of improving 
a country’s ability to maximise its economic output. Yet, although many universities in Africa, such 
as those in Malawi and Senegal, tried to implement policy that would enable girls and women to 
access education, it is evident that institutions put more emphasis on engineering, IT and 
vocational training for the market than considering other disciplines. To me, this seems to be a 
significant initiative in efforts to break the barrier to education experienced by women. However, 
authentic equality could only be attained when women are afforded enabling opportunities and are 
well prepared to excel in predominantly male fields such as engineering.  
So, it is doubtful whether this economically driven model that encourages cost sharing between 
donors and states and leads to private HE will indeed drive African states to economic 
development and create conditions in which women will excel. This is because HE structures and 
staff members focus on producing knowledge for the global market, rather than addressing local 
issues. In my view, the likelihood is high that HE may continue to disadvantage and exclude 
women, because these institutions are trying to answer the call for commoditised knowledge for 
the global market. The challenge of the globalisation policy in Africa lies in the way African states 
and their universities include the policies in their systems, as prescribed by the international 
donors. For me, the Bank’s policy, reinforced and determined by the provision of finance and 
loans, has put African states in a vulnerable position. This is because such institutions of higher 
learning end up intensifying their policies in relation to the need for the globalisation vision and 
ignore their context and local crises, such as the exclusion of women and other marginalised 
groups. It is clear that the World Bank (2000: 15) postulates that the global “markets require profits 
and this can crowd out important educational duties and opportunities”. The World Bank therefore 
perceives HE as a manufacturer of technicians for economic development, in which the few elites 
(mostly men) acquire technical skills for a competitive world. In this sense, those in possession of 
the commodity (knowledge) will determine and dominate AHE, whereas the under-represented will 
only marginally influence the production of knowledge. 
In an effort to address the above impasse, UNESCO (2002) brought together 120 participants from 
various universities in the world (Asia, Africa, Pacific, Arab states, Mediterranean, Europe, North 
America and Caribbean) as well as HE institutions, leading donors of the World Bank, and 
agencies. During this conference, the participants argued that globalisation in HE is associated 
with a substantial growth in international trade in the global markets. This growth is driven by 
political, economic and technological factors and there is no reason to expect a slowdown of the 
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process in the near future (UNESCO, 2002: 42). This depiction manifests how HE stakeholders are 
immensely polarised with regard to trade and markets in their institutions and have no space to 
cater for the needs of marginalised groups, particularly women, who have encountered and still are 
encountering exclusion. Those who strongly opposed the treatment of HE as a commodity or 
tradable service claimed this would negatively affect various regions of the world, but the hardest 
hit depended on the context, in this case Africa (UNESCO, 2002: 43). I agree with the UNESCO 
report that it is impossible to expect Africa, like other developing regions, to achieve the intended 
outcome of including previously excluded people, mainly women and the non-affluent or 
marginalised groups, in HE, given the World Bank’s pressing demand for a market-driven model. It 
is further argued that this situation has rather increased the vulnerabilities of women, who are 
already excluded and marginalised, since African universities in particular could not cope with the 
demand of producing knowledge for the market and responding to local needs, including 
addressing women’s marginalisation. Thus Knight (2008: 5-6) asserts that, due to each nation’s 
individual history, traditions, cultures, resources and priorities, globalisation has ultimately 
impacted negatively on the educational development at universities in these countries.  
In the light of the above, the second dilemma rests on the way the SAPs programmes seem to be 
imposed on developing countries and their educational institutions, particularly their universities. A 
study by Brock-Utne (2003) asserts that it is problematic when powerful and undemocratic 
international financial institutions use neoliberal frameworks to shape domestic policies that further 
deprive marginalised groups (women) of their basic human rights, especially inclusion in AHE. To 
illustrate this point, one example of SAPs, namely the imposed fees for access to basic education 
and far-reaching tuition fees for HE, directly reduced access of the most marginalised and 
vulnerable groups, particularly women. Equally, Assié-Lumumba (2006b) emphasises that the 
main outcome of the World Bank’s involvement in defining HE policy and financing priorities in 
Africa is the damaging implication for the efforts to bridge the gender gap in higher institutions of 
learning. In some post-colonial countries such as Mali, these policies were actually presented to 
parents as a compensation for the opportunity cost that imposed factors forbidding the enrolment 
of girls in schools. In my view, the World Bank promoted education for the deprived groups, in this 
case girls in schools, as a mechanism to increase women’s participation in HE in Africa. 
Nonetheless, such policies caused pressure on AHE, with its emphasis on knowledge for the 
global economy, which hinders the agency and capacity of local institutions to include women.  
The third issue is unequal distribution of investment, which reinforces women’s exclusion from 
AHE. Subbarao, Roney, Dundar and Haworth (1994: 28) posit that the World Bank’s policy on 
investment and unequal distribution influenced gender equality in HE on the African continent as 
early as the 1970s. The proportion of the World Bank’s education projects acknowledging gender 
was 28 per cent for the period 1972 to 1981, whereas the proportion of total investment in 
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education projects acknowledging gender was 16 per cent in the same period. However, between 
the 1980s and 1990s there was a clear “regional shift” in favour of South Asia, where the number 
of education projects acknowledging gender increased from 12 per cent to 38 per cent, and the 
investment in the projects recognising gender significance also increased, from eight per cent to 65 
per cent (Subbarao et al., 1994: 32). From this depiction, unlike Asia, Africa has been under threat 
between the 1970s and 1990s, which hampers the continent’s vision to address local needs 
especially gender inequality. This silence or discouragement through a lack of investment led to 
the non-recognition of women’s representation in comparison to the earlier period, and created 
imbalances in HE and its efforts to create space for female enrolment in HE. This was hampered 
by the World Bank’s SAPs, with their unequal distribution of investment in regions to reach gender 
equality.  
Fourthly, the absence of gender issues in the World Bank SAPs is made evident in Moja’s (2007) 
study, Politics of exclusion in higher education: The inadequacy of gender issues in the 
globalization debates. She pointed out that the phenomenon of globalisation is characterised by 
the absence of gender issues in the discourse on its implications for education and the policies and 
practices of the labour market. She emphasises the significance of women’s involvement in the 
discourse in all policies of globalisation. However, the challenge of taking women seriously as 
students, researchers, faculty members and educational leaders cannot be sacrificed if Africa is to 
develop a wealth of professional talent, skill, creation and innovation (Moja, 2007: 62-64). Despite 
several conferences calling for equal representation of women and their contribution to knowledge 
production and scholarship and as students in AHE, women are still shunned in such practices, 
which lead to their underrepresentation at all levels.  
Equally, Mlama (2007: 120) and Moja (2007: 62-64) argue that university curricula have remained 
generally non-responsive to gender issues, thus producing experts in the form of economists, 
engineers, teachers, planners, scientists, doctors and others who then go on to lead professional 
development sectors without the necessary skills to mainstream gender in the development 
process. It is undeniable that the impact of the pre-existing structural inequality that emanated from 
the colonial system and the capitalist economy has been intensified further by increasing global 
and national imbalances in access to power and resources, especially for African women (see 
Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 39). SAPs did not change the status quo, but rather stirred the under-
representation and exclusion of women. Thus, social progress can be achieved only through social 
inclusion of all members of African society, especially of the female population, which constitutes a 
half or more of the population (Assié-Lumumba, 2007: IV; Meena, 2007: 105). The point is that 
African universities ought to secure the inclusive institutions and knowledge production that are 
needed to break out of their developmental predicaments.  
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Examining HE in South Africa, Waghid (2012: 72) states that, with the legacy of apartheid 
[colonial], the production of knowledge which merely focusing on research, teaching and learning, 
and community engagement require a paradigm shift. In his view, the function of postcolonial 
universities ought to propel towards producing advanced, high-quality scientific knowledge and 
technology, to train highly skilled professionals and researchers as a necessarily workforce, and to 
cultivate a democratic citizenry through social engagement. Like other universities in Africa, South 
African universities also have limited impact on the citizenry, because, in the first case, they do not 
adequately address inequalities in terms of race, gender and disability, and do not contribute to the 
eradication of global problems such as poverty, environmental degradation and conflict. Secondly, 
universities do not commit themselves to the education of enlightened, informed and critical 
citizens, and can be said to be elitist because elitist education would not engender in students a 
capacity for judgement and for informed participation in democratic life. The point is that public 
universities pay more attention to producing knowledge for the market rather than instilling in 
people, specifically the marginalised groups, and the capacity to engage critically and demand their 
rightful spaces in a democratic society. Waghid (2012: 72) posits that such universities do not 
succeed in developing in students a questioning, critical and democratic attitude.  
I concur with Waghid’s position that African universities’ focus on producing knowledge for the 
market rather than producing democratic citizens has several effects, namely (a) universities 
remain sites of exclusive expertise, that is only the academics know best; (b) students (like many 
during the apartheid/colonial era and perhaps also today) do not have critical minds to initiate 
social change; and (c) universities remain representative of a small percentage of the population 
(as if scientific research of a high quality is the preserve of only a few privileged intellectuals). In 
this way, the knowledge monopoly remains confined to those who speak with authority and whose 
arguments are given priority because they speak with superior knowledge and rationality. In 
Waghid’s depiction, the contemporary African universities have the implication of commodified 
knowledge for the global market, rather than knowledge for responding to local needs, such as the 
inclusion of women and other marginalised groups. In the absence of democratised knowledge, 
universities in Africa would remain elitist and would not necessarily make a contribution to the 
democratisation of knowledge and society, which aims to produce students and academics from 
marginalised sectors, such as women, who eagerly wait to be taken up in the knowledge monopoly 
of such universities (Waghid, 2012: 72). In this respect, one can acknowledge the efforts made by 
the World Bank and other international donor agencies such as the IMF to widen HE in Africa. Yet, 
the focus of globalisation on the commodification of knowledge for the global market imposes 
difficulties on HE institutions in their bid to create institutional spaces in which all people flourish, 
irrespective of their background or lack of capacities to flourish. Taking the above predicament into 
consideration let me illustrate the effects of globalisation on women.  
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2.2.3.3 The effects of globalisation on women in higher education  
One of the primary responsibilities assigned to AHE was to promote the skills necessary for 
functioning effectively in an increasingly competitive global economy. Due to the severe effect 
imposed upon African universities by global forces, Zeleza refers to globalisation as a project of 
neo-liberalism where it has been “articulated primarily through SAPs and that globalisation 
throughout its projects has accelerated the corporation of unitary management, commercialization 
of learning and commoditization of knowledge” (2004: 42). As a result of this neo-liberalism project, 
the nature, governance and identity of scholarly discourse and pedagogical practices at 
universities in Africa have also changed. Zeleza (2004: 51-52) further traces the impact of 
globalisation on HE on the African continent through what he calls the “six Cs”: 
 
Corporatisation of management (adoption of business models for the organization 
and administration of universities); collectivization of access (growing massification 
of higher education, continuing education or lifelong learning, and accountability to 
outside stakeholders); commercialization of learning (expansion of private 
universities, privatized programmes in public universities and vocational training); 
commodification of knowledge (increased production, sponsorship, and 
dissemination of research by commercial enterprises, applied research, and 
intellectual property norms); computerization of education (incorporation of new 
information technologies into the knowledge activities of teaching, research, and 
publication); and connectivity of institutions (rising emphasis on institutional 
cooperation and coordination within and across countries). 
This introduces the debate on what one can expect of the interaction between HE systems and 
practices on the African continent and globalisation and neo-liberalism. Zeleza regards 
globalisation as the biggest challenge affecting HE on the African continent, showing how the initial 
mission of educating Africa’s citizens to become self-reliant is being compromised. Asserting the 
impact of globalisation, a 2005 survey of higher education by various economists (Mohamedbhai, 
2008: 12) shows that university as a traditional institution of higher learning is undergoing major 
changes, which are affecting them to the very core. There are four main reasons for this. Firstly, 
the democratisation of education in all states poses a threat to the traditional position of 
universities as institutions of HE for the elites; secondly, the rise of the knowledge economy has 
put pressure on traditional learning methods and the courses offered at universities; thirdly, the 
phenomenon of globalisation is turning higher education into an export industry; and lastly, 
competition comes into play, as traditional institutions have to compete for students, funds and 
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research grants. These are some of the aspects that negatively affect the African universities’ 
implementation of gender equality.  
To a profound extent, globalisation causes universities to adopt a neo-liberal discipline in the way 
they conduct their affairs, teaching and learning as well as governance and management. This 
simply means that universities in Africa perceive students as consumers of commoditised 
knowledge and competitors in the global market, rather than as transformers of the past 
imbalances and injustices on the continent. Nonetheless, I agree that the onus is on African 
leaders of both states and universities to prepare themselves to navigate through these 
complexities. This simply means that the management and leadership of African universities 
should take a new look at the way in which they adopt the external policies that Amaral et al. 
(2003: 14) call the “one model fits all”, so as to redefine these and make them relevant to the 
context, particularly in relation to advancing gender equality. The point I am making is that 
globalisation can be regarded as another form of enslavement and indoctrination, considering its 
influence on the state discourses and governance systems, as well as the way it affects higher 
education arrangements and practices on the African continent. I concur with Yizengaw’s (2008: 
10) viewpoint that weak leadership in management and governance exacerbates the challenges 
faced, as management inefficiencies drain scarce resources away from the fundamental objectives 
of increasing access, quality and relevance and thinly spread human and financial resources.  
This prioritisation of the international demands of knowledge production for the global market 
certainly leaves HE without agency to fulfil the goal of producing self-reliant citizens who can 
address local challenges, such as gender inequality. Divala (2008: 175) argues that universities in 
Africa had to adopt, negotiate and struggle with the neoliberal forces and concomitantly had to 
achieve transformation towards “localised” relevance and “globalised” recognition and 
competence. This has affected most of the universities’ operations, from the kind of knowledge 
pursued and recruitment of teaching staff to student enrolment and graduation rate imperatives. 
The point is that even though African countries, through their Ministries of Education, have taken 
on the task to pursue a number of strategic objectives, including improved access, participation 
and equity with an emphasis on science and technology education and training and decentralised 
management and efficiency gains, the whole project is demanding. One can concede that the 
acquisition of knowledge to navigate through the complexities of this world is a necessity for 
everyone, especially in the light of the fact that the gross enrolment ratio (GER) has increased to 
five per cent in sub-Saharan Africa; however, gender disparities have traditionally been wide and 
remain so since 2005 (UNESCO-UIS, 2009: 2). It is clear that there has been and still is a gap in 
gender parity in African universities, which ties in with the way such institutions are run – according 
to the adoption of international policies. Hence, the sudden explosion of AHE is seen as a lucrative 
and viable commodity that requires good leadership to succeed in engendering equality.  
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2.2.3.3.1 Women’s representation as students and staff members in higher education 
There are conflicting influences to the enrolments of women to AHE due to the SAPs’ and 
globalisation project which positioned learning into a mere technical and professional fields at the 
expense of humanities and basic sciences.  Ironically, statistics illustrate that there has been an 
increase in the raw numbers of female students in HE. Nonetheless, high attrition rates in the lower 
levels of the education system comprises a persistent dilemma, as this leads to low enrolment at 
the HE level (Meena, 2007). Regarding the representation of women as students, Yizengaw (2008: 
10-13) points out that the problems are mismanagement and divergence in adopting the World 
Bank policy as reflected by the gross enrolment ratio of female students remained at around 2% 
between 1995 and 2004, compared to 5% and above for male students. In 2004, of the 3.4 million 
total student enrolment in tertiary education, the proportion of female students was only 38%, while 
the enrolment of female students in mathematics, science and engineering was particularly low. 
UNESCO-UIS (2009: 15-16) illustrates the disparity in growth between men and women in sub-
Saharan Africa. Some statistics on the disproportion among students who have access to HE 
shows that approximately 6.8% are male while 4.5% are female. These statistics mean that, for 
every 100 male students enrolled in 2007, there were only 66 female students.  
The preceding statistics reveal that women are at the margin of HE in Africa in comparison to men, 
which incite gender inequality. I argue that universities in Africa are integral sites by virtue of their 
emphasis on the production of knowledge and research; however, they also perpetuate gender 
biases, which to a large extent is problematic. Even if women have access to HE, they will not 
secure better work prospects, since they are excluded from the dominant disciplines, which are 
reserved for men. The foregoing picture demonstrates that gender inequality is evident in AHE 
based on the discrepancy on opportunities for female in comparison to their male counterparts. 
One can concede that HE in Africa continues to lag behind in addressing the equal access of 
female students in comparison to their male counterparts. As a result, Kyomuhendo (2001: 10) 
calls for a re-examination of the systems, structures, norms and values of society that govern and 
define the universities and their ways of operation, which are distinctly patriarchal in nature.  
The low representation of women as staff members and academics can be linked to the under-
representation of female students in AHE. The concern is that women access disciplines that are 
considered as lower in value that will not necessarily secure them good work prospects in society. 
Yizengaw (2008: 10-13) shows that the number of female teaching staff was just 4% in 2004, 
which had a negative impact on the number of women researchers in AHE. A UNESCO-UIS report 
(2009) claims that women are under-represented and under-measured in science in AHE, and that 
women still have a long way to go to attain parity in employment. At the same time the report 
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pointed out that, women made up approximately 25% of the world’s researchers. The argument is 
that under-representation of women in research activities can be traced back to education 
systems, particularly at the higher education level. It is proposed that other aspects, such as 
stereotyping, work-life balance, labour market conditions, governance and the role of researchers 
in society may also hinder women’s access to continuity and advancement in research positions. It 
is questionable whether AHE institutions ought to equip women with research capability and 
expertise to contribute to a democratic society.  
Taking into account the figures provided above, one can conclude that women’s exclusion in AHE 
is connected to their consistent under-representation in AHE teaching, research and academic 
administrative positions. For instance, Meena (2007) points out that, while women are minimally 
included, and really marginalised, many tend to be clustered in the lower levels of the academic 
occupational ladder. Mama (1996) affirms that various mechanisms have been introduced that are 
aimed at eliminating gender inequality by establishing gender-focused academic units and 
programmes in teaching and learning, and research on relevant learning and knowledge 
production, these seem to have proved futile. Stromquist (1997) attributes their exclusion to the 
relationship between the empowerment of women and the structural gender-based power relations 
in AHE and society at large. Therefore, there is a need to interrogate the structures and 
encompassing values that the HE system itself reproduces. This verifies how gender disparity has 
been a concern for many researchers on the continent, and persists. 
  
2.2.3.3.2 African university as an ivory tower to women  
The effect of globalisation on women in HE underlines that knowledge production with regard to 
women and gender from an African perspective is imperative (Assié-Lumumba, 2007: IV). Cloete 
(2002) points out that many emerging global knowledge partnerships and research networks 
continue to be dominated and controlled by men in areas that are historically gender biased, such 
as research and consulting. Using a South African example, Cloete (2002) argues that research 
remains in the hands of white males, as was evident from the research, which found that men 
produced 83% of the scientific output between 1990 and 1998. This simply implies that women are 
less likely to engage in research, and hence men dominate knowledge production. In so doing, 
knowledge production has been and continues to be produced to the advantage of its producers, 
who are men, and relegates issues related to women to the periphery of HE. Chachage (2001: 8) 
contests that: 
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The tying of education to the apron strings of the 'market' is essentially an 
imposition of restrictions on those forms of knowledge that aim at raising larger 
social and political issues ... The fundamental objectives of the university – scientific 
inquiry, pursuit of knowledge and the search for the whole truth in the interest of 
social transformation – are increasingly being relegated to the position of what 
cynics of institutions of higher learning consider to be mere 'ivory tower' ('elite', 
'luxury' and 'esoteric') activities. 
A close consideration of the above citation emphasises the point that, even during the postcolonial 
period, universities seem to maintain the traditional way of favouring some model and imposing 
their hegemonic form of knowledge for their own sake, rather than that of the public. It is with this 
understanding in mind that I use the words of Chachage (2001: 8) to refer to the African university 
as an “ivory tower”. One can vividly conceive that the production of knowledge in public AHE, like 
elsewhere in the world, is faced with competing perspectives in terms of what, for whom, and in 
whose interests they are producing knowledge, i.e. that they are responding mainly to local 
aspirations and the needs of the 21st century. It is evident that the initial goal that Africa would 
produce self-reliant citizens who can respond to local needs, especially the inclusion of 
marginalised groups such as women, has been wiped away and moved to the periphery of 
educational discourses and practices. Thus, knowledge production in AHE remains in the hands of 
the powerful and a few elites (mostly men). 
The UNESCO-UIS (2009) report acknowledges that women are faced with considerable barriers 
when pursuing HE on the continent. As a result, the patriarchal system persists and men remain 
dominant in accessing HE as students and researchers, retaining leadership positions and 
determining the form of knowledge to be offered (see Meena, 2007; Mlama, 2007). Women 
continue to depend on men to produce knowledge for their benefit, rather than contributing to it 
themselves. Sawyerr (2004) poses a profound question regarding male-dominated roles in HE 
that: what is the way forward when universal patriarchal power appears so hard to denaturize? In 
his view, instead of picking on the negative factors only, it is equally important to critically examine 
the factors in African culture that are empowering for women (Sawyerr, 2004). Considering this 
call, it therefore is essential to interrogate why women continue to be excluded and what is keeping 
them at the edge of HE and knowledge production, access to which could empower them for social 
growth. I contend that, despite the call for women’s empowerment, contributions from women 
appear to be at the periphery of HE decision making, and their voices are not heard in educational 
discourses, i.e. in research and at all levels of leadership.  
In essence, my argument is that globalisation lives itself out in different ways and permeates HE on 
the continent. Thus, one cannot go without restating various dissatisfactions of the effects of 
globalisation on AHE, especially its radical call for a market model, as is evident in the work of 
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African scholars such as Assié-Lumumba (2007), Mlama (2007), Meena (2007), and Waghid 
(2011a, 2012). Moreover, Adesina (2006: 3-5) delimits globalisation as the neo-liberal conservative 
ideology and mind-set that shaped the idea of education as a public good and that was replaced by 
a commodity logic that insisted on applying the market as a resource-allocative mechanism to the 
sector. The dilemma lies in the commodity approach, which misinterprets the valid importance of 
universities, especially in the African context (Adesina, 2006: 15-16). This simply means that 
universities need do much more than transmitting marketable skills, and should focus on the 
primary roles of the production and dissemination of knowledge as a public good, rather than solely 
on the market. I agree with Waghid (2012: 72) that university education is distinct from and should 
not try to replicate the functions of technikons (polytechnics), but rather take as its role equipping 
people (both men and women) with technical know-how and with democratic virtues such as 
critical thinking, respect and caring, to mention a few, which seem lacking in our postcolonial 
university system.  
 
2.3. Link between higher education in Africa and women’s contribution to knowledge 
production 
The idea of globalisation has radically distorted the ideals of HE in Africa in terms of research, 
development and knowledge production, particularly the call for the commoditisation and 
marketisation of knowledge, which have a negative impact on women’s access to HE institutions, 
to employment as well as to making a contribution to knowledge. This situation is attested to by the 
number of women who are researchers and academics, as well as the number of publications on 
the continent. Subotzky (1999a: 1) asserts that this negation allows universities to generate new 
organisational forms, practices and knowledge production, with an emphasis on entrepreneurial 
skills, characterised by increasing market-like behaviour and governance, which are already 
dominated by men. He further claims that, on one hand, HE is under pressure to become more 
market oriented and to respond to rapid changes in technology and knowledge production, while 
on the other hand it is expected to work for the benefit of society, promoting social equity and 
responding to community needs, such as including women in AHE (Subotzky, 1999b: 34). The 
assumption is that AHE ought to address the under-representation of women in its institutions, yet 
rather focuses on producing knowledge for the global market. This places women in the 
disadvantageous position of further exclusion. The point is that, even though the World Bank has 
made an effort to finance institutions to implement this globalisation ideology, it concurrently 
expects them to solicit money or fundraise to sustain themselves. This idea posed a major threat to 
HE in Africa, which triggered high fees.  
As a result, universities have become elitist institutions producing knowledge for their own sake, 
rather than for the public need, and most importantly not addressing the gap of women’s 
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participation and their lack of contribution to knowledge on the continent. This impasse leads public 
universities to increase their fees as a way of sustaining themselves, and thereby abandon the 
continent’s initial agenda of transforming HE by making it accessible to all people, particularly 
women. There is a link between HE and knowledge production, whereby universities can be 
related to a market where knowledge has to be bought as a product (Knight, 2008: 13). This 
means that education is perceived as a private good for individual consumption and benefit, and 
only those who possess the capital and are already well prepared to access such markets will get 
the best products. Most male students tend to follow IT and science subjects due to high funding 
allocations in those fields, while fewer (female) students register for Humanities and Social Science 
subjects. In this way, women are unable to access institutions of HE due to their economic and 
social status and capacities. I reiterate the Commonwealth Secretariat’s (1999: 10) position that a 
more truly gender-responsive culture requires gender equity in access, the redressing of structural 
barriers that influence the access and participation of both sexes, and women’s active role in 
decision making in the management and administration of HE. Conversely, African universities 
appear to discard their national obligation to realise their social interest − mainly attaining equality 
and inclusion − when these continue to provoke women’s lack of access to knowledge production.  
 
2.4. Delineating the position of women in higher education on the African continent: 
Concluding remarks 
In this concluding section, I wish to highlight the position of women in HE in three epochs. The 
argument is that HE was found in Africa even in the pre-colonial era. Yet HE skills and knowledge 
were meant mainly for boys and men, which gave rise to male-dominated institutions. Ajayi et al. 
(1996) pointed out that men were seen as valuable agents to bring about national development 
and therefore were held responsible for the well-being of women and children. Women were 
educated with low-level skills, while men were equipped with arts and music and so forth for 
societal evolvement. Upon the arrival of the colonisers, HE was not a priority and few institutions 
maintained the male-dominated education system. Such institutions were vehicles to impart 
Western ideology and ways of life to African people. The perception was that African culture and 
ways of knowing were uncivilised and primitive, thus in need of Western civilisation to change. 
Within the context of post-colonial HE in Africa, human capital was a dominant theory that drove 
HE systems from the 1970s, followed by the neo-liberal project of globalisation, which emphasised 
knowledge production as a commodity in the global market. Students were expected to access 
such social institutions to acquire special knowledge. However, with the legacy of the patriarchal 
system and male-dominated spaces, HE institutions worsened the lack of women’s access to such 
institutions and their under-representation in knowledge production. The main theory that 
underpins HE in Africa is neo-liberal theory, with its globalisation project resting on capitalism as an 
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economic driver for nation-state development. The expectation is that people need to be educated 
with technical skills and knowledge to be human resources to boost the economy of their countries. 
This ideology of producing technocrats with technical know-how does not have the ethos of caring 
for others, since there is a greater concern about what is produced (the end product), than with 
who produces and how the perceived prominent knowledge is produced.  
Consequently, marginalised groups such as women – either as students or researchers – remain 
at the periphery of HE in a democratic system, as they have been in the pre-colonial and colonial 
periods. This clearly demonstrates how HE rather is interested in sustaining economic 
development at the expense of the people. I argued that the World Bank’s policy of globalisation 
pervades HE policy and practices, and has encumbered the continent’s initial transformational 
agenda of improving the lives of the people and educating self-reliant citizens. Because AHE 
adopted the commodification of knowledge, it will not be possible to have concern for people, 
especially for marginalised groups (particularly women). The dilemma is that the universities are 
turned into markets and continue to exclude women as students and staff members, which 
invariably results in gender inequality on the continent. In this way, universities in Africa could be 
referred to as “ivory towers” that are favourable to the male gender and retaining their position in 
terms of marginalising women. People in such institutions therefore cannot really learn how to 
demonstrate concern and care for others, since their practices are driven and determined by 
economic, rather than human, interests.  
 
Considering that World Bank policy drives current policy evolution in HE in Africa, it emphasises 
knowledge as a commodity and remains silent on how other aspects, such as gender equality and 
empowerment, can be construed in its discourses. Thus, I contend that the above disproportion 
has created a dichotomy that poses a threat to the initial goals of social interest, and thus 
perpetuates inequality and lack of inclusion through an emphasis on knowledge as a commodity 
for the global market. The next chapter examines the conception of inclusion as Ubuntu and 
gender equality from different theoretical perspectives. The focus lies on how Ubuntu as a local 
world view can assist in bridging the gap of gender inequality in AHE. And why AHE practices 
should not be divorced from local needs, but rather be connected to both local and global 
practices.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTIONS OF INCLUSION AND GENDER EQUALITY IN AFRICAN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter has shown that AHE during different epochs, and particularly in the post-
colonial era, which is the focus of this study, has excluded women as students and staff members. 
Their exclusion resulted in gender inequality, despite the shift to democratic rule claimed by many 
African countries. In this chapter, the notion of inclusion, which could be construed as Ubuntu from 
an African philosophical perspective, will be examined in the light of a number of theories drawn 
from African, Western liberal, and post-liberal perspectives. Each of these perspectives provides a 
particular understanding from which the notion of Ubuntu can be understood as inclusion. This 
could provide a broad understanding of what inclusion means and how gender equality could be 
achieved in a post-colonial democratic HE system in Africa. I argue that AHE continues to exclude 
women in diverse ways, despite numerous expansion policies such as affirmative action. Since the 
concept of inclusion requires critical interrogation, I begin by probing the existing understandings of 
Ubuntu by different African scholars. Secondly, I examine and synchronise Western liberal views of 
inclusion in an attempt to offer an extended view of Ubuntu. Lastly, I draw on a post-liberal 
Rancièrean perspective of equality of voice to frame Ubuntu as the inclusion of all people, 
particularly women, in a post-colonial AHE system. In the main, my exposition of the notion of 
Ubuntu is premised on an understanding that AHE requires an indigenous concept in terms of 
which the inclusion of women in HE can be secured. And, if the notion of Ubuntu can be framed 
differently, the possibility that women will be included equally in HE might be realised. 
 
3.2 Towards an African Conception of Inclusion in Understanding Higher Education 
In conceptualising inclusion, I draw on some African scholars’ conception of Ubuntu to foster 
women’s inclusion in HE in Africa. However, it will be helpful first to consider the context of an 
African philosophy of Ubuntu9 (humanness). Ubuntu is a world-view and a contextually guiding 
concept of Afrocentricism10. According to Van Binsbergen (2002: 6), Ubuntu is a revived African 
                                            
9
 The root of the term Ubuntu is ntu/nhu, or human, or person and similar terms are found in other African languages, such as nit in 
Wolof, nti in Egyptian, and neddo in Peul. The designation of a person by a generic term meaning human is evident throughout Black 
Africa, starting with Egypt (Diop, 1974:198). I would add that omunhu/ntu (a person) and ounhu/ntu (humanness) occur in the Namibian 
Oshiwambo (Oshimbadja) language. 
10
 Afrocentrism is a worldview that considers African people and their values, cultures, histories, collective struggles, needs and 
aspirations to be central to the interpretation and utilisation of their normative concepts. Afrocentricity commonly contends that 
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concept that does not only focus on a particular locality or region, but rather on the entire continent. 
De Tejada (cited in Ramose, 2002: 324) sees Ubuntu as a way of life and practice of many 
Africans in most parts of the continent, especially in those regions stretching “from the Nubian 
desert to the Cape of Good Hope and from Senegal to Zanzibar”. However, Ramose explains that 
this geographical delimitation is problematic, since it creates a barrier to the desert as Africa's 
birthmark, and therefore obscures the meaning and import of human interaction on the continent 
before the desert sneaked in. This means that connecting a philosophy of Ubuntu to a 
geographical location may delimit the relevance to the entire continent.  
So, the concept of Ubuntu is used in several Bantu languages, e.g. Zulu, Xhosa and Ndebele; 
botho is the equivalent term in Sotho, and hunhu in Shona, which then presupposes that Ubuntu 
manifests an African philosophical way of life, in terms of which each person is regarded as a 
human being who may engage in all processes of knowledge (Mapaure, 2011: 160). Ubuntu 
corresponds to ‘umundu’ (in Kikuyu, Kenya), ‘umuntu’ (in Kimeru, Kenya), ‘bumuntu’ (in kiSukuma 
and kiHaya, Tanzania), ‘vumuntu’ (in shiTsonga and shiTswa, Mozambique), ‘bomoto’ (in Bobangi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo), and ‘gimuntu’ (in kiKongo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
in giKwese, Angola) (Kamwangamalu 1999, 25-26). In addition, Waghid (2009: 76) confirms that 
Ubuntu means “human interdependence through deliberative inquiry … [that] exists in most of the 
African languages, although not necessarily under the same name”. In other words, an African 
philosophy of Ubuntu is not something new; it must have existed among the peoples of Africa since 
ancient times. Hence, in order to understand fully the fundamental nature and significance of 
Ubuntu, one has to approach it both pragmatically and conceptually in order to relate it to AHE. I 
will now turn to the underlying idea behind African philosophers’ conceptualisation of Ubuntu as an 
opportunity for the inclusion of all people, and particularly women, in AHE. 
 
3.2.1 Ubuntu as inclusion – an African perspective 
Ramose (2002) describes a comprehensive conception of Ubuntu – a notion that exists in many 
Bantu languages. For him, Ubuntu could be perceived in terms of three maxims: “The first maxim 
means that to be human is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, on 
that basis, establish respectful human relations with them …. “the second maxim means that if and 
when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of another 
human being, then one should opt for the preservation of life”. The third maxim is a “principle 
                                                                                                                                                 
approaching knowledge from a Eurocentric perspective, together with certain mainstream assumptions applied to information in the 
West, has led to injustices and inadequacies in meeting the needs of African people – here meaning indigenous black Africans and 
those in the African Diaspora. The Afrocentric paradigm therefore seeks to discover and interpret information through African eyes, 
utilising it in ways that ensure benefits for Africans (Mapaure, 2011: 159-160; Van Binsbergen, 2002: 4). 
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deeply embedded in traditional African political philosophy”, which says “that the king owed his 
status, including all the powers associated with it, to the will of the people under him” (Ramose, 
2002, 324-325). This implies that the concept of Ubuntu is a personified way of life – a word with 
no English equivalent.  
The first designation means “a person is a person through other persons”, which is the meaning of 
the Zulu maxim, “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (Ramose, 1999: 49). This shows how the being of 
an African person is not only embedded in the community, but in the universe as a whole. This is 
articulated mainly in the prefix ubu- of the word Ubuntu, which, refers to the universe as being 
enfolded, containing everything. The stem -ntu means the process of life as the unfolding of the 
universe by concrete manifestations in different forms and modes of being. This process includes 
the emergence of the speaking and knowing human being (Ramose, 2002: 325). As such, this 
being is called umuntu or, in the Northern Sotho language, motho – one who is able by common 
endeavours to articulate the experience and knowledge of what ubu is. Thus, -ntu stands for the 
epistemological side of “being”. This is the wider horizon, in which the intersubjective aspects of 
Ubuntu should be seen. Mutual recognition and respect in the different intersubjective relations are 
parts of the process of unfolding of the universe, which encompasses everything in the speaking 
and knowing of human beings. In the main, Ubuntu as a philosophical concept is associated with 
the being of a person, which is determined by his or her association with other persons in 
intersubjective community.   
Ramose (2002: 325) underlines the oneness and wholeness of this on-going establishment of 
community. One can surmise that the oneness of African philosophy is perceivable in the plurality 
of its voices, and that no voice should be disregarded in the whole community of engagement. In 
particular, the notion of Ubuntu underlies the communalism by which the African community is 
characterised. For Ramose, the meaning of Ubuntu indicates that there is an elevated judgment of 
the community in African thought and practice, which is greater than that of the individual, but that, 
does not take place at the expense of overlooking the individuality of the person. A person is a 
person in the community, and his or her individuality is exercised through others in that community. 
This attests to a culture of mutual relations, of caring for one another and sharing with one another. 
The notion is not only expressed in African languages; it is also practised by talking to one another 
in dialogue – in this case in AHE. One therefore could infer that Ubuntu clearly exhibits an 
opportunity for inclusion, that is, one in which everyone (women and men) is included in 
deliberation. If it is correct that AHE upholds Ubuntu, then no one is supposed to be excluded and 
their voices will be heard in policy and decision making. The point is that the underlying principle of 
Ubuntu emphasises a community in which every member is included and in which each of their 
voices is heard. Although there might be some disagreement between members, for instance in 
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the AHE community, each member could depend on other members of the community for 
sustenance and support.  
Furthermore, Tutu (1999, pp. 34-35) underscores the significance of Ubuntu as inclusion as 
follows:  
 
Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks to the very 
essence of being human. When you want to give high praise to someone we say, 
‘Yu, u Nobuntu’; he or she has Ubuntu. This means that they are generous, 
hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also 
means that my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong 
in a bundle of life. We say, ‘a person is a person through other people’ (in Xhosa 
Ubuntu ungamuntu ngabanye abantu and in Zulu Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye). I 
am human because I belong, I participate, and I share. A person with Ubuntu is 
open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that 
others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes 
from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when 
others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, treated 
as if they were less than who they are.  
The citation above implies that Ubuntu as a way of life is unique to African thought and practices, 
which implies that AHE cannot be dismissive of the concept, specifically as it regards the inclusion 
of women. The concept of “I belong, I participate and I share” could be said to underscore what it 
means to cultivate an inclusive environment. Again, the phrase “a person is a person through other 
people” assumes that, when some people are excluded and mistreated, others should act to 
address the problem. In other words, when women, for instance, are humiliated or oppressed, they 
are regarded inhumanely, and this points to the absence of Ubuntu in the practice. In addition, 
Wiredu (2004) points out that an African philosophy of Ubuntu as inclusion cannot be articulated 
without any reference to what it means for a person, specifically an African – whether a man or 
woman – to be educated. For Wiredu, African higher educational discourses need to shape human 
action in a way that is comparable with and analogous to its fundamental ideas, meanings and 
practice (in this case Ubuntu) within its context, that is, Africa. No doubt an educated person 
upholds reasonable knowledge of her culture and environment, and demonstrates the ability to 
construct and articulate justifiable arguments. In other words, if African people’s way of life is 
constituted by Ubuntu, their customs and practices should manifest such values. Thus, AHE ought 
to act out the democratic element of Ubuntu, that is, inclusion, in which all are acknowledged as 
equal members of the same community. By so doing, all students nurtured in such institutions 
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would be able to engage in deliberations and offer reasons why women and other marginalised 
groups are excluded and treated unequally.  
In response to the aforesaid, Wiredu (1996) explains further that, since African philosophy is a form 
of analytical inquiry, Ubuntu should aim at reformulating and shaping the current African polity 
(including that of higher education) on the basis of consensus, negotiation and reconciliation. 
Taking into consideration the above view and the practice of Ubuntu in AHE, everyone (women 
and men) should engage in discussions and negotiations about issues of concern in order to reach 
consensus without disregarding those views that seem under-developed. As a consequence, in 
that environment, women could be included and their points of view recognised, since people 
engaging in dialogue presumably subscribe to Ubuntu. Nonetheless, Maathai (2009) asserts that 
women’s exclusion is due in particular to the elongated colonial ideology and patriarchal system 
that perceives a woman as inferior and as someone who may not be treated equally in relation to 
men. I contend strongly that, in the absence of a legitimate form of Ubuntu in HE in Africa, the 
exclusion of women will continue to permeate post-colonial education practices.  
To accentuate the analytical aspect of African philosophy, Appiah (1996) asserts that Ubuntu 
should evaluate arguments relative to a particular culture, and that such arguments relate to 
Africa's intellectual heritage. He notes further that Ubuntu may create possibilities for African 
people to “understand each other as reasonable” individuals who are determined to treat one 
another with respect within a community of practice (Appiah, 1996: 134). This implies that Ubuntu 
should not be regarded as a faultless worldview, but as a concept with merit that could be explored 
in order to assist in recognising others as reasonable. As such, no educational institution in Africa 
could claim to practise Ubuntu without affording equal space to all to contribute reasonably to all 
pressing issues. Thus, Appiah's notion of recognising others as reasonable beings should be at the 
centre of Ubuntu as an inclusive philosophy in African societies, including in the HE community. 
However, since some people (mainly women) are often excluded, the practice of Ubuntu as 
inclusion requires further scrutiny and expansion. Appiah’s call for a critical reflection on our 
understanding and practice of fundamental concepts such as Ubuntu in order to bring about 
change in the educational community of engagement makes sense (Appiah, 1996: 135). One 
would support the call for a critical engagement with and reflection on the concept, as it could help 
to address the problem of the absence of Ubuntu in African educational institutions, which has led 
to the exclusion of women. Equally, Letseka (in Waghid, 2011a: 240) regards boto or Ubuntu “as 
normative in that it encapsulates moral norms and virtues such as kindness, generosity, 
compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and respect and concern for others”. The idea of respect and 
concern for others is more profound and implies the inclusion of all, because even those who seem 
to experience some exclusion are considered. More recently, Waghid and Smeyers (2012: 6-7) 
have affirmed that Ubuntu as an African philosophy represents a form of human activity that can 
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create space in higher education in which all (women, men and other groups) can freely engage 
with one another deliberatively through practices and shared values such as Ubuntu.  
At the same time, everyone can engage in critical conversations by interrogating and contesting 
their views and experiences. Waghid and Smeyers (2012) seem to argue that, with the 
embodiment and practice of Ubuntu in HE, everyone’s voice and experience would be listened to 
and respected. This simply means that no one should be excluded, as women and men ought to 
co-exist as equal persons. Nevertheless, one’s concern about the practice of Ubuntu in relation to 
women’s exclusion seems to bring the potentiality of the concept into disrepute. In my view, if the 
notion of respect for all human beings is a main constituent of Ubuntu, one could argue that the 
exclusion of women from AHE is indicative of a lack of human interdependence. Acknowledging 
the inclusion of all participants (women and men) as equal members in HE is one way of showing 
respect. To include is to respect people's dignity, not only because they are women or men, but 
because they are human beings. Thus, creating space in which everyone can engage with one 
another in a humane manner is equivalent to recognising their rights to share in a communal 
practice in higher educational institutions. Affording women the opportunity to be included would 
unlock their cognitive and intellectual ability to express themselves freely within an enabling 
environment, and justify democratic HE in Africa.  
With reference to Waghid and Smeyers (2012: 6), educational institutions on the African continent 
ought to become concerned especially with cultivating Ubuntu as respect for persons in terms of 
which everyone – women, men and others – deliberate freely in a humane and communally 
engaging manner. This implies that these educational institutions need to be concerned with 
creating democratic and responsible citizens and future leaders who are attenuated to the humane 
practice of Ubuntu. More importantly, through its commitment to educating people for humanity, a 
postcolonial AHE would propel its task of nurturing citizens in an inclusive, respected and valued 
environment. In relation to the concern whether Ubuntu is indeed prevalent in AHE, Assié-
Lumumba’s perception of Ubuntu will be examined as a way of ascertaining its existence and 
efforts to create spaces for women. 
 
3.2.2 Ubuntu and space for women in African higher education 
On the discussion of Ubuntu, Assié-Lumumba (2007) proffers that HE in Africa has ignored the 
controversial issues: such as women’s access, gender, and the production of knowledge. Rather, 
the emphasis should be on the problem of creating a space for women’s access and inclusion in 
HE by reclaiming human rights, and providing a source for informed participation in social 
processes. Central to this argument are issues concerning the basic fundamental rights of women 
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in HE. Assié-Lumumba (2007: 471) acknowledges the importance of women’s access to HE and 
knowledge production as a way of breaking the cycle of poverty and human misery in African 
societies. The inclusion and participation of women as students and professionals in HE processes 
will enable them to speak and act more confidently and assertively in order to contribute 
meaningfully to the production of knowledge.  
The point is that, since modern African societies are confronted by various predicaments and new 
challenges, such as HIV and AIDS, inadequate healthcare and poverty, there is a deep need for 
access to education by all at all levels in order for human development to take place (Assié-
Lumumba, 2007: 472-473). To address the crisis, Assié-Lumumba states that it is necessary to 
break the imbalance in formal education that limits women’s acquisition of knowledge, their ability 
for self-realisation and their contribution as agents in the process of socio-economic development 
in Africa. The understanding is that, without women’s inclusion and the appropriate acquisition of 
knowledge through education, it would be difficult to tackle the societal problems facing African 
societies today and to ensure that the continent’s economic development flourishes. In addition, 
the issue of unequal access by women to formal education, in particular HE, may lead to the 
limited representation of women in critical positions in the fields of education, politics and economy, 
and in knowledge production (Teferra & Altbach, 2004: 22). Consequently, the poor distribution of 
education constitutes an objective barrier to development.  
Furthermore, poor access to education limits women’s participation in decision-making processes 
and the planning of issues affecting their day-to-day lives. This restriction does not only miss the 
benefit of women’s insights, but excludes and overlooks their concerns, viewpoints and input, 
which constitutes an infringement of their rights to exercise their abilities. Apart from the low 
number of women at all levels in the formal education sector, especially in HE, there is a concern 
for the nature and type of education obtained by those who go through it. Hence, unequal gender 
distribution in education, both in quantity and type, is a major characteristic of many educational 
institutions. Assié-Lumumba (2007: 473-474) also notes that, although several policies have been 
adopted that are aimed at increasing enrolment and redressing inequalities, African nation-states 
have failed to maintain the pace of closing the gap, particularly in HE, where the imbalance is 
dominant. She also shows that the foundation of social progress and development, which includes 
the political, social and economic levels, needs to be valued, developed and utilised to enhance 
the quality of life for the general population. It is irrelevant to continue to address the issues of 
imposed or imported formal education and African indigenous education in dichotomous and 
mutually exclusive terms. In other words, it is a requisite to integrate formal education into the 
African social reality.  
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Consequently, Assié-Lumumba (2007: 474-476) advocates for the consideration of an indigenous 
knowledge system, particularly the notion of human dignity, which is constituted in Ubuntu. She 
explains that, although the illiteracy rate among African women is high when compared to that 
among European women, African women have been involved in every aspect of society on a basis 
that allowed different but equally worthy participation by both women and men in education, and in 
the production and utilisation of knowledge. They have also acquired other forms of literacy, such 
as the ability to read the world around them, to identify means and strategies for survival, and to 
promote human dignity (Ubuntu). Since African women constitute the majority of marginalised 
people, the focus on their full inclusion and gender equality would be a demonstration of a genuine 
effort to improve people’s lives through an integrated development policy that allows human 
capabilities and their knowledge and skills to be harnessed for the benefit of all people in both local 
and global communities. The point is that an African indigenous approach to the acquisition of 
knowledge needs to be reinforced formally and further developed in response to new and modern 
challenges, including the lack of inclusion. Here, the inference is that African Ubuntu possesses 
the quality that could be used to include all people.  
However, the interesting question is why AHE still excludes women and treats them differently from 
men. My contention is that Ubuntu needs to be examined further to create conditions for the 
inclusion of women in HE. In addition, for African people to realise their aspirations and achieve a 
good quality of life in which their human needs are satisfied in dignity, it is necessary to formulate 
long-term plans founded on sustainability. This simply means that there is a great need to break 
the barriers to allow access of women to schooling and HE. In this case, each learner or individual, 
whether male or female, must be given the opportunity to reach his or her full potential (Assié-
Lumumba, 2007: 473). Sharing the same sentiment, Teferra and Altbach (2003: 4) posit that the 
influence of colonialism on AHE has contributed to restricting students’ access, undermining the 
teaching of students in indigenous languages, limiting academic freedom and, constraining the 
Africanisation of the curriculum.  
Waghid asserts that university education on the African continent is limping, especially with its 
focus on "performativity" and "meritocracy", which lead to the production of “technicians” of 
learning rather than critical thinkers (2012: 5). Likewise, Assié-Lumumba concedes that, since 
schools and higher education institutions play a major role as central educational institutions, they 
must also organise activities that can contribute to the promotion of people’s well-being in all areas 
of expertise in which women are shown to be powerful and positive, and in which they are 
acknowledged for their potential contributions to teaching, research and policy formulation. This 
implies that AHE should educate and consider the expertise, knowledge and experiences of 
African women in all spheres of learning, and empower them by encouraging their participation in 
all deliberations concerning their welfare and that of the community at large.  
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In this regard, Assié-Lumumba (2007: 477-479) avers that efforts should be made to provide 
learning opportunities that would bridge the gap in gender inequality. For African states and their 
institutions to break away from inequality, HE ought to offer girls and women equitable access to 
education at all levels and of all types. Women will regain access to their social space, which will 
enable them to play their full roles as equal members of communities and nation-states, as 
indispensable agents and as driving forces for change, as well as becoming beneficiaries of social 
progress. Such participation and involvement of all members of society in economic and cultural 
production, as well as in political participation and decision-making processes at various levels of 
society, are necessary conditions for the well-being of all. In view of this, there is a great need for 
women, as constitutive of the marginalised, to gain access to quality education at all levels, not 
only at the elementary or literacy (informal education) level, but at the HE level as well. However, if 
women are still gravely excluded from AHE, the idea of human dignity as constitutive of Ubuntu 
seems to be undermined, despite advocacy for African girls to gain access to education, thus 
ensuring their inclusion. However, women still experience exclusion, which calls into question 
whether Ubuntu has in fact been realised in higher institutional practices. The point I am making is 
that Ubuntu as an African worldview of inclusion has not manifested itself in institutional practices 
in AHE, which is why women have been and still are excluded. 
 
3.2.3 Outlining meanings and dilemmas of Ubuntu as inclusion in higher education 
In this subsection I want to examine the potential of Ubuntu to enhance the inclusion of women in 
HE. Firstly, the core understanding that underlies African scholars’ perception of Ubuntu as 
inclusion is that it is a communal practice, which by its nature is inclusive. Ubuntu as a 
contextualised approach centres on a community of engagement of all members, and this 
understanding of Ubuntu, if extended to HE, would make a case for the discourse to be inclusive. 
In this sense, the phrase of “I am because we are” is a manifestation of inclusion through Ubuntu, 
which AHE ought to encourage. The idea that an African philosophy of Ubuntu is underlined by “I 
as We” makes AHE problematic, as women seemingly remain excluded. That is, despite the 
existing inclusiveness in the communal practices embodied in the notion of Ubuntu, there remains 
a grave exclusion of women, who also are treated unequally. For this reason I contend that the 
notion of Ubuntu requires reconceptualisation in order to address women’s exclusion in HE in 
Africa. It strengthens the argument in this dissertation that the lack of inclusion of women in AHE 
can be addressed positively if the notion of Ubuntu is reconceptualised, which potentially would 
make possible the substantive inclusion of women and gender equality. Such a dilemma in AHE 
(that is, the exclusion of women and gender inequality) is not perpetuated by Ubuntu.  
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However, a reconceptualised notion of Ubuntu can create conditions for women’s inclusion and 
gender equality. Secondly, the agreed understanding of Ubuntu centres on the idea of seeing 
humanity in others and having concern for the other. However, if AHE could enact or practise the 
said view, then women’s exclusion would be in consonance with the idea of Ubuntu. That is, what I 
want to ensure is that the inclusion of women becomes something in agreement with Ubuntu, not 
something different from or in contrast with it. Excluding women from HE means that they are 
being disregarded and treated inhumanely. Such elements of exclusion in the practice of AHE 
seem to affirm to some extent Enslin and Horsthemke’s (2004: 57) distrust of a limited 
understanding of Ubuntu. It remains unclear how characteristically African ways of philosophising 
are meant to help resolve problems and clarify issues in education. Prominent issues of concern 
are how an African philosophy of education from an Ubuntu perspective can contribute to 
curriculum selection, problems in HIV/AIDS education, the debates about authority and the 
classroom or schooling, and identities, democracy and citizenship.  
Although one would not completely reinforce the cynical view of Ubuntu above, the authors’ 
concern seems partially credible, especially considering that Ubuntu exists in the language of 
African societies, yet women remain excluded from HE. Their question heightens my interest in 
interrogating the notion of Ubuntu. My point is that, although Ubuntu is lived out differently among 
African peoples, there is a need to reinforce and extend its emphasis on inclusion, especially in 
societies in which higher education institutions continue to exclude women and treat them 
differently from their male counterparts. If Ubuntu symbolises a community of practice and human 
dignity, the placement of women on the periphery, as well as their perception as passive members, 
shows that African institutions cannot be trusted to promote vigorous inclusion. The assumption 
implicit in the dilemma of exclusion is that contemporary higher education institutions in Africa 
seem to restrict women’s voices. This suggests that an African conception of Ubuntu in its current 
form may not bring adequate transformation to the AHE system. Taking into account the dilemma 
of women’s exclusion in AHE, this study seeks ways to look differently at the conception of Ubuntu 
as inclusion. It will explore Western liberal notions of inclusion, even though it is presumed that 
African and Western notions are not always regarded as mutually inclusive. As stressed in Chapter 
1 of this study, Wiredu (2004) clearly recognises the prominence of linking African to Western 
knowledge systems, especially when these arrangements are to the advantage of African people, 
particularly disadvantaged groups (i.e. women). Thus, a call for the reconceptualisation of Ubuntu 
as inclusion from liberal perspectives may offer a different view that may well guide the post-
colonial AHE system, and hence make the impetus for women’s inclusion and gender equality 
more compelling. 
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3.3 Reconceptualising Ubuntu as inclusion in African higher education 
On the surface, the notion of inclusion appears to be a dominant element to evoke and deepen 
democratic11 practices. But this dissertation is concerned about the prevalence of women’s 
exclusion in AHE. In order to understand how HE perceives Ubuntu as inclusion, it may be helpful 
to consider a different and reconstructed perception of inclusion from liberal perspectives. Before 
exploring the liberal conception of Ubuntu as inclusion, I wish to examine its (inclusion’s) brief 
evolution. According to Young (1989) there is a dichotomy between the notion of social inclusion 
and exclusion that has emerged in recent years as a strong policy-leading concept at both the 
national and international level. The notion of social inclusion was driven by the emancipatory 
momentum of modern political life (Young, 1989: 250). Young states that the bourgeoisies12 
commenced the idea by challenging Aristocratic privileges and claiming equal rights for all groups 
of people, such as women, Jews, blacks, and others who pressed for inclusion. As a result, 
modern political theory stressed the equal moral worth of all persons, and social movements of the 
oppressed claimed inclusion of all people to full citizenship. Although the advocacy for women’s 
inclusion began as early as the seventeenth century (Walters, 2005: 8), different movements 
strongly claimed their rights in the eighteenth to twentieth century’s. Among these were the 
excluded, oppressed and marginalised groups who thought that winning full citizenship status that 
is equal political and civil rights, would lead to their freedom and equality. Nevertheless, when 
equal rights were advocated by the liberal capitalist societies in the late twentieth century, some 
groups realised that they were being treated as second-class citizens.  
Subsequently, feminist and other social movements raised concerns about why equal citizenship 
had not achieved social justice and equality. Young (1989: 251) argues that ensuring the inclusion 
of everyone in social and political institutions would require the pronouncement of special rights 
that focus on group differences in order to destabilise oppression and disadvantage. The point is 
that, for democratic institutions such as higher education bodies to attain inclusion, particularly for 
those situated differently, such as women and other excluded groups, enacting special rights for 
them would be a necessity. To interpret Young’s viewpoint, it is clear that robust inclusion cannot 
be attained through a mere call for special rights in terms of which women are given access to HE 
and left to engage as equal beings. Rather, there should be strategies to equip and guide women’s 
integration in higher education institutions towards legitimate inclusion. In the context of Africa, the 
                                            
11
 Democracy is best understood as a model for organising the collective and public exercise of power in major institutions of a society 
on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting people’s well-being can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and 
reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals. Legitimacy in a complex democratic society must 
result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation by all citizens on constitutional issues and questions of basic justice 
(Benhabib, 1996: 68). 
12
 The bourgeoisies make up the class of capitalists, who own the means of social production and are the employers of wage labour. 
From a Marxist political view, the working class is supposed to drive out capitalism and effect the transition to socialism (Blackburn, 
2008: 46).  
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impetus for an inclusive democratic society is driven by various international conventions and 
policies that coerce HE to create a space for the marginalised and excluded groups.  
As articulated in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the 2000 United Nations MDGs, to which many 
African nations are signatories, demands as goal three the empowerment of women and gender 
equality. Therefore, each designated country should achieve 50% gender equality by 2015. The 
core aim is to alleviate social exclusion and marginalisation to advance women’s legitimate 
inclusion at all levels. Inclusion and gender equality surfaced as a global and local agenda in HE in 
1998, when UNESCO raised concern particularly about the African continent at the World 
Conference on Higher Education (UNESCO, 1998a). This concern was twofold, namely women’s 
lower enrolments in HE to date, and the absence of the gender dimension in the HE curriculum. 
That concern gave birth to the introduction of affirmative action (AA)13, which was promulgated to 
promote the expansion of and inclusion of women in HE.  
For this reason, creating a policy merely for women’s access to university education in Africa, 
without hearing their voices, does not indicate genuine inclusion, considering that in the cultural 
background of many of the women, only men are permitted in the public space. Arising from the 
above, one could argue that, although much effort has been expended on the issue of inclusion, 
there remains a crisis of exclusion in HE on the continent. To proffer a richer and transformative 
understanding of Ubuntu as inclusion in AHE, the next section will draw from the conception of 
inclusion of Western liberal theorists in an attempt to think differently about inclusion in relation to 
Ubuntu.  
 
3.3.1 Young’s conceptualisation of inclusion/exclusion 
On a literal note, inclusion means involving others or inviting them to participate in doing something 
in public. Like a preliminary understanding of the concept of Ubuntu, inclusion is recognised as a 
norm for democratic society, including the higher education community (Young, 2000: 23-25). The 
idea of inclusion in decision making plays a central role in democratic discourses and society in 
which everyone ought to be included in public deliberative engagement. The inclusive processes of 
communication ought to be marked by people’s disposition to be accountable to others and to 
make deliberation open to the public, making it accessible for it to count as normatively legitimate 
(Young, 2000: 13). This approach envisages that decisions on how to address and promote 
                                            
13
The policy of affirmative action (AA) has been adopted by many African countries to engender the inclusion of more women at all 
levels of society, especially in higher education. A study in four Commonwealth higher education institutions indicated that AA 
programmes could make women passive and dependent: “… it will not work out that way, because in spite of doing everything for the 
female and thinking things will work out that way, the female has to be independent to some certain level and if she gets to a place 
where everything is being done for her, the product at the end of the day will not be worth it. So, they have to really think about it, yes, 
help us, but don’t go too far” (Morley, 2004: 18).  
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inclusive democratic institutions such as higher education bodies are legitimate. The question is: 
Can a legitimate public HE system be sustained in Africa if women and other groups are excluded? 
Young argues that justified inclusion can only happen when all stakeholders are included in the 
process, which needs to occur irrespective of their colour, creed, gender, ethnic group, economic 
wealth or educational status.  
Within this framework, inclusion embodies a norm of moral respect for individuals, irrespective of 
whether they belong to a group allegedly superior or inferior (in this case, women). This position 
makes sense because, in an inclusive AHE system, all people – whether women, who are 
regarded as inferior, or men, who are regarded as superior – should be included to show respect 
for their being. Specifically, inclusion increases the chances that those who make proposals will 
transform their positions from an initial self-seeking standpoint to a more objective appeal to 
justice, because they must listen to others with different views to whom they are also answerable 
(Young, 2000: 52). Young’s view of a normative element in democratic institutions appears 
significant here. Her normative view implies that AHE may include women in a normative manner, 
that is, for the sake of inclusion.  
Even so, in such a form of inclusion, AHE may simply represent women and show their presence, 
without meaningful inclusion. For instance, an increase in the number of women as students and 
staff members may be used as empirical evidence of inclusion, but the courses they teach and 
levels of appointment they hold might not always be significantly better than those occupied by 
men. Moreover, Young states that everyone, including women, should articulate ideas and 
concerns as members of the deliberative community in public spheres. Therefore, public 
deliberation permits the articulation of all interests, opinions and criticisms in such a way that all 
participants are confident that the outcome has developed from good reason and consensus. 
Every person participating in and contributing to decision making and the conditions for political 
dialogue must do so by his or her choice of action (Young, 2000). This model promotes the idea 
that each person has to be included and treated as important in the dialogues and decision-making 
processes from which their voices and interests were previously excluded.  
Ironically, Young states that, while mechanisms are hastened to include all stakeholders, new 
forms of exclusion come to play, that is, exclusion is concurrently intrinsic within inclusive 
democratic processes. This view shows that a more nuanced understanding of Ubuntu as inclusion 
should be one that contends with forms of exclusion in a subtle way. In other words, Ubuntu can be 
inclusive and simultaneously exclude. A notion of inclusion as argued for by Young will guide 
Ubuntu as inclusion differently, as women’s presence in AHE institutions will be far more inclusive 
than a reliance on mere statistics and percentages. That is, their inclusion would be substantive 
rather than just statistically viable. Moreover, those included also experience various forms of 
exclusion. This view reinforces my argument that post-colonial AHE has excluded women, in spite 
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of various mechanisms for promoting their inclusion. Although inclusion and equality are 
fundamental to facilitating public deliberation for a functional and inclusive democratic society, 
exclusion is inherent within inclusion, as access of women to HE becomes apparent while, at the 
same time, their voices are not considered in educational deliberations and knowledge production.  
For this reason, one would agree with Young (2000: 52-53) that the deliberative democratic 
institutions such as institutions of HE in Africa fail to address the issue of women’s exclusion. The 
point is that certain democratic institutions in Africa frequently violate this norm of inclusion by 
excluding women and other marginalised groups internally. In other words, while HE institutions 
create spaces to include those who previously were excluded, other forms of exclusion surface. 
Young offers a compelling argument that excluding some citizens from political deliberation within 
democratic societies, such as in AHE, is a failure to live up to their emancipatory promise. 
Subsequently, the notion of exclusion can be conceptualised in two ways that is external and 
internal exclusion, as outlined below. 
 
3.3.1.1 Understanding external exclusion within African higher education 
External exclusion is commonly practised in democratic deliberations and occurs when some 
members are purposely kept out of public debates or decision-making processes (Young, 2000: 
52). This means that, in HE institutions, some people are kept out of dialogues or knowledge 
production as well as processes of decision making. Firstly, external exclusion can happen in a 
“back-door brokering” approach in which powerful people acquire what they want out of the 
process through self-appointed committees (Young, 2000: 53). For example, in external exclusion, 
some members of the self-appointed committees could engage in private deliberation prior to the 
meeting and decide on the agenda and outcome of the policy, which is only presented in a public 
debate for endorsement. Such forms of deliberation, according to Young, violate the principles of 
inclusive democracy, as the people without dominant power are excluded, while the dominant 
groups control what happens in all processes. In the above account it could be presumed that 
external exclusion is inherent in Ubuntu within AHE, since only people who are regarded as 
powerful (in this case men) may be elected in private meetings, while women are regarded as 
inferior and excluded. The assumption could be that the powerful groups know better than the 
excluded people and therefore could make decisions for them.  
Secondly, external exclusion occurs on the basis of the allocated venue and time for public 
deliberations, which create some impediment for many people who wish to attend. This implies that 
decisions on the venue of such higher educational deliberation are not communicated to everyone, 
which then leads to the inaccessibility of such engagement. Thus, decisions are made without the 
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input of the entire public. Thirdly, the most prevalent form of external exclusion occurs when 
economically or socially powerful members exercise their political domination over the less affluent 
(Young, 2000: 54). For example, those who can afford to buy sufficient media time end up 
dominating the public discussion of issues of public interest, excluding others intentionally on the 
basis of economic inequality. This can be related to the current form of HE, which is economically 
driven and in which knowledge is viewed as a commodity. For instance, students from well-to-do 
families end up choosing courses and institutions that are assumed to offer the desired knowledge, 
leaving the poor groups (e.g. women) with no choice. Similarly, despite the fact that democratic 
governance proclaims equal rights for all citizens, due to differences in power and resources, 
women and other disadvantaged groups end up being excluded.  
 
Therefore, it is evident that higher educational institutions in Africa address external exclusion to a 
certain extent through the introduction of strategies and policies, such as affirmative action and the 
structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank. However, other modes of exclusion occur, 
as attested to by statistics on the percentage of women who are students and staff members in 
institutions of HE in Africa (Assié-Lumumba, 2007). In other words, in spite of various mechanisms 
being used to address external inclusion, HE in Africa continues to exclude women in subtle ways, 
which make its practices and outcomes quite unacceptable.  
 
3.3.1.2 Understanding internal exclusion in African higher education 
Internal exclusion is the second approach, which is less noticeable and which often occurs even 
when individuals and groups are literally included in discussions and decision making. Young 
(2000) points out that internal exclusion is a less identifiable form of exclusion that is prevalent in 
many democratic engagements and other political public spaces. For instance, many women with 
access to HE serve in committees and various commissions, but do not have the skills to engage 
and make meaningful contributions in the same way as their male counterparts. This happens 
when powerful groups tend to ignore, dismiss or patronise the views of others, because they (the 
others) lack expertise or because their experiences are different. The outcome in HE is that such 
people are prevented from making meaningful contributions to decision making, knowledge 
production and policy making. If women’s voices do not have any impact, then their presence in 
HE does not guarantee their contribution to policy formulation and other deliberations. For this 
reason, the question is what can be done for women to make meaningful contributions to all 
democratic processes in AHE.  
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The point here is that, even though women are externally included, subtle ways of exclusion 
inherent in the idea of Ubuntu in such institutions affect these women. In other words, women are 
admitted into higher educational institutions and included in discourses, but the condition of 
deliberations creates an environment in which those unfamiliar with the specific style of expression 
or use of language find it difficult to understand and participate fully in the deliberations (Young, 
1996: 130). This leads to the dismissal of the participation of some people as being out of order, 
thereby inducing internal exclusion of those who seem to be lacking knowledge. In my view, 
women are physically present in such discourses, but due to other systems of negotiating the 
outcomes or decisions of that engagement, their voices are repudiated. When public discussions of 
problems and issues are inclusive, they permit the articulation of all interests, opinions and 
criticism, and when they are free from domination, participants in such deliberations would be 
confident and convinced that the outcome is legitimate.  
Against the aforementioned background, Young (2000: 55) calls for communicative democracy as 
an action to supplement non-inclusive forms of deliberative democracy in order to confront internal 
exclusion in a way that would result in the realisation of an inclusive democratic process. In 
contrast, since democratic HE ought to be inclusive, enabling every person to find a deliberative 
space; it becomes disheartening and questionable that HE excludes women in Africa. The impetus 
for internal exclusion comes into play especially in the case of women, which then confirms the 
lack of meaningful Ubuntu prevalent in AHE. In this respect, Young’s conception of exclusion 
suggests that, despite the numerous policies that encourage women’s access to HE on the 
continent, such as affirmative action (AA), only a few of these women are able to make meaningful 
contributions to decision making, policy making and knowledge production, as shown in the 
previous chapter. Young has proposed a communicative approach that could assist in advancing 
the inclusive democratic public institutions which Africa requires. Regarding the process of 
mitigating internal exclusion in democratic deliberations, which also includes AHE, Young (2000: 
53) offers three forms of communication, namely greeting, rhetoric and narrative or storytelling. 
The first action of manifesting internal inclusion is through greeting, which is a way to acknowledge 
others in public. This approach enables participants to recognise and respect each other’s 
presence as members of a community. For Young, this approach has a major role to play in the 
dialogue that aspires to reach an understanding between people who consider the other’s 
individuality. In the case of AHE, one first needs to recognise the presence of women (female 
students and academics) in lectures, research and decision making, while encouraging a 
continuous discussion and exchange among participants and promoting respect and tolerance.  
Nevertheless, while appreciating greeting as a first step in public engagement, which shows that 
one is acknowledged, one’s voice could still be disregarded because of the dynamic and cultural 
practices that regard women as inferior and as being who are only expected to listen and adhere to 
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the structural norms of traditional African societies (Kwesiga, 2002). For Young, greeting could be 
accompanied by rhetoric. This approach entails naming the forms and styles of speaking that 
reflexively and argumentatively attend to the audience through speech. Young (2000) points out 
that, with rhetorical figures, a speech constructs the occasion, the speaker and the audience by 
invoking or creating specific meanings, connotations and symbols. At the same time, rhetoric 
serves this connecting function, whether the speaker and the audience share meanings or not. If 
this is the purpose of rhetoric in democratic deliberation, then more women without rhetorical skills 
will be excluded, and they may not be able to follow such a form of engagement. Young (2000: 63-
65) rightly notes that rhetoric may not help in addressing exclusion, since it is contrary to the idea 
of inclusion. The approach has a high chance of provoking internal exclusion and suggests that all 
participants ought to possess rhetorical skills in communication.  
However, I would argue that rhetoric may not necessarily lead to inclusion in AHE because of 
many women’s ability and nurturing, which limit them from unleashing their cognitive and 
intellectual skills. People without rhetorical skills may as well be excluded from debate. The point is 
that rhetoric coupled with greeting as a form of communication that focuses on the 
acknowledgement of people in public may not necessarily address the internal exclusion that 
pervades AHE today. Considering that women are still regarded as inferior and are expected to be 
silent, they may lack the ability to articulate and respond to rhetorical questions or talk. I hold that 
such forms of communication may propel the dominant members of a democratic HE system to 
take them at face value, without taking their voices seriously.  
The third form of communication is narrative or storytelling, which aims to guide individuals towards 
understanding each other’s situations. By listening to other people’s narrative, one may develop 
compassion for others, particularly those who are not physically affected by the narrated situation 
(in this case, the excluded women). Moreover, one has to be acknowledged in public as a 
participant by way of greeting, before one begins to share and listen to each other’s narratives. By 
articulating their problems and experiences, the listeners are able to understand the serious and 
difficult situations others go through, and those unaffected will be able to contribute to the decision-
making process. In this way, all listeners will understand how one’s positions, actions and values 
appear to others from their narratival perspective. Such narratives also serve to exhibit values and 
cultural meanings, while the experiences and values of the participants resonate with social 
knowledge based on the contextual situations of individuals (Young, 1996: 129-132). In the same 
way, Young (2000: 70-71) affirms that the combination of various narratives from different people’s 
viewpoints ought to produce collective understanding, unlike rhetoric.  
Most notably, narrative plays a pivotal role in arguments in a free and equal political discussion in 
which decisions depend on a need or entitlement. In other words, every person has a story to tell 
and does it through different styles and meanings. Each person is allowed to tell a story with equal 
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legitimacy, and each story has equal value in the communicative situation. Moreover, that 
“narrative reveals the particular experiences of those in social locations, experiences that cannot 
be shared by those situated differently but that they must understand in order to do justice to the 
others” (Young, 1996: 131-132). In other words, narrative has to do primarily with how individuals 
make their case by telling stories about their physical, temporal, social and emotional obstacles. In 
other words, narrative exhibits subjective experiences to other subjects. The idea of narrative can 
evoke sympathy while maintaining distance, because the narrative also carries an inexhaustible 
latent shadow, the transcendence of the other, that there is always more to be told. Young further 
clarifies that narrative reveals a source of values, culture and meaning (1996: 132). When an 
argument proceeds from a premise to a conclusion, it is only as persuasive as the acceptance of 
its premises by the deliberators.  
Narrative can also serve to explain to outsiders what practices, places or symbols mean to the 
people who hold them. Through narrative, the outsiders (in this case those already excluded) 
possibly may come to understand why the insiders (included women) value what they value and 
why they have the priorities they have. The process of narration not only exhibits experience and 
values from the point of view of the subjects that have and hold them. It also reveals that each 
social perspective has an account not only of its own life and history, but of every other position 
that affects its experience – the kind of exclusion that is difficult to test or observe, but rather is 
expressed through people’s narratives (Young, 1996: 131-132). Nevertheless, in my view, this 
might be a minimal form of inclusion, which allocates special rights to some groups (in this case, 
women), and seems to place those who are unable to articulate their reasons and are non-
eloquent as victims of more marginalisation. Following Young, if Ubuntu as inclusion is at the core 
of the democratic ideal, then the political and social exclusion prevalent in AHE is a sign that 
democratic societies do not live up to their promises. Consequently, to attain real inclusion there is 
a need to understand people’s differences as a resource, rather than as an obstacle to be 
overcome.  
Nonetheless, communicative forms that are relevant in the American context may not create a 
transformative educational environment in Africa, where the problems of internal exclusion of 
women and other marginalisation issues abound. One would need to take cognisance of African 
society where, unlike men, women continue to be placed in inferior positions (Kwesiga, 2002). 
Listening solely to their narratives may continue to place them in a victim mode, rather than 
creating conditions that would enable them to assert their voices. In my view, Young's forms of 
communicative democracy, specifically greetings and narrative, could be the beginning of internal 
inclusion. Even so, this approach is limited due to the cultural and religious beliefs that force 
women into subservient positions and place them in victim mode. Thus, communication exclusively 
may evoke further exclusion. In this sense, Young's conception of inclusion as a condition for 
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Ubuntu can inherently embrace two forms of exclusion that is external and internal exclusion. 
Therefore, on the basis of this understanding it is apparent that women are excluded in subtle 
ways. This study will show that, in a sense, AHE has mitigated external exclusion through policies, 
but internal exclusion remains a dilemma. Simply put, women are included procedurally and hence 
statistically. Yet they are not included substantively. The point is that, while communication should 
be part of higher education’s democratic processes, recognition needs to precede the 
communication, rather than be the sole foundation for inclusion. The focus should transcend 
communication towards a legitimate means of inclusion that potentially may engender an inclusive 
democratic HE community. Thus, Nussbaum’s conception of inclusion will be explored in what 
follows. 
 
3.3.2 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a way to evoke inclusion for equality 
Nussbaum (2000) proffers the capabilities approach, which is assumed to be sufficient for the 
development and attainment of justifiable equality. Her approach accounts for human, and 
invariably women’s, capabilities, and is based on what human beings are actually capable of doing 
or becoming in the real world, irrespective of their gender and other differences. She notes that 
gender equality lies at the heart of many feminist studies; women demand the rights to shape 
ethical and moral questions about the way they should be treated. At the same time, various 
traditions have perpetuated gender inequality and hindered the progress of women because of 
gender discrimination. Inequality continues to differ according to context. Nussbaum’s central 
question is how we can solve these ethical problems and apply universal concepts that will allow 
women to gain significant equality in the world? To answer the question, Nussbaum offers the 
capabilities approach to equality and argues that it would cause a rethinking that would trigger a 
different understanding of the way the universal capabilities approach elevates women to an equal 
place in the world to men. For her, this approach opens a pathway for women to live a fulfilled life 
that is not influenced by traditions that enable injustice to persist against women in different 
spheres of life. Consequently, Nussbaum (2000: 78-80) offers ten fundamental functional human 
capabilities to bridge the gap of inequality. She maintains that each person is worthy of being a 
human being on the basis of the fact that the person is able:  
 
a) To imagine, think and reason – and to do these things in a truly human way;  
b) To form a conception of good and to engage in critical reflection;  
c) To live with and toward others, to recognise and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction – to be able to imagine the 
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situation of another, to have compassion for that situation, and to have the capability 
for both justice and friendship;  
d) To be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others [which] 
entails, at a minimum, protection against discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin; and 
e) To work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into 
meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with others.  
From the above outline of the significance of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, it can be inferred 
that, for equality to be secured and protected, it is necessary to recognise that every person, 
irrespective of their differences (women or men), has the capability to engage in discourses, offer 
reasons, show concern for those whose voices are excluded and unequally treated, and act to 
enable women to engage in meaningful relationships, like their male counterparts. One of the 
prominent capabilities suggests that all human beings ought to have equal opportunities in order to 
live a good human life (Nussbaum, 1999: 42). Essentially, Nussbaum posits that women have the 
same potential to hold these capabilities as men, and it is necessary to apply this approach to 
women as being equal to men. The fundamental nature of this conception of equality looks at 
women and their progress in relation to the capabilities of girls or women. Her capabilities 
approach to women’s development provokes does not provoke the question whether women 
should be able to build houses, but whether they have the capability to do so (Nussbaum 1999: 
42). In this sense, the approach prompts me to think deeply about exclusion and to consider 
whether women’s exclusion is exercised on the basis of inability, incompetency or a tangible 
incompetency. To her, women have the right to assert themselves. They therefore need to 
exercise their freedom to act autonomously.  
In other words, their freedom to act autonomously is their right to exercise democratic rights. Some 
good examples of these democratic rights include their right to life and their right to constructing 
their own voice. Recognising women’s rights may assist them and others experiencing exclusion 
and unequal treatment in HE in Africa to claim inclusion. Accordingly, Ubuntu as inclusion could be 
understood from the capabilities approach, in which all, particularly women, are perceived as equal 
human beings, who are able to act freely and articulate their points of view. Nussbaum draws on 
Sen’s explanation of equality, which is closely related to concerns of social justice and political 
value. Concurrently, she tries to demystify Sen’s idea of equality, since it is connected more to 
human rights but lacks the commitment to substance that the capabilities of a society ought to or 
most centrally have to pursue (Nussbaum, 2003: 35). Her aim is to enhance the idea because of its 
criticism by feminists, and to suggest that the level of health service or educational provision in a 
just society ought to be delivered as fundamental entitlements to all its citizens.  
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In her view, the equality of resources falls short because it fails to take into account individuals’ 
needs and different levels of resources, if they are to come up to the same level of capability to 
function (Nussbaum, 2003: 32). This means that the human capabilities approach is underlined by 
people’s accessibility to resources and intellectual exposure, which then causes women from 
deprived backgrounds to lack the ability to engage. It seems that the above point of inadequacy 
may jeopardise the capabilities approach as a means to mitigate internal exclusion in AHE. Like 
other marginalised groups, women from rural areas, where their rights to quality education and 
opportunities are limited, might experience further exclusion due to their inability to engage in 
deliberation to the same extent as men. To address this predicament, Nussbaum (2003: 36) points 
out that only if we formulate definite capabilities – even one that are tentative and revisable – 
would we be able to use capabilities as defined to elaborate a partial account of social justice, a set 
of basic entitlements without which no society can lay claim to justice.  
This approach is useful to supplement the idea that, if the social goal of the capabilities of the 
members of society is to perform significant functions, then women should have the rights and 
obligation to contribute to the progress of the entire society at a greater level. This simply means 
that the capabilities approach is important because it forms a channel and environment for women 
(female students and staff members) to take part in areas where males dominate, which is the 
norm in most African societies. The significance of women’s labour or mental capability, whether 
they are inside or outside of the home (private or public), has been undermined in various regions 
of the world, and particularly in Africa. However, recognising their capabilities and acknowledging 
that women serve and contribute to fundamental issues in different ways, could pave the way for 
their inclusion. However, these capabilities may have to be approached in a special order in which 
each is to be applied in various cultures. This approach claims that a life that is incomplete with 
respect to one of the capabilities will fall short of being considered a good human life (Nussbaum, 
2003: 42). In other words, if human life lacks one of these aspects, it creates a barrier that prevents 
the individual from achieving what she or he personally desires and envisages. People should 
attain the ability to control their own lives and make their own decisions – not only to contribute to 
individual desires, but also to provide reasons for the choices for which they have to give account. 
This could mean that women, like all human beings, ought to celebrate and exercise their freedom 
to express their views and contribute to deliberations in higher education. However, if women’s 
concerns are not considered, their lives are not well lived.  
In addition, Nussbaum (2003) calls for a process in which women (female students and staff 
members) should be afforded an opportunity to advance in society based on having equal status 
as men. This approach calls for a universal set of predictions that permit an individual to become 
equal with others. On women’s inclusion, she argues that people’s capabilities should be allowed 
to reach their full potential in a way that would enable women to claim their space in democratic 
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discourses. One can say that the relevance of the capabilities’ approach lies in the fact that it does 
not simply have the potential to induce positive prospects for women, but it could also unlock 
opportunities for anyone (not only women) who is undermined or oppressed in any sphere of life, 
including higher education. For instance, it is possible for women to be visible physically in higher 
education, yet their presence is not felt and their voices are not heard on issues that concern them 
due to their lack of capabilities. This may cause universities to shun opportunities for women to 
prosper as equal and capable human beings.  
Also, Nussbaum (1999: 43) notes that ”human capabilities exert a moral claim that they should be 
developed since human beings are creatures such that they need to be provided with the right 
educational and material support, in order to become fully capable of the major human functions”. 
The argument is that capabilities will only be unlocked through nurturing and that HE should offer 
accurate and ample support for what needs to ensue. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach has the 
advantage of taking distinct positions on these disputed issues, while pointing out what the 
motivating concerns and their goals are (Nussbaum, 2003: 37-40). In the case of AHE, female 
students, staff members and others are deliberately excluded in order to limit their achievement 
through restrictions or structures that describe the acceptable roles of women at all levels of 
society, or what they could become. This concurs with how women (female students and staff 
members) are being marginalised not only in the private space, that is at home, but also in the 
public space, such as in institutions of HE in Africa, where they are excluded and treated 
unequally.  
Conversely, the fact that each individual has the capability to show respect to the other and 
recognise the capability in others indicates that it is inevitable for AHE to create a favourable 
environment in which women can influence decisions, policies and knowledge production. For this 
to happen, Nussbaum calls for educational discourses in which each participant is required to 
listen to others’ points of view, based on the understanding that each contribution (either from 
women or from men) is of value and ought to be respected as such (Nussbaum, 2003: 41). In this 
way, equality among participants ultimately will be enacted, as well as respect for others (not only 
as African women, but as human beings who can offer reasonable arguments in a cosmopolitan 
world of engagement) as capable and competent individuals by sharing their perspectives, thus 
promoting inclusion and equality. While the human capabilities approach is plausible in the context 
of affluence, it may not guide African universities towards a justifiable form of inclusion. This is 
because, following this particular understanding of Ubuntu as inclusion through the capabilities 
approach entails exercising your freedom as a member of an AHE institution. And women are not 
always positioned to do so.  
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Hence, considering the dynamics of women’s maltreatment and exclusion on the continent, the 
capabilities approach alone will not create an enabling environment for women to reach their 
individual potential. The point here is that, because women are already excluded and their voices 
are not heard, a call to exercise their freedom is insufficient to address internal exclusion. How can 
they be included if their voices are persistently marginalised in HE? The point is not that the 
capabilities approach to women exercising their freedom in the quest of being justly included in HE 
discourses is inappropriate. In fact, they should continue to make such claims. However, when 
conditions in AHE are not conducive to them exercising their capabilities, we require something 
else. For this reason, I draw on Butler’s conception of a troubling gender as a way to extend 
inclusion – that is, attempting to make it more substantive.  
 
3.3.3 Butler’s gender-troubled view as a means for substantive inclusion 
In this section, the notion of gender14 equality and inequality held by different theorists will be 
examined in order to understand its place in HE in Africa. Before exploring the notion of gender 
equality, which is an important concept in this study, it will be helpful to discuss the basic views on 
the concept of gender. The interest in gender equality, particularly within the political movements, 
began in the developed world in the 1960s. The systematic organisation for the struggle toward 
gender equality in Africa started in the 1970s with a creation of an Association of African Women 
for Research and Development (AAWORD) (see Assié-Lumumba, 2006a). In addition, 
Breitenbach, Brown, Mackay and Webb (2002: 1, 15) point out that the evolution of the gender 
equality project in Africa commenced in the 1980s and 1990s by different groups of women and 
men, and other marginalised groups, which demanded that political processes attain greater 
equality as well as equal opportunities for all citizens. Other activists, practitioners and academic 
commentators on equality shared, at the very least, a position that denied a weak and reductionist 
form of equality, and called for a vigorous version of equality based on gender in postcolonial AHE.  
In her book, Gender Trouble, Butler (1990: 2-5) shows the limits of reflexivity in thinking about the 
self beyond the dichotomy of sex and gender. Butler enjoins feminist critics to analyse how the 
category of women is produced and restrained by power structures, rather than looking at the 
power structures for emancipation. While engaging in a critique of patriarchy, she embarks on what 
she calls a “feminist genealogy of the category of woman” and considers the concept of gender as 
                                            
14
In Africa, the term ‘gender’ tends to evoke certain emotions in both the user and hearer of the term. For men, it conjures up images of 
militant women who forcefully and emotionally want to become like men. These women want to wrest ‘power’ in its various dimensions 
from the rightful owners, who in this case are the male of the human species. For some women, the term gender calls up images of 
fellow women who have lost direction and who want to destroy their God-given mandate to be submissive and follow their husband’s 
direction (Ayanga, 2012: 85). 
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genealogy15, which might seem to promise a future direction for philosophical analyses. In this 
sense, the distinction between sex and gender seems to be increasingly unstable, since gender is 
radically independent of sex and is a “free-floating artifice” (Butler, 1990: 7, 22). Butler’s view 
implies that gender identifies those things that do not conform to the system of “compulsory and 
naturalized heterosexuality”, and divulges how gender norms are socially instituted and 
maintained.  
Profoundly, Butler’s argument prompts me to further explore an appropriate means of 
understanding equality, besides seeing it from the position of gender, which is constructed with 
women and men in mind and does not account for those who fall outside the dichotomy. Butler 
(1990: 35) also describes how gender congeals or solidifies into a form that makes it appear to 
have been there all along. She claims that the idea is drawn from the French feminist Simone de 
Beauvoir, who stated that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”, that is referring to 
gender identity. Subsequently, “gender is a process which has neither origin nor end, it is 
something that we do rather than we are” (Butler, 1990: 128-129). I found this understanding of 
gender compellingly, particularly the idea that being a woman or a man is something that is 
constructed. In other words, gender is viewed as a social relation that is categorised based on 
individual uniqueness and limitations (Butler, 1990: 324). Conversely, the challenge resulting from 
the identification of gender based on biological differences between women and men is that the 
categorisation leads to constructed discourse with the intention of recreating hegemonic paradigms 
and perpetuating today’s power relations – including in social institutions such as AHE (Butler, 
1990: 182-185). In this respect, defining women and men as universal categories disguises the 
interests such definition serves. As a result, anything that is defined as natural or universal should 
be studied critically. I would agree, therefore, that gender should not only be approached based on 
the categories of man and woman, but also on the different social relations that prevail among 
them.  
This theory of gender related to performance and performativity reveals the power relations that 
underlie pre-determined gender and sex. In this way, “the action of gender requires a performance 
that is repeated. This repetition is at once a re-enactment and re-experiencing of a set of meanings 
already socially established” (Butler, 1990: 178). Furthermore, Butler (1990) states that 
performativity creates a fictitious reality, in which gender and its roles are determined based on the 
binary distinction between men and women. This implies that the category of women from which 
the feminist struggle arises is different from the political, hierarchical fiction based on biology 
(which is also applicable in AHE). Butler’s view shows that, in everyday life, we take gender for 
granted; we only recognise a person as a man or woman, girl or boy. Being a man or a woman, 
                                            
15
 Genealogy investigates the political stakes in designing as an origin and causes those identity categories that are the effects of 
institutions, practices, and discourses with multiple and diffused points of origin (Butler, 1990: viii-ix, 10).  
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then, is not a pre-determined state, but rather a “becoming”, a condition actively under 
construction. If I understand Butler correctly, her concern is about the perception of the category 
“woman” as a single type, at the expense of other groups, such as homosexuals, lesbians, 
transgendered beings, and so forth. For her, to view a woman as a single category may lead to 
more exclusion. The Butlerian notion of gender-troubled situates the construction and existence of 
this category. She describes the subject-in-process that is constructed in discourse by the acts it 
performs. To her, the gender issue becomes troubled firstly by “calling the category of ‘the subject’ 
into question” – by arguing that it is a performative construct (Butler, 1990: 341). Secondly, it 
becomes trouble by “asserting that there are ways of doing” one’s identity that will cause even 
further trouble for those who have a vested interest in preserving existing oppositions such as 
male/female, masculine/feminine, gay/straight and so on. 
The inference is that identity as a performative construct is a complex theory, in which the subject 
is an actor who simply gets up and “performs” its identity on a metaphorical stage of its own 
choosing (Butler, 1990: 341). Further, gender identity is a sequence of acts, but there is no pre-
existing performer who does those acts, no doer behind the deed. For Butler (1990: 128-129), 
therefore, gender is a matter of choice and it is performed; and to choose for gender is to interpret 
the received gender norms in a way that organises them anew. This implies that gender is an act 
or a sequence of acts that is always inevitably happening. It is impossible for such a happening to 
exist as a social agent outside the terms of gender. This view is appealing, especially for 
understanding gender equality in AHE in order to expose the existing narrow view before making 
claims for any justified democratic processes. Thus, to foreground Ubuntu as inclusion in AHE 
based on the gender category of woman/man will exacerbate internal exclusion. In addition, Butler 
(2004: 1) postulates that: 
 
If gender is a kind of doing, an incessant activity performed, in part, without one’s 
knowing and without one’s willing; it is not for that reason automatic or mechanical. 
On the contrary, it is a practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint; 
moreover, one does not ‘do’ one’s gender alone. One is always ‘doing’ with or 
another, even if the other is only imaginary. What I call my ‘own’ gender appears 
perhaps at times as something that I author or, indeed, own. But the terms that 
make up one’s own gender are, from the start, outside oneself, beyond oneself in a 
sociality that has a single author (and that radically contents the notion of authorship 
itself).   
From the above assumption, one can argue that the aim is not to prescribe a new gendered way of 
life, but to open the field of possibility for gender talks in the current society and field of knowledge. 
Thus, the keenness to connect equality based on gender with African higher education will meet 
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with challenges due to the categories of woman and man. Those who fall outside the gender 
category will automatically experience internal exclusion. I concede that approaching equality 
based on gender will not help us to achieve our inevitable goals in the African post-colonial 
education system. I therefore would respond to Butler’s call to trouble the binary gender dichotomy 
by looking at sex, as including all people who should be treated as equal members of democratic 
(higher educational) institutions (Butler, 1990: 129). In other words, as soon as we think AHE 
promotes gender equality that focuses on the binary distinction between woman and man, then the 
institution would provoke internal exclusion. Excluding some groups (as being transgendered, 
transsexual, bisexual, gay, lesbian, etc.) may lead to inequality of those who are neither woman 
nor man. It would be interesting to ask whether excluding women and other groups and treating 
them unequally is not a way of dehumanising such people. I therefore affirm on the basis of the 
above that gender should not to be approached from a binary viewpoint, but rather should seek to 
include groups that fall outside these oppositional categories of man and woman.  
In line with my view of gender being troubled in the context of Africa, Sylvia Tamale, editor of the 
book African Sexualities (2011), affirms that gender binary positions are highly contentious in the 
light of the fact that the social construction of gender is not fixed, but rather is fluid. Like Butler, 
Tamale perceives gender categorisation in the context of AHE as problematic and exclusive to 
people who disregard the binary category. I agree that gender categorisation needs to be 
deconstructed in AHE institutions to address the constant exclusion and maltreatment of 
marginalised groups. The concern of Ubuntu as inclusion here focuses on gender, but we need to 
look beyond current discourses of gender equality by examining the etymology of the word Ubuntu 
- humaneness. Since Ubuntu valorises humaneness, not in its gendered form, what matters as far 
as Ubuntu is concerned, or the meaning of the notion at least, is humaneness, not categories of 
humaneness such as able-bodied versus disabled man or woman, heterosexual or homosexual. 
Does this mean that this is what happens in practice in Africa, where a philosophy of Ubuntu is 
propounded and celebrated? Not really. The key point that should be developed here is that the 
notion of Ubuntu provides a framework that moves beyond categorisations, although our own 
practices have negated it by categorising people.  
Since democratic HE is basically a Western depiction, I would show that Africa has its own 
distinctive and dynamic background and culture that seem to induce women’s internal exclusion 
and inequality in various and subtle ways. By the same token, an African contention of inclusion 
based on gender is evident in Tamale’s (2011) monograph, which points out the dilemma of 
exclusion and inequality. She locates AHE in the democratic project of a post-colonial epoch. 
Tamale sees sexuality as a biological process of reproduction while, at the same time, it is socially 
constructed as a homogeneous and unchanging notion for all Africans. This homogeneous 
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sexuality is identified as being out of touch not only with the realities of lives, experiences, identities 
and relationships, but also with current activism and scholarship (2011: 2).  
Tamale further states that the discourse about and experiences of African sexualities have been 
and remain shaped by issues of colonialism, globalisation, patriarchy, gender, class, religion, age, 
law and culture (Tamale, 2011: 4; 23-26). Notably, while the post-colonial African institutions 
(specifically HE) strive to achieve inclusion and equality within a global democracy, the continent is 
confronted with the big challenge of debating the complexities of intersecting oppression and 
marginalisation. One of the issues is how to regard as equal human beings identified groups that 
do not conform to gender categorisations and that include sexual minorities such as lesbians, 
gays, transgendered, intersexed, rape survivors, sex workers and people living with HIV and AIDS. 
Expressing a similar concern, Ayanga (2012: 85) states clearly that the gender discourse is often a 
case of people talking at one another, rather than talking to one another while appreciating one 
another’s points of view and contributions. The process leads to one side seeking to hold on to 
what is perceived as rightfully theirs, whereas the other struggles to acquire the same. Thus, if 
AHE has embodied this perspective of gender categorisation, as seems to be the case, the 
possibility of achieving equality is limited. I am challenged to envisage equality differently, not 
presuming that the conception of inclusion of women and gender equality in postcolonial AHE 
leads to democracy.  
With Butler’s gender perspective, one is impelled to investigate what democratic HE ought to be, 
since equality based on gender poses more danger for internal inclusion in AHE. The fact that the 
justification of equality continues to be approached on the basis of the number of female (or male) 
students and staff members of higher institutions, those who are outside the gender categorisation 
(women or men) will obviously be excluded. In that case, the democratic deliberations will end up 
ignoring their presence and continue to exclude them. Butler (1990) sees gender categorisation 
within a dominant ideology of heterosexuality as a social construct in which every person can 
decide what he or she wants to become. I identify with Butler’s standpoint, in that gender 
categorisation could further exacerbate internal exclusion when used as yardstick for inclusion. 
The problem is that to begin identifying the other in the public could prove problematic in many 
African societies, where the issue of homosexuality is regarded as taboo and unrealistic. Ironically, 
a single category – women – could prove problematic, since within that category groups such as 
lesbians may not receive fair treatment. Those who would be categorised as lesbian or gay might 
experience more exclusion, marginalisation and harassment than inclusion. Therefore, such a 
dilemma requires critical engagement when trying to identify and explore other specific voices not 
included specifically in the context of AHE.  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
Butler’s problematisation of gender categories could be used to probe what we never thought of or 
what we overlooked in the quest for the democratisation of African institutions and society. In this 
regard, approaching Ubuntu/inclusion based on gender as a yardstick may thwart the 
advancement of equality. For Butler, gender categorisation is problematic because it relies on 
dualism, that is, woman and man. Those groups who defy gender categories, such as 
homosexuals, bisexuals, transgendered, intersexed, lesbians and gays, will not be included. This 
implies that people who are neither women nor men are not human enough to be included in AHE. 
The point here is that inclusion based on the category of gender can in fact be very exclusive and 
hinder the urgent need for women’s inclusion. The concern about emphasising a gender category 
in HE in Africa is also shared by Mama (2006). She argues that “Africa urgently needs strong, 
creative and intellectually productive institutions of higher learning to address continental 
knowledge needs in a manner that is closely grounded in the political and cultural aspirations of 
Africa's diverse peoples; women as well as men” (Mama, 2006: 53). For gender to be less 
destructive a category to consider, she suggests that university scholars and academic 
administrators in Africa should become intensely sensitive to the challenges of gender equality, 
social justice and democratisation. This calls for equity of access at all levels and in all areas of the 
higher education sector as a minimal condition for the pursuit of gender equality.  
Mama (2006) further proposes the integration of institutional and intellectual strategies that 
promote the practice of gender equality, and concomitantly equip students for the production of 
both a democratic citizenry and the ideas that existing political and policy commitments stand for in 
order to meet the demands of gender equality. With this in mind, one is compelled to question the 
authenticity of Ubuntu as inclusion in the efforts towards equality that are championed in AHE. It 
seems that it is unfeasible to enable Ubuntu to advocate for equality based on gender 
categorisation and for the equal treatment of all, especially those who fall outside the constructed 
category of gender. In my opinion, before we claim equality, there is a need to interrogate the 
notion of gender particularly within African society, where the gender category is viewed as static 
and unchangeable. Our efforts should be to find a way to deconstruct the gender category first, 
before calling for equality. An AHE that regards woman or man on a binary basis will bring about 
more exclusion and consequently fail to advance equality in HE institutions. So far, Butler’s idea of 
gender, particularly regarding the category of man or woman, has helped me to unpack the 
problem of inclusion that is based purely on gender.  
 
It is clear that the notion of gender is fluid because some categories can have effects on hetero- or 
homosexual (gay-man and lesbian-man) characters. We need to account for more groups, such as 
transsexual and transgender, since the problem of exclusion does not merely affect women, but 
also marginalised men. Even under the category of men, gays and other groups may experience 
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exclusion, just like women. Therefore Butler’s perspective helps one to understand inclusion 
through the categories of woman and man. It can be said that there is a need to understand 
different constituents better in order to deal with internal exclusion in particular. As soon as HE 
emphasises inclusion based on gender, then students nurtured in such institutions will maintain the 
same categories, which ultimately may prolong exclusion and inequality. I now highlight the 
possibilities and limitations of the above-explored liberal theories of inclusion. 
 
3.3.4 Possibilities and limitations of liberal perspectives in promoting Ubuntu 
Although the liberal theorists discussed above proffer compelling arguments that may advance 
Ubuntu as inclusion, there seems to be some erroneous beliefs that hinder its fulfilment. For 
instance, Young’s conception of internal exclusion tallies with the dilemma that is prevalent in AHE. 
It seems that the communicative approach that is based on greeting, rhetoric and narrative is 
insufficient; hence a need for paradigm shifts. Thus, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach advances 
the use of Ubuntu to address internal exclusion in AHE. However, although her call for capabilities 
through which individuals can exercise their freedom to claim equality is credible, it promotes the 
exclusion of those who lack the capacity to exercise their freedom and rights. I have argued 
elsewhere that liberal perspectives are undeniable in trying to enhance women’s inclusion 
(Shanyanana, 2011: 114). However, the African cultural background or upbringing, which places 
girls/women in an inferior position to boys/men, may make it impossible for them to simply locate a 
space in which to engage their male counterparts in dialogue. Consequently, the notion of Ubuntu 
as inclusion has reached an impasse, and it requires further re-conceptualisation. For this reason, 
Butler’s idea of using gender as a characteristic of or yardstick for Ubuntu/inclusion highlights the 
gender-troubled view, particularly the category-base of a woman or man, which in itself is exclusive 
to those who defy the category boundary. Again, a single category of women can be problematic, 
since within that category other groups such as lesbians or transgender and so forth may not 
receive their fair treatment.  
 
Therefore, aiming for inclusion through gender equality could provoke even more exclusion of 
those groups that fall outside the gender category, such as homosexuals, bisexuals, intersexed, 
and transgendered. The key point in this study is that we need to look beyond current discourses 
of gender equality in the etymology of the word Ubuntu (humaneness) if AHE is to be recognised 
as a post-colonial and transformed democratic institution. One can argue that Ubuntu valorises 
humaneness, although not in its gendered form, but in the idea that a person is a human being in 
totality and is part of humanity. Put clearly, it is apparent that, what matters most as far as Ubuntu 
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is concerned, or at least the meaning of the notion, is humaneness – not categories of 
humaneness such as able-bodied versus disabled, man versus woman, heterosexual versus 
homosexual. The question is: Does this mean that this is what happens in practice in Africa where 
the philosophy of Ubuntu is proclaimed and celebrated? Not really. The key point here is that the 
notion of Ubuntu (drawing on Butler’s gender-troubled idea) provides a framework that moves 
beyond categorisations, albeit that AHE practices negate it by actually categorising people. It 
should be noted that Africa has its own distinctive and dynamic background and culture that seems 
to induce the exclusion and inequality of African women in many ways.  
However, the aforementioned liberal perspective of Ubuntu as inclusion is insufficient to engender 
the internal inclusion of women in AHE. It is argued here that HE needs to transcend an inclusion 
that is based solely on gender categorisation and capability approaches. Rather, AHE ought to 
move towards the recognition of all human beings. More importantly, our attempt to transform post-
colonial AHE requires a paradigm shift beyond the liberal position. Therefore, the exploration of a 
post-liberal perspective in understanding Ubuntu may help to address the idea of internal exclusion 
in AHE. At this point, I turn to the Rancièrean notion of equality as disruption in order to provide a 
transformative understanding of Ubuntu that would promote the inclusion of women on the 
continent, especially in AHE. Put differently, if Ubuntu was extended to merely recognising internal 
inclusion, acknowledging people’s capabilities to exercise their freedoms, and looking beyond 
gender categorisations, women’s voices might still be excluded. Hence I present a different 
understanding of Ubuntu – one that can connect to Rancière’s idea of equality as voice with the 
constraints of internal exclusion in AHE. 
 
3.4 A Rancièrean conception of Ubuntu as equality of voice in higher education 
When constructing the concept of Ubuntu as inclusion following Rancière (1999), one infers a 
framework of thinking about equality that describes a way to act out, rather than distribute, equality. 
For Rancière, equality is the presupposition of those who act on their own behalf, rather than being 
represented by others. The idea of acting on their own behalf ties in very well with an inclusive HE, 
in which women, like other members, engage in educational deliberations and demand their 
deliberative spaces. Nonetheless, when people are being represented, the representatives act in 
support of others for the purpose of achieving equality on the assumption that they are acting on 
behalf of others, that is the marginalised groups (women, the disabled and the poor) who are 
incapable of asserting their own equality. For me, this idea of being represented is rather 
incapacitating and non-emancipatory, since the voices of the excluded will remain on the margin. 
To put it succinctly, Rancière points out that “equality is not a given that politics presses into 
service, an essence embodied in the law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining; it is a 
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mere assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it” (1999: 33). This 
simply means that equality cannot be achieved only when those who are deprived of it receive it 
through others, but also when they engage in educational deliberations on their own capacity. In 
other words, when women are receiving equality it would still mean that others must give it to them, 
which eschew their agency as equal citizens. In concurrence with Rancière (1999: 30), equality is a 
way of disrupting and attaining justice, and that is what people (women) are entitled to expect from 
the state or social institutions (higher education) in which they happen to find themselves.  
Attaining equality is based on how people ought to act and what they do while claiming their 
equality – even in African higher educational arrangements. Rancière argues that equality is not a 
principle of receptivity or passivity – attained by being visible in AHE without making any 
meaningful contribution. Rather, it is a principle of activity. I find Rancière’s view of people (women) 
engaging in a particular activity to demand equality, rather than waiting as passive recipients of 
what is being distributed to them, quite compelling. Women, and in fact all categories of people, 
ought to be included as a way of claiming their equality with their voice. This approach has the 
potential to engender equality in HE, as it could empower and change the position of women, 
enabling them to air their voices like their male counterparts. Thus, only when AHE creates an 
enabling atmosphere in which all voices are heard will equality be achieved. Women should not 
expect to receive equality as passive objects and to be recipients of services; they need to demand 
what is rightfully theirs through vigorous inclusion. In this way, an appropriate and active form of 
equality in AHE would be engendered.  
The potential question is how women and other excluded groups may demand their inclusion in 
post-colonial democratic institutions such as AHE? Following Rancière’s (1992: 4-8) analogy of 
Joseph Jacotot’s depiction of an intellectual framework among teachers and students, it follows 
that Rancière purports that all humans are equally intelligent, and that the difference between them 
lies not in their intelligence, but in their attention. Rancière writes that “what stultifies the common 
people is not the lack of instruction, but the belief in the inferiority of their intelligence” (1992: 39). 
The task of a teacher, then, is not to teach students what they do not know, because they are 
capable of finding out what it is that they do not know. This view that everyone, including women, is 
capable of learning in a way that can unleash their intelligence has implications for AHE. 
Consequently, the task of a teacher in a Rancièrean view is to motivate students to attend to their 
work so that their equal intelligence could find expression (May, 2008: 57-58). If inclusion as 
Ubuntu can be advanced by captivating the intelligence of students, that is, women and men, then 
there is no reason to exclude women when it comes to AHE.  
Responding to the query whether those who lack capacity and confidence, particularly African 
women, possibly might be able to act and claim their equality, Rancière (1992: 46) posits that 
equality can be acted out based on the equality of intelligence. To him, equality of intelligence does 
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not imply that students have the capability to score the same marks or grades; rather, it implies 
equality of intelligence on a standard base. In other words, intellectual skills may vary from one 
person to another, but we are equally capable of using those skills to communicate, to discuss, to 
make decisions, and to take account of the world around us. The presupposition behind equality of 
intelligence is the starting point for all politics. As regards the idea of understanding and practising 
equality, Rancière argues that “[o]ur problem isn’t proving that all intelligence is equal. It’s seeing 
what can be done under that supposition. And for this, it’s enough for us that the opinion be 
possible – that is, that no opposing truth can be proved” (1992: 46). Stated differently, it is clear 
that human beings possess equal intellectual abilities which can be nurtured. Equality should be 
approached on that basis. However, there are always people who contribute to public discussions 
and those who are assigned to contribute to private work (May, 2008: 124). Of those in the two 
groups, only a few members will determine the course of society, as is evident in the case of HE in 
Africa. One can clearly establish whose voice counts the most, and whose voice is not considered, 
because inequality is being perpetuated.  
Within this framework, the possibility of women articulating their viewpoints and making meaningful 
contributions to educational debates could produce equality. The emphasis should be on 
cultivating women who possess the attributes of intelligence, such as attentiveness and 
assertiveness. Equality ought to rest on a person’s ability to be attentive to what is seen and what 
is spoken in the world around. Intelligence is, first, “attention and research before being a 
combination of ideas” (Rancière, 1992: 54-56). Interestingly, in order to establish one another’s 
intelligence, people have to listen attentively to the point of view of others, and this can be done by 
higher education practitioners in Africa by including women and treating them as equal partners. 
The notion of being attentive in Rancière’s view is said to be “the moral foundation of the power to 
know”. However, this moral act, in turn, is not to be used to condemn others, but is a moral act of 
being truthful to oneself, and to start from the fact that “not knowing yourself would be a 
contradiction in terms” (1992: 57). Regarding the equality of intelligence, what I consider interesting 
is the exploration of the power that is set free by any man or woman when he or she judges 
himself/herself equal to everyone else, and judges everyone else equal to him/her. 
Moreover, are the “ambitious” ones mostly men who claim they are not inferior to anyone else, 
namely women and the other marginalised groups, while judging themselves superior to everyone 
else? Such an individual identifies himself or herself in the inequality of the social structure, rather 
than with the equality of intelligence. It is only people who can lay claim to equality, says Rancière, 
who are really equal. As such, some form of individualism or the existence of a sense of unity 
holding society together is an extra quality already in place. Everyone would have an equal share 
in something that would unite them even before relating to one another. Rancière (1992: 58) 
further states that “people are united because they are people, that is to say distant beings”. 
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Therefore, knowing this fact one is forced to communicate with others in order to live and survive in 
the world. This could be tied to the call for women’s inclusion in AHE. Women should be included 
not only because they are women, but because they are part of the community and of the world. 
There is no extra quality uniting people, no “reality of real”, no mystical segment (Rancière, 1992: 
64). For everyone to engage in the community of intelligence there is a need for the distant being 
to communicate, to translate and counter-translate in order to move ahead with others. This implies 
that, if women and other oppressed groups cannot articulate their views, it will be difficult for them 
to express their points of view in the community of engagement.  
Nevertheless, talking alone does not place a person in a community of intelligence, but only telling 
the truth; that is, by starting from a discrete place in oneself, one uses the power of reason to 
participate in the community of intelligence as a distinct but rational being (Rancière, 1992: 64). In 
other words, reason is not the privilege of the wise, but it is for everyone who uses power. In this 
respect, the community of intelligence ought to embody the ability to be attentive, which is a 
fundamental attribute of education. The point is that common ideas about intelligence tend to make 
learning dependent on inner faculties of the mind, rather than on outer events; things are 
illuminated rather than done. One can say that Rancière’s argument of being attentive takes on a 
larger meaning; it is not a call to a “common” teacher to pay attention. That is why he rightly points 
to three ways in which attentiveness could be inculcated – the first is the shift from intelligence to 
attention; the second explains what it means to be attentive, and the third considers the 
consequences of such a view for education, and for forms of teaching in AHE in particular 
(Rancière, 1992: 64-65). Finding one’s voice and the equality of intelligence could have a 
substantial influence and possibly may address inequality in AHE. He argues that equality should 
not be approached based on gender, but rather on the “equalisation of voice”. However, to 
advance “equalisation of voice”, AHE should reconstruct ways of including women and other 
marginalised groups based on voice. Basing inclusion on student or staff members’ percentages 
(women versus men) will not advance vigorous inclusion in Africa. Rather, the focus should be on 
voice. My conviction is that if Ubuntu is extended only in terms of communication, capabilities and 
gender, substantive inclusion might still not happen in AHE. For that reason, equalisation of voice 
as disruptive will enhance Ubuntu as inclusion. 
To promote “equalisation of voice”, AHE ought to nurture in all people, irrespective of their gender, 
some sense of assertiveness, which may enable women to engage in debates and offer their 
reasons with confidence. At the same time, there is a need to cultivate the ability to listen, with 
attentive listening to all members of an educational community as a way of promoting internal 
inclusion. The above view suggests that human beings (men and women) possess equal rights to 
higher educational discourses, in which inclusion and equality should move beyond gender. 
Rather, educational discourses should consider human capabilities in relation to the “equalisation 
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of voice”. In terms of voice, people will listen to the standpoints of others, without considering which 
gender or group is making the claim. The standard will be to judge whether an act makes sense or 
not. Subsequently, to attain the level where people listen attentively, Africa needs to educate 
citizens with such attributes.  
Bearing in mind that full inclusion may not be achieved within the human capabilities framework; 
the work of Rancière becomes important. If all human beings indeed have similar intellectual skills, 
then institutions and educators need to create an environment in which all students could unleash 
their potential and exercise attentive listening in their effort to attain equality. In my view, 
“equalisation of voice” is an ideal approach to the inclusion not only of women, but of other 
excluded groups such as homosexuals. Furthermore, a Rancièrean framework of equality as 
disruption through a voice is remarkable and could be used as a benchmark for internal inclusion. 
This means that being attentive is to be assertive and to disrupt the conversation. In other words, 
this rich conception offers a sufficient, reconstructed framework that moves beyond an inclusion 
based on capabilities and gender, to one that recognises human voice in an inclusive democratic 
HE in Africa, where many women and other marginalised groups aspire to experience humanity.  
 
3.5 Summary: Rethinking Ubuntu as Inclusion and making a Case for the “Equalisation 
of Voice”  
This chapter has explored the conceptions of inclusion and equality put forward by different 
theorists and tried to understand how AHE includes women. From an African perspective, the 
notion of Ubuntu could be interpreted as inclusion, because Ubuntu involves communal practices 
and seeing humanity in others as opportunities for inclusion. Nonetheless, women are still being 
excluded and, because their voices are not heard, equality is undermined. With respect to a 
reconstructed notion of Ubuntu as inclusion, one finds that the concept can promote internal 
inclusion. The chapter has also noted that internal exclusion is prevalent in AHE. Young (2000) 
proposes a communicative approach that is based on greeting, rhetoric and narrative to address 
internal exclusion. I have argued that the framework does not seem to enable AHE to mitigate 
women’s exclusion, especially in view of African cultural practices that disregard women and 
relegate them to inferior positions. I have examined Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a 
possible means of mitigating internal exclusion. Conversely, using capabilities as a standard for 
inclusion can lead to exclusion in AHE, because women, particularly those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, often lack the ability to claim and exercise their freedom. I have used Butler’s (1990) 
concept of gender-troubled to probe the idea of Ubuntu as inclusion, since it predominantly 
perceives human beings as gendered beings, that is, as woman and man.  
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However, I contend that a gendered approach may exclude more people who defy the socially 
constructed categories, such as homosexuals, bisexuals, transgendered or intersexed. Since the 
tendency in educational institutions is to use a single category of woman or man, this study calls 
for inclusion to transcend a dualist gender category and include all disadvantaged and excluded 
groups, irrespective of their differences (Tamale, 2011). Hence, I have argued that the views of 
Young, Nussbaum and Butler in relation to Ubuntu seem to be more liberal, and will cause an 
African liberal perspective to focus more on individual liberty, which will be insufficient to address 
the exclusion experienced by women in HE in Africa. The impasse calls for a shift beyond liberal to 
post-liberal theory, and a Rancièrean perspective of “equalisation of voice” could offer a 
deconstructed view for advancing women’s inclusion in AHE. Therefore, this chapter argues for an 
“equalisation of voice” as a plausible approach for enhancing Ubuntu as inclusion, since it 
possesses the ability to disrupt inequality and move beyond communication, capabilities and 
gender. I contend that Ubuntu as inclusion ought to transcend communication, capabilities and 
gender and move towards voice if substantive inclusion is to happen in AHE. The ensuing chapter 
will offer evidence of exclusion by doing two things: Firstly, I investigate women‘s experiences of 
inclusion. Secondly, I ascertain whether the proposition of AHE is commensurable with the 
“equalisation of voice” framework propounded in this chapter. The chapter will show that all human 
beings have the ability to practise Ubuntu; therefore, AHE should include all people’s voices in 
order to attain substantive inclusion.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXAMINING AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION DISCOURSES AND THEIR 
(IN)COMMENSURABILITY WITH THE NOTION OF INCLUSION AS EQUALISATION OF VOICE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that the African worldview of Ubuntu, which denotes inclusion within 
a communal practice in higher educational institutions, is limited, thus requires a reconstructed 
liberal framework as an impetus for transformation. Through the liberal lenses of Young (2000) and 
Nussbaum (2000), AHE should consider a communicative and capabilities approach as a standard 
for the inclusion of women and other excluded groups. Unlike other liberal scholars, Butler (1990) 
challenged inclusion based on the traditional gender category of woman and man, since these 
exclude those who fall outside the category of woman, such as lesbians, transgendered, 
intersexed and so forth. I echo her view that a gendered form of equality slightly undermines the 
internal inclusion of those without the capabilities and those who could not be identified within 
gender categories. An effort to address internal exclusion more substantively requires a move 
beyond a gendered approach towards a Rancièrean (1999), post-liberal conception of equalisation 
of voice as a laudable framework to promote inclusion. This framework possesses the ability to 
disrupt current practices of exclusion that possibly may ignite a move towards substantive 
inclusion. The edified related meanings of inclusion I argue for in this chapter can be couched in 
terms of the equalisation of voice: communicative, capabilities-oriented, and non-gendered action 
towards a maximisation of voice.  
Thus, Chapter 4 focuses on two main areas: firstly, examining discourses of AHE in relation to 
women’s experiences in order to provide evidence for concealed or inherent exclusion within 
inclusion. Secondly, to ascertain whether or not, women’s experiences of inclusion in such 
discourses are commensurable with the notion of inclusion as a manifestation of the equalisation of 
voice. I then shall employ the elements of an equalisation of voice framework as flashlights to 
explore exclusion in the discourse of AHE. This will happen by looking at three influential 
monographs by African scholars, particularly their views on women’s experiences in relation to 
exclusion and equality in HE in a post-colonial Africa. This consideration is premised on the 
availability of data, leading texts and analyses of women’s experiences of exclusion and inequality 
in HE on the continent. In conclusion, I shall put forward whether or not the proposition of inclusion 
in AHE requires a reconstructed approach to propel substantive inclusion via the equalisation of 
voice. This is what this chapter endeavours to undertake in advancing a reasonable means to 
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recognise the voices of women as equal human beings, not only as Africans but cosmopolitans too 
– an approach that hopefully will facilitate transformation and justice on the continent.  
 
4.2 Elucidating the equalisation-of-voice framework: communicative, capable and 
beyond a gendered view of inclusion   
This section reiterates the argument of the previous chapter that HE in Africa excludes women in 
subtle ways, despite various efforts to include all people and treat them equally. Although efforts 
are under way to mitigate exclusion through HE expansion policies, that is the external and internal 
inclusion of Young’s (2000) interpretation, it also is worth mentioning that their advocacy for 
inclusion based on gender advances further exclusion, hence my call for more substantive 
inclusion. A depiction of exclusion is inherent within forms of inclusion, of which statistics attest that 
women are physically visible in AHE, but their voices are not heard making a meaningful 
contribution to knowledge production, and also not in decision-making processes. This section 
offers a brief recap of the equalisation-of-voice framework reconstructed in the previous chapter. 
This framework appears to have the ability to transcend the taken-for-granted narrative and 
conception of Ubuntu as the inclusion of women within higher education in Africa. From my 
interrogation of the renowned theorists’ work, namely Young (2000), Nussbaum (2000), Butler 
(1990) and Rancière (1999), I arrive at an inclusive paradigm for a post-colonial democratic HE 
system that ought to constitute the necessary features, such as communicative, capabilities-
oriented, and non-gendered action towards voice. Although these features are interrelated, a post-
liberal conception of equalisation of voice holds a great deal of weight in engendering the 
substantive inclusion of all human beings, irrespective of gender.  
My contention is that, when space and deliberation underlie voice as a yardstick for inclusion 
towards equality in HE, the desired form of inclusion should be attained, particularly for women and 
other excluded groups. Simply put, gauging inclusion on the ground of gender is an inadequate 
approach and may not help Africa to address exclusion, particularly internal exclusion, which is 
rampant in higher education institutions. The interrelatedness of the constitutive elements should 
consider the dilemma of representation in universities and the dynamic of gender categorisation, 
which perceives women and those outside the gender category as not human enough to be 
considered.  
Therefore, the dismaying status of the excluded groups (women) in relation to their rights as equal 
human beings requires a post-liberal lens, which can bridge the gap of marginalisation and further 
oppression on the continent through the equalisation of voice. Based on the above, I offered a 
Youngian (2000) view of Ubuntu as inclusion, which inherently is exclusion (external and internal), 
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as discussed in the previous chapter. In terms of external exclusion, a woman will not be invited 
due to social status or race – women who are black, from a poor family or background, with limited 
education, single, divorced, widowed, homosexual and so forth – to democratic deliberations, 
although she is part of the HE system. Internal exclusion is when a person is physically 
represented in the HE democratic processes, but excluded by the use of unfamiliar language and 
so forth. Considering such encounters within AHE, specifically women’s experiences of internal 
exclusion require reconstruction if women are to be fully liberated. This reconstruction is 
necessarily due to African women’s dynamic experiences of domination and relegation to 
subservient positions in their society, including the pessimistic response to the contemporary 
women’s category of homosexuality, that is lesbians, intersexed, and transgendered (see Tamale, 
2011). Even though Ubuntu as inclusion embraces the celebrated idea of communal practices 
encompassing human dignity, interconnectedness and seeing humanity in others, such an 
understanding is restricted, since it internally excludes women from AHE. In my view, the way HE 
excludes women internally is an acknowledgement that women are not human enough.  
As a result, such a deficit view of women spawned a need for Nussbaum’s (2000) capabilities 
approach to be applied as a yardstick for inclusion and equality. Using the capabilities approach as 
a base for inclusion, women, like other human beings, ought to exercise their capabilities to 
achieve equality. However, while Nussbaum’s championing of the ten capabilities as rights are 
elucidated in universal declaration of human rights, African women’s capabilities remain subjected 
to oppression and exclusion, and might not necessarily permit them to engage in HE as equal 
members. Even though Nussbaum (2000: 78-80) underlines the idea of women and the human 
capabilities approach, I contend that this approach is limited and, in isolation, may not achieve 
internal inclusion. Hence, I call for AHE to cultivate students (women) with the abilities to engage 
since this is an indispensable task in mitigating injustice and oppression, which are ubiquitous and 
pervasive.  
I argued elsewhere that, in Namibian democratic education, “teachers and students learn to speak 
their minds and are prepared to confront or fight various injustices in their society, such as rape, 
murder, women and child abuse, domestic violence, armed robbery, theft, alcohol and drug abuse, 
teenage pregnancies, poverty, unemployment, tribalism, racism, exclusion of minority groups in 
decision making” (Shanyanana, 2011: 52-55). This simply means that democratic higher education 
institutions in Africa, especially universities, ought to cultivate citizens, particularly women, with 
valuable capabilities as a means for their inclusion. This is also the view Waghid (2008b: 23) called 
for, namely that democratic (African higher educational) institutions should nurture students and 
teachers with capabilities to take responsibility for their own ideas, to take intellectual risks, to 
develop a deep sense of respect for others, and to learn how to think critically with others in a 
democratic society. For this reason, considering African women’s status and inability to exercise 
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their rights and responsibilities, a paradigm shift transcending the boundaries of capabilities ought 
to be considered. At the same time, there is a need to debunk gender as a benchmark to advance 
equality. Therefore, a non-gendered, which I refer to as a-gendered, approach to engendering 
substantive internal inclusion and equality, is necessary.  
Some scholars have troubled the traditional gender category and its constant use as a surrogate 
for inclusion and equality in African higher education discourse (Butler, 1990; Tamale, 2011: 4). I 
agree that using gender to include may provoke more internal exclusion, since it may as well be 
used to exclude others. This is why Harding (1998) disrupted the traditional category of woman 
and suggested a difference-sensitive reworking of feminism to be linked to wider coalitions of 
oppressed and exploited groups amongst black, lesbian, working-class and colonised women. I 
restate that the aforementioned framework, which emphasises communication, capabilities and 
gendered action, is insufficient to advance the internal inclusion necessary for transforming current 
impoverished practices. As a result, efforts to mitigate the dilemma of internal exclusion will be 
addressed by arguing further for Rancière’s equalisation of voice view, which moves beyond 
capabilities and gender categories and appears plausible for a desirable post-colonial AHE. For 
me, a voice could be a defensible impetus and appropriate means if substantive inclusion is to be 
engendered in HE. I agree with Wiredu (2004) and Appiah (2006) that we need to move beyond 
our local understanding and explore different perspectives in attempts to reconcile the local and 
global insights to bring meaningful transformation to the unjust African higher education practices. 
What follows is my cursory glance at the discourse of AHE in relation to women’s experiences of 
exclusion. 
 
4.3 Scanning African higher education discourses in relation to the experiences and 
roles of women 
In this section I examine the discourse on AHE by renowned African scholars and their notions of 
women’s inclusion and gender equality. The aim is to confirm my claim that exclusion is prevalent 
in HE, not only of the traditional category of woman, but also of the experiences of other excluded 
groups, as retrieved from the discourses. The goal is not to probe the situation in all universities in 
all fifty-four African countries, but to offer a sample of purposefully selected discourses on HE in 
some countries where evidence is readily available. The investigation provided a general 
representation of women, as well as their encounters with and experiences of exclusion, to 
demonstrate how such experiences hamper their flourishing as students, staff members and, 
invariably, leaders at all levels of society. At the onset, it is imperative to acknowledge that the 
selected studies have contributed immensely to pioneering projects on women on the continent. 
Undoubtedly, without their initiatives and advocacy, the current state of women’s access to and 
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inclusion in HE would have remained a dream. At the same time, the analyses touch on women’s 
experiences and interrogate their encounters to determine possible gaps that hinder total inclusion. 
Firstly, I begin with Kwesiga’s (2002) ground-breaking analysis in her book, Women’s Access to 
Higher Education in Africa, a study in which she shares women’s experiences in Uganda. 
Secondly, I engage with the HE discourses in the volume edited by Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004), 
titled African Universities for the Twenty-first Century, which focuses on whether women should be 
cheerleaders or partners with men. I draw on women’s experiences related by selected African 
scholars who share the same concern about HE, especially in some African universities. Thirdly, I 
consider Assié-Lumumba’s (2007) exposition on Women in Higher Education in Africa. The 
primary task is to identify the views of various scholars on women’s experiences in HE in Africa, 
and how their involvement could transform HE on the continent.   
 
 Before outlining the discourse on AHE, it is important to offer some remarks on the origin of the 
term discourse and clarify its use in this chapter. This is because discourse on HE serves as the 
primary data in this chapter. According to Wittgenstein (1958: 50e), the term “discourse” can be 
defined and interpreted in different ways based on the reader’s perspective or background and 
culture. The term discourse comes from the Latin word “discursus”, which denotes “conversation” 
or “speech”. The term can be traced to the period of post-structuralism, the era when theorists 
such as Foucault (1980), Derrida (1976) and others worked diligently to engage with and transcend 
the boundaries of structures. This means that the word discourse is directly related to different 
theories of power and the state, at least as long as discourse is seen in relation to reality itself. This 
conception of discourse is largely derived from the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. 
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (2005: 416) denotes discourse as written 
and spoken communication. It can also reflect a formal way of thinking that is expressed through 
language, a social boundary that defines what can be said about a specific topic.  
According to Foucault (1980), the concept discourse can be related to power, as it operates by 
rules of exclusion. Therefore, discourse is controlled by objects, what can be spoken of; ritual, 
where and how one may speak; and the privileged, who may speak. Crystal (1992: 25) states that 
“discourse is a continuous stretch of (especially written and spoken) language larger than a 
sentence often constituting a coherent unit such as a sermon, argument, joke, or narrative”. 
Discourse can also symbolise novels, short conversations or groans (Cook, 1990: 7). Furthermore, 
drawing from the post-structuralist maxim, Derrida argues that “[t]here is nothing outside the text” 
(Derrida, 1976: 158). In his view, the duality of discourse is also glimpsed in the conceptualisation 
of the absent trace. This means that discourse may exclude what is simultaneously exterior and 
interior to it. For instance, African universities aim to include all people (women and men), but end 
up internally excluding women unintentionally due to the emphasis on gender categories and the 
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like. Derrida’s (1978: 3-4) approach to language is one of deconstruction and the critique of 
Western metaphysics, which has always been structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities: truth 
versus error; being versus nothingness; science versus myth. Meaning is a function of presence 
(the written or spoken) and absence, that is, the chain of suppressed signifiers upon which the 
meaning of the present is based.  
In agreement with Derrida (1978: 4), I posit that African higher education discourse on women’s 
exclusion is elsewhere, never in the words we use; it is always absent. For this reason, we require 
a “constant questioning and dismantling of implicit or explicit notions of presence and a 
concentration on the play of metaphors and the play of language” (Derrida, 1978: 4). It is 
necessary to look for meanings, which are inherent in views such as access, equality and inclusion 
within African higher education discourse, and to go beyond the text or margins in an attempt to 
identify what is not thought about women’s inclusion. For me, critical questions about who is 
included, how one is included, and why, are necessary conditions to determine the form of 
inclusion in the discourse of AHE aimed to achieve what is not thought about women’s exclusion. 
From the above perspectives, it is evident that discourse represents what cannot be identified in 
the use of language, particularly what is silenced and not said (Derrida, 1976, 1978) on a particular 
issue, in this case, HE and the inclusion of women in Africa. Thus, the thought of discourse as a 
language can also be viewed as a social practice whereby social structures determine the way 
higher education practices evolve and are shaped.  
Bearing in mind the above understanding, this chapter will employ the Derridian deconstructive 
analytical lens to engage with the post-colonial higher education discourse and arguments that 
focus on the underlying assumptions about the role of women. The aim is to reveal the hidden and 
absent meaning in relation to the reconstructed equalisation-of-voice framework. Those who 
engage in the analysis of HE and women’s inclusion in such social practices might view, dissect 
and perceive such concepts differently. Thus, unpacking and questioning scholars’ analyses and 
arguments, narratives and proposed ideas, while focusing on their commonalities and respective 
divergent views, could guide us into a deeper understanding of what is necessary for post-colonial 
HE in Africa. For this reason, I intend to investigate the dominant discourse of African scholars on 
the call for women’s inclusion and equality in HE to establish whether it could lead to emancipation 
or would exacerbate further exclusion. In the search for authentic African texts on African voices, I 
find the views of Kwesiga (2002), Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004) and Assié-Lumumba (2007) on the 
dilemma facing women quite pertinent. Although these works foreground my analysis, other African 
voices that share the same concern will be acknowledged. However, I now turn to the experiences 
of women within the discourse on AHE, beginning with Kwesiga’s study, which I regard as ground-
breaking on the continent.  
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4.3.1 Women’s (lack of) access to higher education in Africa: Kwesiga (2002) analysis  
Kwesiga’s (2002) interrogation of women’s access to HE in Africa rests on a call for consideration 
and appreciation of all (women and men) in terms of resources and accessibility within their given 
democratic society. She postulates that, although divergent theories, concepts and approaches 
have been outlined regarding the causes of exclusion and inequality, as well as their remedies, 
women and men are still being treated differently in African society, particularly at higher education 
institutions (Kwesiga, 2002: 8). She further argues that such “theories were formulated or 
generated outward the sub-Saharan Africa”, which is the context of her book. The premise of her 
argument is that the proposed theoretical frameworks were designed for Western economic 
contexts and were inconsistent with the needs and aspirations of Africans. In her view, this 
established inconsistence is expressed in both theory and practice, and has effects on all those 
involved in HE, namely pupils, educators, parents, entire communities, as well as states, 
international agencies and donors. Most importantly, these effects are more detrimental to women 
than men in AHE, due to a lack of access, exclusion and inequality.  
Furthermore, despite numerous policies and initiatives those were developed to address past 
inequalities in many Africa countries (in sub-Saharan Africa), women’s access to HE remains a 
delusion (Kwesiga, 2002: 24). Most importantly, her critical interrogation of the theories and 
concepts is coupled with the strengths and weaknesses of the central social themes, such as 
human capital and investment, gender inequality, and women and development. In her analysis of 
women’s access, she shows that, in terms of human capital for economic returns and investment in 
industrialised countries, women are more capable of finding mechanisms for succeeding in waged 
employment, trading and coping with housework (Kwesiga, 2002: 11-13). Nevertheless, she notes 
that minimal information is available on the challenges women face in accessing HE, earning and 
their rates of return. Specifically, the average return for women with secondary and HE is lower 
than for men. This attests to the dilemma of exclusion in HE, where women’s lower return is 
blamed on their reproductive role, as it is viewed as an alternative occupation to paid employment. 
Kwesiga notes, for example, that besides women’s status in the home, reproduction is seen as an 
alternative occupation. At the same time, employers may decide to pay women less than men, 
since they are most likely to go on leave to bear and raise children. She further points to the 
dilemma facing girls and women regarding the state of gendered schooling – from primary to 
tertiary education – in sub-Saharan Africa. Her argument that women lack access to education (at 
all levels), especially in Uganda, is clear and convincing. She shows that different factors, 
complexities and dynamics contribute to unequal access to education in Africa, using Uganda as a 
case study. Her study highlights the problem of achieving equal access and adequate inclusion, as 
well as developing a just society on the continent.  
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4.3.1.1 The connection between girls’ schooling and women’s access to higher 
education  
The fact that Uganda, like a few other African countries, acquired independence in the 1960s 
shows that the impasse that inhibits women’s access to HE is undeniably a problem to the 
developmental agenda of the continent. The presupposition is that the women’s access to HE in 
countries that experienced early independence should have been fully attained. Nonetheless, 
Kwesiga argues that the lack of access is provoked by the absence of girls from schooling, which 
ultimately undermines women’s inclusion in HE and in other aspects of society (2002: 8). Kwesiga 
reflects on her first-hand experience of the journey in her quest for access to education as an 
African (Ugandan girl and woman). Her interest in examining the lack of women’s access to 
education could be tied to her encounters as a girl growing up in the rural areas of the South-west 
of Uganda. She acknowledges her good fortune of being one of the first girls in her district to 
complete elementary schooling and continue to the secondary level (Kwesiga, 2002: 8-12). I could 
identify with her narrative as evidence of the challenges experienced by girls and women on the 
continent, just as in my story and those of many others from other parts of the continent. Writing on 
women’s access to HE in other African countries, specifically in Ethiopia, which is a multi-ethnic 
and traditional society and one of the least developed countries in the world, Wondimu (2004: 1) 
also notes that the participation of girls and women in education is a critical issue.  
 
Although the country’s participation rate of girls is lower than that of boys at all education levels, in 
HE it stands at approximately 1%. Considering the overall participation rate in the country and the 
position of girls, the development and percentage of women accessing HE become questionable. 
Teferra and Altbach (2003: 9) argue that, as in other African countries, the stagnation of change 
and the effort to remedy the gender and regional imbalances in Ethiopia are due to subtle 
resistance, implicit and explicit oversight, a lack of serious recognition, and ignorance. This point 
proves that the crisis of a lack of female access to HE is not peculiar to Uganda per se, but is a 
continental problem. Therefore, I would argue that a call for women’s access to HE needs to 
specify the type of access ─ either formal or epistemological ─ in order to formalise the type that 
contemporary AHE urgently requires. Morrow’s (2007: 39-40) illustration of these two forms of 
access that HE may offer, that is formal access and epistemological access, is apposite here. As 
underlined in Chapter 1 of this study, formal access emphasises expanding the university to the 
externally excluded by using various means, such as affirmative action and quota systems, in order 
to enable women’s statistical representation.  
Through formal access, HE has made major strides in addressing external exclusion. However, 
those included are concomitantly experiencing subtle forms of exclusion by being denied 
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epistemological access – in particular their lack of opportunity to contribute to knowledge 
production, engage in deliberation and contribute to decision making and policy formulation, what I 
refer to as exercising voice. In my view, only epistemological access can lead to the substantive 
inclusion that the current AHE requires. Only when women, like men, possess the skills and 
cognitive ability that will make their voices heard will a robust inclusion be engendered. The 
problem lies on having women in HE (formal access), but actually lack opportunities to make 
meaningful contributions (epistemological access) to decision makings and policy formation, and 
articulate their views on issues that might concern them. The point I am making is that creating 
enabling opportunities for women to grow intellectually and make a contribution to knowledge, 
which is affording them epistemological access, is indispensable. 
Regarding women’s inclusion in AHE, staff members and researchers connect to the limitation in 
girls’ access to schooling, which shows the challenges confronting women in accessing HE, not 
only in Uganda, but in the entire sub-Saharan Africa. Again, Kwesiga’s personal access to 
schooling and eventually to HE placed her in the position of being a highly knowledgeable, 
experienced female scholar, faculty member and female activist who is able to engage in issues 
related to women’s marginalisation and oppression in her university and state. She acquired an 
education which shaped her position as Dean at a University in Uganda, and her current status at 
a different institution as one of the few African women to hold the office of Chancellor.  
Again, Kwesiga’s experience and contributions to regional and national initiatives justify her role as 
a champion of ways to mitigate the plight of women in HE and other levels of society. In other 
words, her narrative and extensive experience of the crisis give evidence of the crises experienced 
by women in accessing HE. She suggests that access is an approach that could transform the 
unfavourable and exclusive nature of African (higher) education systems. In other words, access 
ought to be a first step by which women could experience inclusion. Thus, without access, plans to 
transform university education become worthless. Her argument triggers a question, “why educate 
women?” In response, Kwesiga (2002: 8-12) offers two reasons to justify the need for educating 
women. Firstly, permitting women to access HE will help them to make an intensive and 
meaningful contribution to their own well-being, as well as to the economic development of their 
communities and country. Secondly, women’s access to HE could enable them to contribute to the 
health of their families. It is important to note that Kwesiga’s call for female access to education is 
connected to the idea of capability as a mechanism to attain inclusion and equality. In terms of 
access as inclusion based on gender, her advocacy for girls’ access to schooling as a means of 
enabling women’s access to HE in Africa is worth noting.  
However, I find her view inadequate, since her advocacy tends to be biased towards external 
inclusion. In my view, her call for equality in accessing education seems secured within a 
traditional gender categorisation of woman and man. This makes sense because the call for 
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schooling on the continent, which also favours boys more than girls, is gendered. She argues that 
access to education based on gender has been established as, and remains, a national concern. 
Her analysis focuses on the traditional categorisation of gender, that is, woman and man, but it 
says less about other groups within the category of woman, namely those with disabilities, single 
mothers, widows, divorced women, and so forth. Likewise, she is silent on the groups within the 
woman category that transcend the traditional category and who ought to be able to access HE, 
such as homosexuals, bisexuals and so forth. These include lesbians, transgendered, bisexuals 
and intersexed. In my opinion, the approach of grouping all women into one category may place 
the call for equal access in jeopardy. I contend that Kwesiga's advocacy for women’s access aims 
to achieve inclusion. However, her approach is limited in engendering equality. If gender is 
employed as a yardstick for achieving equality, then all groups within the category of woman 
should be considered. If not, then the call for women’s access might not help contemporary AHE to 
attain substantive transformation.  
 
Thus, girls’ and women’s access to education points to the “value of education as a tool to reduce 
these barriers” (Kwesiga, 2002: 152). It is on the basis of this background that she advocates for 
girls’ access to schooling, claiming that, as a strategy for “enabling Ugandan women to move 
through the system to HE [it] is without doubt the most sure way to consolidate the gains made so 
far and to open up new horizons” (2002: 152). The underlying assumption in her argument is that, 
as soon as girls access schooling, women would invariably achieve access to higher education as 
a way of inclusion. Although one would agree with Kwesiga’s view here, in current HE a mere call 
for access to HE does not guarantee internal inclusion to achieve gender equality. The fact that 
gender is used as a benchmark for inclusion towards equality shows that African universities could 
be promoting further exclusion of other groups that fall out of the traditional gender category of 
man and woman. Thus, African institutions provoke exclusion when using gender to determine 
access to (higher) education, which induces inequality in women's access to education through 
course offerings, types of secondary school (for instance gendered schools, i.e. girls’ or boys’ 
schools), and the restrictive nature of the system (Kwesiga, 2002: 248). These factors lead to the 
absence of educated women who could be role models, mentors and guides to girls and young 
women in Africa.  
She has rightly noted that education should be a human right and resource for every citizen (both 
women and men) to enjoy. This makes sense because access to education confers benefits on 
individuals, families, communities, and society at large. The essence of the argument is that 
“educating women provides a crucial escape the route from poverty traps that places the continent 
at the tail end of those with access to the essential resources of modern development” (Kwesiga, 
2002: 249). Further, the restrictive nature of the education system in which schools and courses 
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are gendered can be substantiated with the observation by Ajayi et al. (1996), which affirms that, 
even three decades after women were granted equal access at independence in most African 
countries, women made up only 6% of the professoriate. One can regard Kwesiga’s championing 
of women's access to HE and the call for gender mainstreaming and holistic approaches as a 
framework for bridging the gap of inequality between genders on the continent. Even though there 
are clear links between access and inclusion, her focus is rather on women in HE who are not 
afforded the opportunity to make meaningful contributions to democratic processes. This is what 
Morrow (2007: 40) refers to as access in two forms ─ formal and epistemological ─ which was 
already mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study. Formal access entails granting students (i.e. women) 
access to HE, whilst epistemological access occurs when those represented are no longer denied 
the opportunity to make meaningful contributions to decision making, policy formation and 
knowledge production.  
From the above understanding of access, Kwesiga’s perception of women’s access to education 
appears to promote formal access without considering the possibility of epistemological access. 
Indeed, formal access is the first step in women’s inclusion in HE, but there is a need for women to 
contribute to the democratic educational processes for equality to occur. Similarly, from Young’s 
(2000) idea of exclusion inherent in inclusion (internal and external), as alluded to Chapter 3 
(section 3.3.1) of this study, one could say that women require both forms of inclusion to achieve 
equality. The focus on formal access can be seen as a step forward in mitigating external 
exclusion, where groups that were not represented are brought in through various strategies. 
However, if the focus of HE is to achieve formal access, which seems to be case, epistemological 
access may not be achieved. Thus, addressing exclusion would become mere lip-service. Young’s 
analysis shows a high interest in gender mainstreaming, which is linked to the gender dichotomy of 
woman and man in the educational setting, particularly in HE. The concept of access is a related 
meaning and can be seen as a first strategy in promoting inclusion, such that women in Africa 
presumably may experience inclusion in accessing HE.  
However, accessing HE formally does not guarantee inclusion, as a result of subtle ways in which 
exclusion is further perpetuated. The mission to address women’s exclusion can be traced from 
different contexts that are local, regional and international. UNESCO made an urgent call for 
greater access at the World Conference on Higher Education in 1998. The conference centred on 
“equality of access” (UNESCO, 1998a). It is clear that HE discourse on the notion of inclusion as 
transformation has tended to revolve around the idea of access. It also has been noted that African 
studies advocate the idea of access as an approach to inclusion. Hitherto, I have argued that mere 
access (formal), which I refer to as external inclusion, is limited and the use of gender as a means 
to achieve equality may not help to engender substantive inclusion.  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
 
4.3.2 Making women partners with but not cheerleaders for men in African higher 
education  
At this point, I examine the notion of inclusion in African universities and the move towards greater 
participation, which has become an urgent imperative since the onset of post-colonial HE in Africa. 
Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004) focus on women’s experiences and roles in African universities and 
how such institutions could direct HE in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study offers a 
fundamental discourse on the notion of access to knowledge for post-colonial African society, as 
well as issues that revolve around equal opportunities and gender equality.  
In the discourse, access implies all efforts and measures taken by African higher education 
institutions to widen educational opportunities for all citizens as AHE moved into the twenty-first 
century (Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004). Different contributors to this volume deal with different issues 
that are regarded as crucial for Africa to move into the new century. For instance, Okeke inquires 
whether women are partners with or cheerleaders for men in AHE. Her response is that, despite 
political independence and modernisation in Africa, the role of women in the modern economy has 
been and still is limited to that of wives and mothers. For this reason, women remain excluded from 
decisions and actions that define nation building (Okeke, 2004: 480). Okeke’s argument is 
significant, as it builds on Kwesiga’s analysis of women’s access to AHE. In her view, the fast-
growing privatisation of HE in Africa challenges and poses a threat to women’s progress in 
achieving internal inclusion at all levels of society.  
Furthermore, she poses a critical question ─ “what is the purpose of HE for African women?” In 
response, she calls for a move beyond an inadequate form of women’s access within a general 
expansion that would establish a genuine form of inclusion. It should be noted that Okeke’s 
framework debunks taking women’s formal access for granted, and demands epistemological 
access. She points out that any measures aimed at raising African women’s profile in HE should 
re-examine the content and utility of this training, with particular reference to the barriers 
preventing women from participating in nation building as full citizens and partners with men 
(Okeke, 2004: 480-486). Her disquiet about the position of women in HE provoked the question 
whether they are partners with or just mere cheerleaders for men. This shows how external 
exclusion is addressed, as women are statistically and physically visible in HE but, unlike men, 
their voices are not considered, and this indicates a form of internal exclusion. For Okeke, attention 
should be paid to the type of training women receive, which may instil in them the ability to 
participate as full citizens in all developmental deliberations. The presupposition is that only when 
women are well trained will they acquire full citizenship through participation at the same rate as 
men.  
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Therefore, she argues that, if women are to participate fully and effectively in their countries’ 
development, sufficient provision has to be made for them in terms of both access and distribution 
in the various fields of specialisation (Okeke, 2004: 486). In other words, the defender of access as 
inclusion ought to consider women’s backgrounds, struggles and their gender or status in society. 
This implies that women’s exclusion could be linked to their individual position in the society. For 
instance, if a woman is from a poor family, with limited knowledge, widowed, divorced or a single 
mother, her contribution to HE might be disregarded, since she is already marginalised. The point 
is that HE should also require women, as they progress through the system, to question the 
various facets of the present social arrangement that impede women’s inclusion (Okeke, 2004: 
491).  
For instance, an educated African woman should not simply accept the social dictates that define 
women’s access to land, the treatment of widows, and the cultural myths surrounding, among other 
things, female circumcision. Interestingly, Okeke regards the distribution of access as a process of 
ascertaining that women acquire inclusion in HE is limited. This means that affording women mere 
access in a distributive manner, that is external inclusion, can be not only an empowering activity, 
but also a disempowering one. This is because women may just accept their presence, without 
being able to claim equal space and rights to contribute to democratic processes through a voice, a 
way of attaining internal inclusion. It is puzzling that women appear complacent about being mere 
recipients – what Rancière’s idea of voice referred to in the previous chapter – “passive receivers” 
instead of “active claimers” of equality in AHE.  
In my view, although African women possibly expect distributed access, the challenge could be the 
type of formal access that will enable them to participate in democratic processes in HE as equal 
and full citizens with their male counterparts. Furthermore, HE in Africa should also question the 
conditions of those women’s lives and the cultural elements that justify their subordinate status in 
their society (Okeke, 2004: 490). The same sentiment is expressed by Kwesiga (2002), who 
argues that the content of women’s education from the primary level on should be questioned, 
since it heralds women’s representation and inclusion in HE. This view confirms the painful 
encounters women have in HE on the continent. It is against this background that any attempt to 
enhance the quality of African women’s education at the tertiary level must take into account the 
widespread forces that shape and influence the social conception of who they are and what they 
can do in relation to their male counterparts (Okeke, 2004: 488). This point is apparent in 
Nussbaum’s (2000) capabilities approach, which expects that, like men, women should be able to 
express themselves and show their abilities in HE deliberations as a way of inclusion. However, 
the dynamic and complex nature of the African woman does not prepare her to have the capability 
to express herself like her male counterpart. In my view, the call for a distributed form of access 
appears insufficient, as noted in the previous chapter. Thus, Africa should formulate programmes 
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that transcend women’s formal access towards achieving epistemological access, which will 
enable them to interrogate the cultural beliefs and practices confronting their inclusion in HE.  
 
 4.3.2.1 Portrayal of women’s representation in higher education policy initiatives 
In relation to policy development, Okeke (2004: 491) cautions that African governments should re-
assess the hindrances to women’s access to HE and their participation in nation building as full 
citizens who enjoy every right to tap into existing social opportunities. She notes that the crises 
surrounding the participation of girls and women in schooling and paid work in Africa make a 
powerful statement about the roles that society has carved for them in the task of nation building 
when compared to their male counterparts. According to Okeke, the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD), like other policies, appears silent on the issue of women’s access to HE 
and their internal inclusion in democratic educational deliberations. She argues that it would not 
make sense for African leaders and policy makers to promote levels and kinds of training for 
women that would encourage them to aspire to positions that they are not expected to assume. It 
is not surprising that, in the areas of public governance and decision making, the NEPAD 
document points to the potential input women could make, but leaves untouched the social 
structures already in place that deny them the platform to be seen as an important political force to 
be reckoned with.  
As cheerleaders for men in African political forums, women “observe”, for the most part, the 
machinery for public decision making (Okeke, 2004: 483; Okeke & Onu, 2006: 84-86). There are 
other, more significant concerns around women’s representation than the engagement in higher 
education deliberations. It is argued that, without women’s strong presence in such forums, the 
huge economic burden of social survival placed on their backs would receive the usual lip service. 
Inasmuch as it does not earmark any crucial steps for integrating gender into the structures of 
public governance, especially in sectors where women’s contributions have been duly recognised, 
NEPAD’s stance does not necessarily question the status quo. The above statements say much 
about the authors’ take on access and inclusion in Africa, particularly in HE through the African 
initiative NEPAD.  
Suggesting ways to address the crises of exclusion and inequality, Okeke and Onu (2006: 87-88) 
identify gender sensitivity in the policy-making process because it could facilitate the global 
struggle for poverty reduction to a level that meets, at least, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) set by the United Nations Development Programme. They argue that African women’s 
lack of power is at the very centre of their inability to assert their claims of equal partnership with 
men in the development process, including in higher education. By ignoring this state of affairs, 
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African countries continue to endorse not only women’s disempowerment, but also the massive 
waste of human resources on the altar of traditions and cultures that block women’s progress. 
Thus, for Okeke (2004: 490), the continent cannot move forward without confronting the roots of 
cultures and traditions that justify the negative treatment that African women receive at the hands 
of men and the state. She laments women’s experiences in AHE, asking: ”How then could women 
participate as equal partners with men in nation building when they remain outside the forums of 
decision-making, struggling to put together the pieces of community life as the paths to social 
progress unwrap their challenges?” 
 In response, she calls for different mechanisms that could enable women to thrive just like men in 
HE in Africa. More importantly, she argues that expanding HE should not be divorced from the 
nature and scope of training that African women receive at the tertiary level, but ought to be at the 
centre (2004: 490-491). Her suggestion is that an African woman’s training should also provide a 
platform on which she could pose critical questions about those practices that oppress women, 
such as issues of cultural stagnation, and policies and traditions that burden the transformative 
agenda of women’s empowerment, including exclusion. This is a form of epistemological access 
that is absent in HE and that tends to perpetuate internal exclusion. It is evident that women, when 
encountering internal exclusion, lack the abilities and skills to interrogate the mounting ills 
confronting their life on a daily basis, hence my call to critically analyse HE discourses as a way to 
emancipate them from the various oppressions they experience. In addition, HE should equip 
African women with the ability to face the challenges of highly competitive and shrinking national 
labour markets.  
However, my concern is how women acquire capabilities if they are internally excluded from policy 
making on and development of the curricula that should emancipate and unleash their potential? In 
this regard, Okeke (2004: 490) postulates that, for African women, HE should also question the 
conditions of their lives and the cultural elements that legitimate their subordinate status in society, 
including the practice of African Ubuntu, which disregard women and consign them to menial work. 
In relation to her view, it is painful to note that, even though women are physically visible in HE, 
they are internally excluded, which makes it difficult for them to influence knowledge production, 
policy making and decision making on crucial democratic processes in HE. It goes without saying 
that African institutions with projects on women’s access, even in HE, cannot be trusted to 
engender substantive inclusion. Nawe (2004: 493) states that, in the post-independence period, 
HE played a dominant role in the public sector. Considering the thrust of HE, where everyone 
sought to acquire knowledge and skills to develop their nation, women’s participation, like that of 
men, became indispensable. The winds of change triggered different policy strategies for 
enhancing women's participation in HE. For this reason, different scholars have employed various 
strategies to advance women’s participation as a means to demand equity.  
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Nevertheless, despite efforts to address the predicament, women’s access to and participation in 
HE (as consumers and providers) have remained gravely low, not only in Tanzania, but in Africa at 
large (Nawe, 2004: 493). Thus, the primary reasons that propel the enhancement of women’s 
participation can be associated with historical developments, socialisation processes, and the 
demands of the working environment; but, most importantly, the combination of female productive 
and reproductive roles that could lead to fair performances at all levels. Nawe identifies two major 
groups set up to address the anomaly, namely: (a) affirmative measures aimed at redressing the 
past imbalances related to history; and (b) advocacy to address problems in all the areas 
mentioned above. Her study examined published and unpublished material, as well as interviews 
and beneficial experience (irrespective of gender) regarding the set of strategies (e.g. affirmative 
action (AA)) put in place to enhance women's participation (Nawe, 2004: 494). Interestingly, a 
dominant concern is that women in Africa can be noticed in public engagements (seminars, 
workshops and others) where issues pertaining to HE are deliberated. However, only rarely are 
women able to make contributions at the same pace as other representatives. I agree with the 
preceding view that, though NEPAD has attempted to introduce profound initiatives, its foundations 
remain unstable as long as it refuses to consider equal spaces for both African women and men in 
its transformation project.  
Okeke (2004: 491) mainly urges AHE to prepare women for full participation in the process of 
defining the content and nuances of Africa’s development and policy path in the twenty-first 
century. Although I echo Okeke’s analysis, the pertinent question is whether women’s lack of 
access and exclusion can be blamed solely on men and policies. Are there subtle ways in which 
women have contributed to their own exclusion? In my view, women should also be held 
accountable for their exclusion, especially those who made it to management and leadership 
positions, since nothing is said about their efforts to empower their fellow women. There are cases 
in which women who hold leadership positions deny other women the opportunity to climb the 
ladder. In some cases, women leaders allege that they usually feel unsafe having their fellow 
women as subordinates because of the latter’s negative attitudes towards their leadership. It 
appears then that, despite their call for inclusion, women are equally responsible for their own 
internal exclusion from HE in Africa. Unlike Kwesiga’s remarkable contribution to women’s projects 
in Uganda, other studies say little about how women in senior positions have advocated for 
projects that could advance substantive inclusion. 
 
4.3.2.2 Women’s experiences of marginalisation in higher education   
Unravelling women’s experiences of internal inclusion in AHE, Kwesiga (2002) and Okeke (2004) 
assert that female students and academics in African universities are often afraid to speak out to 
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demand transformation. This inability is further compounded by the fact that many women 
academics at managerial levels lack strong networks to encourage mentorship and to create a 
unified voice. Where changes are happening which could galvanise the chances of women to take 
their position as partners with, rather than cheerleaders of, men in HE on the continent, they are 
slow to yield the desired outcomes for women in academia. Despite the crisis of women’s lack of 
access to HE, other social factors block their interest in HE and hinder their human rights within the 
public space of higher learning. In a case study done in Namibia, a country that had only one 
university at the time of the study, Katjavivi & Otaala (2004) observed that the HE institution 
appeared to be an unfriendly environment for women. Their study explored women’s experiences 
in HE, particularly at the university level and in relation to the scourge of HIV and AIDS in the 
country. Katjavivi & Otaala (2004) make reference to Kelly’s study, which challenges the ignorance 
of the impact of HIV and AIDS on HE in Africa (in this case Zambia). The authors argue that the 
epidemic posed a crisis, particularly because of women’s extreme vulnerability and marginalisation 
in universities in Africa (Katjavivi & Otaala, 2004: 580). In the case of Namibia, like many African 
countries, there is evidence of the increasing prevalence of HIV and AIDS, especially because girls 
and women fall victim to the virus through what they call “sugar-daddy” practices on the campus. 
More so, Katjavivi & Otaala refer to Kelly’s report that “the entire university community – but in 
particular the university management – needs to face this threat squarely” (2004: 579). In the 
context of university life today, the institutional culture is in danger of affirming risk more than 
safety that is of HIV and AIDS.  
Ironically, Katjavivi & Otaala caution that the “university in this case Namibia is in danger of 
affirming death more than life” (2004: 579-580). Given the above dilemma of sexual harassment 
and HIV and AIDS in HE, one can attest to the fact that HE can be perceived to be a dangerous 
environment for women, which invariably will hamper their participation and thriving, unlike their 
male counterparts. The point I am making is that, if women (as students and staff members of HE 
institutions) experience such hostility in public institutions, which are supposed to empower them, 
the possibility of affording them epistemological access is limited. Thus, the AHE environment, 
which is swamped by vicious discrimination, may not adequately cultivate women to develop 
intellectually and empower them to challenge the status quo. Katjavivi & Otaala (2004) assert that 
the university is often an inhospitable public space for women. Nonetheless, nothing is said about 
the possibility that women’s access to and participation in decision making could be enhanced, 
considering the predicament of HIV and AIDS, sexual harassment and so forth − which seem to 
hinder their progress in subtle ways.  
Although the researchers were more interested in the effects of HIV and AIDS in HE, I cannot see 
how women’s experiences in such an institution can be divorced from their participation and 
inclusion. My contention is that issues of vulnerability and exclusion are interrelated, and that only 
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when the attitude to women’s contribution to deliberations in HE is transformed will such a 
predicament be mitigated. In my view, the above data paints a dismal picture of how women are 
explicitly and implicitly excluded from the university through under-representation, since the few 
women representatives only have had access to lower-level positions, where they cannot really 
influence decision-making processes and knowledge production.  
This picture of selected experiences of women buttresses my claim for internal exclusion in AHE. I 
have noted that it is not surprising that women’s experiences indicate a lack of access and 
inclusion, considering the numerous social hostilities that they face in HE institutions, such as 
sexual harassment and other vulnerabilities that eventually could lead to their exclusion, even at 
other levels of society. Thus far, I have shown how Okeke (2004), Nawe (2004) and other 
contributors have expanded the call for women’s inclusion beyond their physical representation in 
AHE. These authors have defended an education that prepares women to engage as partners with 
men, rather than as their cheerleaders, a way of celebrating inclusion and equality through a voice. 
From the above analyses, women’s encounters point to serious problems of exclusion, as the 
students and staff members with access to HE are excluded in subtle ways. In so doing, women 
are unable to influence policies or even contribute to knowledge production as equal citizens. To 
shed more light on the limited nature of women’s inclusion in AHE, it is imperative to look at Assié-
Lumumba’s (2007) book.  
 
4.3.3 Gender-based human capabilities and human rights to knowledge  
The discourse on HE in Africa took centre stage during the second part of the third biennial joint 
conference of the Pan-African Studies and Research Centre in International Relations and 
Education for Development (CEPARRED), which was held at Cornell University in Ithaca, New 
York in 2002. At this conference, which gave birth to the book edited by Assié-Lumumba, various 
scholars shared their perspectives on issues regarding women and HE on the continent. The editor 
also highlighted that the purpose of the conference was to engage in critical examination of and 
debates on issues relating to theory, epistemology and knowledge production with regard to 
women and gender from an African perspective. The aim was “to establish a succinct 
understanding of the historical and contemporary factors with pragmatic implications as well as 
pragmatic policy formulation, design and implementation for social progress in Africa” (Assié-
Lumumba, 2007: xviii). The argument is that, since social progress is a desired goal, social 
inclusion should be the means by which all members of the society, and particularly the female 
population, which constitutes more than half of the entire population, encounter progress. It is 
against this background that the book becomes a critical base for this analysis.  
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In the attempt to unpack the discourse on AHE in relation to women’s inclusion, Assié-Lumumba 
succinctly points out that structural inequality in terms of region, rural or urban residence, religion, 
ethnicity and social class has pervaded the educational system. This dilemma of inequality has 
been, and remains, a serious factor in AHE and in the continent’s development. Kwesiga (2002), 
Okeke (2004) and Assié-Lumumba (2007: 1-2) articulate that the fundamental thrust of access to 
AHE is that, if women have access to HE institutions, they will acquire higher knowledge, which 
should enable them to contribute to the development of the continent. This simply means that 
women with limited exposure to HE lack the power and legitimacy that knowledge offers. 
Therefore, the lack of access to formal (higher) education jeopardises individuals’ (women’s) self-
realisation and participation in social processes. In other words, access or lack of it can either be 
an enhancing process or an encumbering one. In Assié-Lumumba’s view, access to education 
(both lower and higher) is an economic and political issue, since it is a major source of the 
development of human capabilities and driver of socio-economic development (2007: 6). She 
suggests that female access to education needs to encompass a holistic education system in 
which all levels are interconnected and considered, as well as treated as being equally important. 
In simple terms, her text agrees with Kwesiga (2002) and Okeke (2004) that a lack of women’s 
access to education is responsible for their limitation in participating in decision making and 
knowledge production on the continent.  
One can argue that, even by 2007, HE reflected consistent female under-representation, despite 
the various policy reforms and political efforts of the last four decades. Assié-Lumumba, as well as 
other participants in the joint conference, shares the dilemma of women’s lack of access to higher 
educational discourse in Africa. Her fundamental concern about gender inequality is evident even 
in her earlier publication, Empowerment of Women in Higher Education in Africa: The Role and 
Mission of Research (2006b). Assié-Lumumba claims that the persistent structural gender 
inequality is one of the most counterproductive and self-destructive traditions in AHE. She points to 
the societal norms and constraints, policy priorities, and contradictions between the officially stated 
pursuit of development agendas and the actual denial of women the possibility to participate fully in 
these agendas.  
Furthermore, she notes that the gender policies and programmes in Africa, which sometimes 
report impressive quantitative achievements, endorse high structural inequalities with regard to 
gender. In her view, the achievement of gender equality: 
     
Should not be measured by simple statistics, particularly in terms of the number of 
policies and programs designed. Rather, the real indicators of substantive equality 
are in terms of the actual improvements in chances for women to increase their 
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consciousness and have more of their informed participation in all decisions and 
knowledge production (Assié-Lumumba, 2006b: 26).  
 
As long as the removal of gender gaps in African countries, particularly in the area of HE, remains 
only cosmetic, ending mostly as political rhetoric, and despite the many gender policies and 
programmes instituted to empower women, politics and decision making will remain a male 
domain. Moja (2007: 53-55) furthers the debate by exploring the experiences of women in HE, and 
the limitedness of gender issues in the context of globalisation, which to her encumbers the 
progress in the area of gender equality on the continent. She calls for the creation of women’s 
space in the deliberations on globalisation and policies critical to the project. She states that HE 
has ignored gender issues in globalisation, as discussed in Chapter two of this study, and it’s 
restructuring, which manifest constant exclusion of women in subtle ways. One predominant way is 
how women are side-lined and discriminated against in higher educational practices, such as 
governing appointments, promotional exercises, peer reviews and publications.  
The presupposition here is that the historical exclusion and/or under-representation of women, 
especially in fields such as science and technology in the corporate world, prove that new forms of 
exclusion are more subtle than the discriminatory practices that were more overt in their exclusion 
of women from participating in HE. For Moja, the challenge is to ascertain that opportunities are 
created for participation in the new, emerging fields of the knowledge economy. It is clearly noted 
that HE institutions, particularly those in developing countries (including Africa), have to a large 
extent remained élite institutions and have failed to focus sufficiently on the science and 
technology requirements of the information revolution, which need increased female participation 
rates and better gender representation. Hence, HE continues with sexist practices that promote 
gender inequality and remains the stronghold of privileged groups and classes (Moja, 2007: 56-
57). In other words, the politics of exclusion is both complex and subtle, and it would be hard to 
identify overt proponents of the exclusionist politics of women in HE. Overall, women remain 
under-represented.  
The above-explored view affirms what Young (2000) calls forms of exclusion, especially internal 
exclusion, in which those who seem to be included are kept out of democratic processes, policy 
formation, decision making and deliberations. Thus, without full inclusion, women will find it difficult 
to take their place in society and make meaningful contributions to national development. Although 
several national policies and international agencies offer ways to address women’s exclusion by 
adopting world declarations on gender equality at all educational levels, and promoting inclusion in 
all fields of study, inequality remains a normal practice in higher education and on the entire 
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continent (Mama, 2006: 53-54). I agree strongly that the exclusion of women from the globalisation 
debate is rooted in the entire education system in Africa.  
As long as girls are left behind in schooling, women will remain under-represented, hence the call 
for vigorous inclusion on the continent. Moja (2007: 65) raises the question whether higher 
education institutions afford a safe and friendly environment for women to participate in learning 
and to advance their future careers. In response to her question, she identifies organisational 
culture as the culprit and impediment to women in their efforts to excel as students and in their 
upward mobility as faculty members. For her, the culture in HE mirrors the culture of the society 
within which it is situated. Hence, genuine inclusion of women in HE needs concerted and urgent 
attention. 
 
4.3.3.1 The position of women in science and mathematics in higher education  
On the dilemma of the limited participation of girls and women in the fields of science and 
mathematics on the continent, Asimeng-Boahene (2007: 717-719) claims that, in Botswana, 
women have remained invisible, despite their long recognition and position as a cornerstone of 
development all over the world, and especially in Africa. She proposes that something positive be 
done to change the situation and make these subjects more appealing to women. Duncan (cited in 
Asimeng-Boahene, 2007: 716) posits that boys continue to be channelled into the so-called 
masculine fields such as mathematics, science and technology, whereas girls are directed to the 
so-called feminine disciplines such as home economics, languages and teaching. In the same 
vein, the absence of senior female scientists and mathematicians in most public educational 
institutions in Africa implies that girls would have few or no role models with whom to identify and 
few female mentors to encourage them pursue their dream in such disciplines (Asimeng-Boahene, 
2007: 719). In my opinion, one may not expect women to be fully represented if girls’ access to 
schooling, particularly to dominant courses, are controlled and allocated based on gender.  
It is highly recommended that African governments should encourage science and mathematics 
education for girls via schools and universities, which ultimately will enable women to contribute to 
knowledge and economic prosperity. Prosperity will be achieved only if women share in fields of 
study that were traditionally meant for men, and if they are empowered to participate in the same 
manner as their male counterparts. Only then will genuine equality and inclusion be advanced. I 
support the call by Asimeng-Boahene (2007: 724) that women’s lack of participation in and 
contribution to science and mathematics education as a form of external exclusion needs to be 
addressed urgently. Meena (2007) affirms that the dilemma of access based on gender triggers the 
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unequal representation of women in HE, especially in science, mathematics and technology, as 
highlighted above.  
Some other contributors to the Assié-Lumumba (2007) edited volume state that, while many 
governments have done much to support regional and international conventions and declarations 
that would address gender disparities in HE rhetorically and legislatively, most countries have 
failed to implement these intentions strategically and programmatically, especially at the tertiary 
level (Meena, 2007; Mlama, 2007). In this sense, one can surmise that the above discussion 
challenges women’s access to HE and gender equality as dominant strategies for achieving social 
inclusion in the bid for social progress. Thus, one can say that a possible standard for assessing 
women’s experiences in HE is their statistical representation in HE, which does not seem to be 
reflected in the labour market and in knowledge production. Correspondingly, providing evidence of 
women’s participation in South Africa, the Council on Higher Education (CHE, 2013: 1) reported 
that more women were enrolling in postgraduate programmes, but that women were more 
successful than men in completing their programmes. However, despite their successful 
completion, only 42% of doctoral graduates in all fields other than education in 2007 were women. 
In other words, there are more men than women enrolled in doctoral studies in different fields: 
approximately 35% of women enrolled for doctoral studies in business, commerce and 
management, while 53% were in education, 43% in human and social sciences and 40% in 
science, engineering and technology.  
Looking at the portrayal above, the statistics on doctoral student cohorts per gender in South Africa 
are presented to substantiate my claim of the under-representation of women in HE in Africa. On 
can say that women’s representation is of critical concern even in countries such as South Africa in 
which the number of female students seems to fare well, especially at undergraduate levels. 
However, the figures above should not be taken as representative of the whole continent, but could 
provide a general nuanced perspective of how women are still externally included in minimal ways. 
Besides, there could be regional differences in some countries, depending on the state of 
development and the historical background of the regions. Even though the report by the CHE 
remarks on the progress made by South Africa’s HE, it confirms that the picture in other African 
countries may be more dismal, depending on the level of development (CHE, 2013: 1). Apart from 
ensuring female students’ participation, South Africa seems to be committed to promoting and 
monitoring the equal participation of women in HE. However, the above portrayal exposes that 
women are excluded, either deliberately or inadvertently, which undermines the institutions’ ability 
to achieve substantive inclusion and transformation. 
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4.3.3.2 Women’s external exclusion as staff members and researchers  
Despite some achievements in female students’ (external inclusion) formal access to HE, women’s 
formal access to leadership positions in Africa shows a different picture. Teferra and Altbach 
(2003: 9) state that some African countries, such as Tunisia, Lesotho and Mauritius, have achieved 
50% of female access to higher education, but in terms of women’s role as staff members, only 
Morocco (24%), Tunisia (33%) and South Africa (36%) could be commended for their efforts. 
Unsurprisingly, only 7% of the faculty members in HE institutions in Ethiopia are women. It is clear 
that, although some countries have addressed women’s external exclusion by expanding access to 
universities, women need much better access to HE than men to achieve equality (Wondimu, 
2004: 4). Similarly, the CHE analysis found that, in 2005, public HE employed more men than 
women. However, women outnumbered men for the first time in 2006; and the CHE (2013: 1) 
reports that, in 2007, women constituted 51% of the total staff in public higher education 
institutions. A look at the array of academics in universities shows that 52% were women, while 
46% of the staffs in the universities of technology were women, especially at the lower cadres such 
as support professionals and non-professional administrative posts. Again, the disturbing 
experiences of women in HE are not only shared by students, but by female staff members as well. 
The available data indicates their under-representation and forms of exclusion.  
The dilemma of misrepresentation was deliberated on by HERS-SA (2008) at a conference held in 
Cape Town with the theme, “Institutional cultures and HE leadership: Where are the women?” The 
conference called for gender equity in academic, administrative and executive leadership in HE at 
all levels. The targeted groups are NGOs, government, higher education institutions, and 
educational and research agencies. It is noted that there has been an increase in women’s access 
to HE as students, especially to universities. Women’s participation in South Africa seems better 
than in all other African countries, but there is stagnation when it comes to women climbing the 
leadership ladder. Similarly, Mlama (2007) emphasises the absence of women’s contribution to 
research and the challenges they face in accessing leadership positions due to the increasing 
dependency of African governments on external donors, which leads to a loss of autonomy over 
the process of educational reforms.  
An analysis of patterns of gender inequity in education in South Africa and the implications of their 
positioning in the educational and labour market structure shows that the women represent diverse 
races and class categories. While significant strides have been made through affirmative action 
policies to address both racial and gender inequalities in HE, women continue to dominate low-
level administrative and non-professional positions in the labour market, even years after the 
dismantling of apartheid (Higgs, 2007; Moja, 2007). In addition, regarding promotion to certain 
positions such as junior lecturer and professor, there is huge inequality between women and men. 
Regarding women’s participation in research, the CHE analysis also shows that, as in many 
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developing countries, most of the research in South Africa is carried out by men. The number of 
papers written and published by women in traditional universities ranges between 14% and 37%. 
In 2006, National Research Foundation (NRF)-rated16 female researchers comprised 24% of the 
total, although their number has increased remarkably to 48% since then. Although South Africa is 
a top African country as far as women being afforded ample space in HE is concerned, the 
statistics on female researchers remains marginal. Although HE achieved some success in the 
area of women’s access to higher education institutions, the statistics reveal that external exclusion 
remains prevalent. This means that women are physically visible, but are not afforded access to all 
aspects of HE, especially to knowledge production. 
In terms of women as leaders, Guramatunhu-Mudiwa’s (2010: 1) study of 117 universities revealed 
that 105 universities (87.7%) were led by men, while only 12 universities (10.3%) were led by 
women. For instance, there is a wide gender disparity marked by male domination and women’s 
under-representation in vice-chancellorships, and ten (66.7%) countries (namely Angola, 
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, Swaziland and Zambia) have never had a female university chancellor. Interestingly, 
out of 15 countries, South Africa had the highest number of women leaders of universities, at six 
out of 23 (26.1%); Madagascar had 25%, Zimbabwe 18.2% and Tanzania 8.7% (Guramatunhu-
Mudiwa, 2010: 10). This implies that only four of the 15 countries had either public higher 
education institutions or universities led by female presidents (that is vice-chancellors, rectors or 
chief executive officers).  
Clearly, HE is still predominantly a male domain, and men control knowledge and economic 
production, while women are relegated to reproductive tasks and have no or limited influence on 
production. This manifests their external exclusion even from leadership positions in AHE. 
Likewise, CODESRIA (2009: 2) observed that some strides have been made in terms of women’s 
external inclusion in AHE, as attested to by the increasing number of female students and staff 
members. Thus, the structures of many African universities remain deliberately masculine, in 
expressions of the representation, decision-making procedures and culture of their members. This 
confirms that HE remains a gendered and highly exclusive terrain serving the needs of the few.  
CODESRIA (2009: 3) further clarifies that the persistent shortage of senior female academicians is 
a typical testimony of gender disparities at all levels of education on the continent, which requires a 
deeper understanding if transformation is to occur in Africa. A more nuanced perspective can be 
gained by focusing on regional data, e.g. the Commonwealth of Independent States has a 
relatively high share of women researchers, at 43%, followed by Europe and Africa (33%) 
                                            
16
According to NRF Online (2013), the NRF rating is a key driver in the National Research Foundation’s aim to build a globally competitive science 
system in South Africa. It is a valuable tool for benchmarking the quality of HE researchers against the best in the world. These ratings are allocated 
on the basis of a researcher’s recent outputs and impact as perceived by international peer reviewers. 
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(UNESCO-UIS, 2010: 80). However if the goal is to transform AHE, why are so few women 
enrolled in PhD studies and working as researchers, or even holding leadership positions? Apart 
from this, women who are statistically represented in AHE appear to encounter other forms of 
exclusion. 
 
4.3.3.3 Portrayal of women’s internal exclusion as staff members and researchers  
Despite the fact that women as students and staff members are externally included, there is 
evidence of internal exclusion in AHE. The problem of justifying internal exclusion is that, 
scientifically, one may not identify this form of exclusion. But a look at people’s narratives and 
shared stories reveals it nonetheless. As Young (2000) postulates, exclusion is inherent within 
inclusion. As soon as one claims to be included – in this case based on statistics – one continues 
to experience other forms of exclusion, such as vicious discrimination and prejudicial remarks that 
provoke exclusion. Adding to the evidence of women’s experiences of internal exclusion, Maürtin-
Cairncross (2013: 1) posits that women have entered the academic arena only relatively recently, 
and that academia’s patriarchal history remains evident. Men continue to predominate in senior 
positions, as women struggle to establish themselves within the “centre” of the academic 
enterprise. Based on Maürtin-Cairncross’s study conducted in South Africa, women experience 
some sense of invisibility and exclusion within their workplaces. Different academic respondents in 
her study stated that (Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1):  
 
Women are made to feel invisible[;] one is often called to meetings and informed of 
decisions that were made. When challenging these decisions, you are “allowed” to 
speak but at the end of your discussion, the initial decision is reiterated as if you had 
not spoken at all. That is the reason that some women become aggressive….they 
want to be heard; they want their opinions to be taken seriously. When they react in 
this way, they are labelled emotional…. So what does one do [?] I have taken to 
remain[ing] silent…. (Respondent 1, higher education executive). 
 
The work climate females experience in a very covert way excludes women from 
the real decision making….They [the men] have a camaraderie which excludes 
women, in the real sense. Women are listened to, without taking their points 
seriously. [Men’s] importance and being busy becomes an excuse for hoarding 
information and creating a sense of power that hides their inefficiencies. 
(Respondent 2, higher education executive).  
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…. being overlooked because of perceptions about you (age, EI [Emotional 
Intelligence], intelligence not being taken seriously by the senior managers and 
being overlooked for the work you deliver on in favour of someone else….) 
(Respondent 5, director).   
From the above, I deduce that women, especially those in senior positions, often feel excluded 
from decision making because their presence and ideas are often ignored. Furthermore, some 
respondents identified their exclusion as being inculcated by the limited number of women in senior 
positions in HE, which means that the few women’s voices in such decision making does not have 
an impact in male-dominated institutions (Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1): 
 
There are not many women role models or people who have occupied similar 
positions from whom I can learn. It is my perception that those who are out there are 
extremely busy or I do not know about them. There is definitely no “old/experienced 
girls club” and again it is my opinion that the women do not form groups who call on 
each other for support. (Respondent 7, director). 
 
[There is a] lack of a critical mass of women in leadership positions, leading to 
isolation, which in turn often means that women do not have the confidence or 
support to take on styles and approaches different [than those of] male colleagues. 
(Respondent 8, executive member, women’s network). 
  
I also found that all departments/areas of the institution were not going to assist me 
at the initial phases. They did not see it as “their business”—probably because 
people did not understand. Perhaps fear of change also has a great impact. 
(Respondent 9, director).   
 
Noticeably, women’s experiences demonstrate that, when they feel invisible and excluded, 
especially when they are only a few in senior positions in which they are expected to influence 
decisions and policy making, they consequently become afraid to act with confidence. The 
following quotations reflect some of these sentiments (Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1):  
 
Lack of confidence on the part of many women [keeps them from being] bold and 
stand[ing] up for themselves. (Respondent 5, director). 
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Male counterparts…are driven by a fear that they may lose power and therefore 
they do not share it. They do self-esteem-lowering things – ignore people... 
[implying] I am busier than you and therefore I can give you only limited time and 
space! Women’s need to be made to feel valued is never addressed. Building self-
esteem…you have to find these things for yourself and spend energy on "bouncing 
back" and keeping your own power as they will take it away from you and make you 
feel inferior; if you are not working from an inner center of strength you are doomed. 
(Respondent 2, higher education executive).   
The foregoing experiences in HE illustrate how people without self-confidence could find it difficult 
to assert their voices as equal agents and stand up for their arguments, largely because of the fact 
that there are few women representatives in senior positions. On the other hand, the challenge 
faced is due to women’s resistance to supporting one another’s standpoints, as well as their 
promotion. I agree with Maürtin-Cairncross that, even though the “dominant social groups often 
control the channels of communication, reinforcing women’s subordinate status, when academic 
women do not challenge dominant institutional cultures, they may tacitly accept subordinate status” 
(2013: 2). This suggests that only when women have the confidence to challenge these 
exclusionary attitudes and practices by demanding their equal space might their ideas possibly be 
taken into consideration as a way of attaining internal inclusion. The point is that internal exclusion 
is implicit, evident only as expressed in women’s experiences, which makes it difficult for it to be 
revealed by looking at statistics on the numbers of women and men. My argument is extended by 
UNESCO-UIS (2010: 68-71), which maintains that:  
 
We should start by considering what the data do not reveal. The fact that a rising 
number of women are pursuing higher education does not mean that there are 
fewer opportunities for men. The growth in female enrolment partly reflects the 
changing values and attitudes related to the roles and aspirations of women in 
society that are the legacy of social change and feminist movements which 
emerged globally in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Thus, what I find troubling is that the current discourse, which champions access as inclusion, 
appears to be surface rather than substantive inclusion. Although most of these women’s 
experiences are extracted from South Africa, I argue that such forms of exclusion are evident in 
different countries on the continent. A study of two universities, one in Cape Coast, Ghana and the 
other in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on the crisis of widening participation in public HE, revealed 
that, although policies are prevalent, “poorer and mature students were still absent from higher 
education” (Morley, 2012: 21). Although such universities have stipulated quotas for female 
students, especially those from disadvantaged groups, there are no monitoring systems to show 
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that such students actually participate in programmes and complete their studies. Morley observes 
that two hundred students from disadvantaged backgrounds, (particularly women), shared their 
unsatisfactory experiences in primary, secondary and HE. The study notes that students from 
diverse backgrounds, including under-represented groups (women, mature students, low socio-
economic status, and people with disabilities) often experience hardship in their HE encounters 
(Morley, 2012: 22).  
Furthermore, the access by and participation of female students from poor socio-economic 
backgrounds depends on loans and bursaries, while mature women share the stress of earning, as 
well as of extended family responsibilities. Those with disabilities have no provision for accessing 
higher educational institutions, which indicates that exclusion from HE can be experienced 
differently by women depending on their background and condition. Sharing their experiences of 
HE, some students acknowledged support from a number of caring individuals working in HE, such 
as lecturers, counsellors and advisors (Morley, 2012: 22). Clearly, some students appreciate the 
support and care provided by staff members to enable them to excel. This is fascinating to note, as 
it suggests that HE might as well turn into a caring public institution if staff members practise some 
form of care. Poignantly, the study shows that many lecturers seem unwilling to be accountable for 
widening participation and quality assurance; hence their inconsistent and delayed decisions 
regarding grades and curriculum. The evidence suggests that forms of exclusion are perpetuated 
in HE, specifically in relation to disadvantaged groups, including women.  
To augment the prejudicial attitudes encountered by women in AHE, as expressed in different 
studies, I take a cue from various engagements with female students during postgraduate 
pedagogical deliberations and seminars at Stellenbosch University. Amongst them are students 
from a number of African countries, namely South Africa, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria, who shared their experiences of internal exclusion in HE. For 
instance, one of these students said that internal exclusion emanates from a number of issues: in 
her case, a lack of confidence to engage in deliberation due to her lack of proficiency in English. 
She prefers to speak to the lecturer or presenter after the seminar, rather than to engage with them 
in public. She acknowledges that she often has ideas, but to air them in public becomes a fearful 
exercise. This student, like others, feels that few female students who engage in deliberations are 
comfortable and certain of what they are saying. Similarly, another student agrees that fear of 
airing an idea that might be dismissed, and one’s inability to offer an argument and defend it, 
comprise another issue. In similar engagements, another student indicated that, because of her 
fluency in English, she could engage freely, despite her uncertainty of her ideas. The same student 
felt that, as a student, it is her right to make a contribution to pedagogical deliberations, just like 
other students.  
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Apart from the above, some students identify insensitive comments from their fellow women 
especially to when will one give birth. In her words, "I get irritated by such comments and I can't 
understand why my study is seen as not important till I produce a baby". Such comments left her 
with doubt about whether she should have babies or focus on her studies first, which provoked a 
sense of insecurity in the presence of colleagues with babies. Another issue shared by some 
married women is questions about whether their husbands helped them or wrote the work for 
them? Some single women’s educational relations with male lecturers are often questioned. This is 
related to what Wagner-Martin (1994: 21) refers to as “the trap of the stereotype”, where she 
argues that the first question that society (HE) “still asks of any women is whose daughter [wife or 
student] she is. …The traditions of both patriarchy and heterosexuality are confirmed”.  
From the above experiences it is clear that internal exclusion is provoked by numerous issues, 
such as poor language proficiency, fear of intimidation, discomfort about speaking in public, lack of 
confidence and inability to defend one’s argument, as well as sexist or prejudicial remarks about 
giving birth, and connecting a women’s work either to a husband or female supervisor. I contend 
that, if universities in Africa will not take the issue of internal exclusion seriously, then legitimate 
transformation will remain a dream. Women’s access to HE in Africa as a strategy for mitigating 
external exclusion is an achievement. However, I am concerned about the absence of women’s 
voices in democratic processes and knowledge production. It is apparent that mechanisms and 
strategies are in place to include women in HE, but it is disconcerting to encounter persistent 
internal exclusion in HE in Africa. Given the above predicament facing women in HE in Africa, I 
wish to explore in what follows whether the given proposition is commensurable with the 
reconstructed framework deemed suitable to engender substantive inclusion. 
 
4.4 (In)commensurability of the African higher education discourses with the 
equalisation-of-voice paradigm  
In this section I attempt to ascertain whether the discourse of AHE is commensurable with the 
equalisation-of-voice framework, namely its related concepts of communicative inclusion, non-
gendered or gendered form and voice. What come to the fore are notions of women’s access, 
representation, participation, capability and gender equality as means to achieve substantive 
internal inclusion. In terms of statistics, women are represented in HE, as various policy initiatives 
such as affirmative action aim at promoting women’s inclusion. Despite efforts to address the lack 
of access of women to the discourses on HE (Assié-Lumumba, 2007; Kwesiga, 2002; Zeleza & 
Olukoshi, 2004), gaps remain in the effort to engender substantive internal inclusion in which the 
voices of female students and staff members are recognised. The point is that some strides have 
been made in tackling external exclusion in AHE, but internal inclusion is yet to be attained. It is 
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argued here that the available data create the impression that, because women are statistically 
and physically visible in AHE, inclusion is automatically achieved and, ultimately, that gender 
equality is attained. Although the presence of women can be observed in HE, their inclusion is 
limited to statistics, as their voices are absent in terms of making meaningful contributions to all 
democratic processes and knowledge production.   
The exploration of women’s experiences and shared stories in this chapter demonstrates that AHE 
is not necessarily commensurable with the equalisation-of-voice framework. Firstly, the proposition 
of access in HE as a way to inclusion is silent about how much inclusion HE aims to attain, 
whether external or internal. Secondly, the proposition of access is based on the traditional gender 
categories of woman and man as a yardstick for inclusion. However, such traditional categories of 
gender say nothing about other groups within the category of woman, such as those with 
disabilities, single mothers, widows, etc. Again, the gender categories ignore the inclusion of other 
groups and the current development of the homosexual category, e.g. lesbians, bisexual, 
transgendered and intersexed. Thirdly, the HE framework may claim women’s access to HE based 
on statistics; however, this is mere access, which addresses external exclusion; it does not warrant 
substantive inclusion. Distressingly, internal exclusion continues because those who seem to be 
included are still excluded in subtle ways, as I will show further on in this study. In essence, the 
overall arguments in existing studies on the roles and experiences of women in HE in Africa are 
commendable, yet limited in terms of achieving substantive internal inclusion. Various efforts to 
consider women’s inclusion and strategies, focusing on gender as a yardstick for equality, pose a 
threat to the transformation project. Thus, the analyses confirm the perpetuation of exclusion by 
omitting the subcategories of women, namely those with disabilities, homosexuals, intersexed, 
transgendered, and the poor. In my view, the lack of women’s access to HE requires urgent 
attention, as it undermines women’s capability, which is shunned through the rampant denial of 
girls’ access to schooling. I conclude that the claims by the authors mentioned earlier share some 
features in respect of the equalisation-of-voice framework, that is access and capability, but they 
differ in their call for a traditional categorisation of gender (woman and man). In other words, 
inclusion based on gender, communication and capabilities may not help the excluded groups to 
access intellectual encounters that would enable them to assert their voices. The constant focus on 
gender, especially in the area of women’s access to education, will not enable contemporary 
African universities to be on par with other nations in achieving substantive inclusion towards social 
justice.  
Chauraya (2012: 257) argues that HE policies and programmes in Africa have remained gender 
neutral, gender blind or gender insensitive, thus failing to change the gendered structural status 
quo in the African context. Eventually, as long as the status quo remains gendered, HE 
programmes and policies will also remain ineffective and unbeneficial to both women and men as 
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equal members of such democratic engagements. In affirming the call for gender as a yardstick for 
equality, UNESCO’s Director-General, Irina Bokova, strongly encouraged all governments, the 
international community, civil society and other partners to take stock of the rich body of evidence 
presented in the organisation’s publication to make gender equality the hallmark of all education 
policies (UNESCO-UIS, 2010: 6). She stresses that gender equality is the most fundamental 
condition for making our world more just and peaceful. Her view confirms that gender is strongly 
identified as a benchmark for achieving equality. However, the call for gender as a benchmark for 
inclusion is incongruent with the equalisation-of-voice framework. In my view, the idea of gender 
equality in HE in Africa is limited, since it does not mitigate exclusion. In addition, women’s access 
to HE requires skills and abilities that would enable them to attain economic prosperity and other 
heights, including internal inclusion. The studies reveal the predicament of African women who 
also are undermined at all other levels of society (culturally, religiously, etc.) and who have the 
same capacities to compete with their male counterparts. Ironically, considering my reconstructed 
framework, which seems to propel equality, this causes tension for the ideal form of transformation 
that Africa requires.  
In terms of the capabilities that women are presumed to possess, those who lack ability will 
constantly experience internal exclusion, especially those from poor socio-economic or academic 
backgrounds, as well as those with disabilities. Again, even though some women may be eloquent 
in claiming their positions and exercising their rights, those with limited abilities are likely to be 
excluded internally. Hence, Nussbaum’s (2000) advocacy for capabilities calls HE stakeholders in 
Africa to prepare women to acquire the relevant skills that would enable them to express their 
equality and achieve internal inclusion. I concur with Rancière’s (1999) view of equality, which 
considers voice rather than gender. The AHE proposition of inclusion and equality based on 
gender remains a challenge and is incongruent with the equalisation-of-voice framework. Thus, 
inclusion based on voice would advance substantive inclusion, as human beings, irrespective of 
their differences, could air their voices and contribute to policy and knowledge, rather than simply 
being reduced to statistics and numbers. In other words, one’s voice is a remarkable yardstick for 
advancing the equality of all human beings, especially the excluded. The current arguments in HE 
are limited and inadequate when trying to address the weighty issues of internal exclusion in 
Africa.  
From the above analyses, I concede that, in the past decades, AHE has achieved immense results 
in the area of women’s access, yet there is more to do in mitigating internal exclusion. The point I 
want to restate is that my intention is not to discard the gender categories, but to acknowledge that 
there is a need to be sensitive to their nuances in the call for inclusion in AHE. So, within the 
category of woman, just like man, there are other groups that are ignored and, if they are not 
recognised, internal exclusion will remain. Therefore, there is a need for a paradigm shift that 
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transcends gender and vicious discriminatory and repressive tendencies towards voice as a means 
to engender substantive inclusion in order to lead towards authentic transformation in Africa. 
 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have argued that the AHE discourse of inclusion and equality based on gender is 
incommensurable with the democratic conception of equalisation of voice. Such an approach 
lessens external inclusion and considers only women’s statistical representation – that is, gender 
as a basis for inclusion lessens external inclusion, but ignores internal exclusion. In other words, 
women are there, but not there. Therefore, I have called for a move beyond statistical 
representation and for a striving toward addressing the intrinsic form of internal exclusion. 
Women’s internal exclusion is evident when those included are encountering prejudice and 
discrimination that provoke their exclusion in subtle ways, leading to their voicelessness. To 
nurture a voice, AHE ought to create opportunities for women to grow intellectually and make a 
contribution to knowledge, just like their male counterparts. This is in line with Morrow’s (2007) 
illustration of two forms of access ─ formal access and epistemological access ─ which can help 
us to understand HE in Africa, as referred to in Chapter one of this dissertation. Women have 
attained formal access to HE based on the statistical records of and their percentages in the 
institutions, and this has somewhat addressed external exclusion.  
However, such women are yet to celebrate epistemological access, which will afford them a voice 
and allow them to make a meaningful contribution to knowledge production, decision making and 
policy formation. My argument is that women are still subjected to internal exclusion, although 
external exclusion is also not an overwhelming situation. That is, women remain excluded 
substantively, despite being included in minimal ways. I presuppose that internal inclusion is 
necessary in order for women to contribute towards human development and flourishing on the 
African continent, whether in their homes, workplaces and other professional spheres of societal 
life. I have argued throughout that, in different epochs, AHE has favoured men, which promotes a 
culture of patriarchy. The ensuing chapter will explore how the culture of patriarchy underscores 
women’s internal exclusion and show why such beliefs and practices do not have a place in a 
democratic society.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICES AS CONDITIONS PERPETUATING 
INTERNAL EXCLUSION IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that women are internally excluded in AHE, despite their numerical 
representation. This means that, although women’s enrolment in HE has increased, their impact, 
paradoxically, is not felt much. In this chapter I explore what underscores internal exclusion – as I 
have identified in the previous chapter – which shows evidence that patriarchal conditions that is 
male chauvinism and domination, are persistent. Such conditions perpetuate the cultural beliefs 
that perceive women as mothers who have to merely raise children and, vices such as 
discrimination, subjugation and sexism – all instances of internal exclusion. My aim is to offer a 
philosophical argument for why the aforementioned conditions are undesirable that undermine 
women’s humanity and simultaneously ensure their internal exclusion in current HE. Firstly, I 
explore the conception of patriarchy and its ideology as reflected in conditions of male domination 
and chauvinism. Secondly, I illustrate how patriarchal conditions are fashioned within cultural 
norms and practices. Thirdly, I attempt to reveal how the patriarchal culture undermines and 
aggravates internal exclusion in AHE. Lastly, I challenge a gendered response to women’s internal 
exclusion, especially gender roles and the perspective that women, by nature, are child-bearers 
and child-rearers, care-givers and moral keepers. I argue for a non-gendered, reconstructed 
approach that construes that all human beings are moral keepers, against the socially constructed 
perception that sees women as sole moral keepers.  
 
5.2 Conception of patriarchy and related conditions that perpetuate internal exclusion 
In this section I intend to establish and interrogate the patriarchal beliefs that contribute to women’s 
subjugation and internal exclusion in AHE. Such beliefs are expressed through various conditions 
that implicitly or explicitly shape people’s minds and practices. Despite the presence of the 
patriarchal beliefs highlighted above, Castells (2001) illuminates the tension imposed on HE by 
stating that, historically, universities have played a major role as ideological apparatuses, 
expressing the ideological struggles present in society. Correspondingly, universities have always 
been mechanisms of selection and socialisation of the dominant elites and particular groups, who 
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support the fact that the university is viewed as a hub of knowledge production in which the hard 
skilled labour force is trained – what Castells calls the “professional university” (2001: 5). If this is 
what higher education, specifically universities, ought to do, internal exclusion of women to 
knowledge production is to deny them vital opportunities to realise their full potentials. 
Nevertheless, Castells (2001) cautions that universities are also subject to more implicit pressures 
from the host society, and the combination of the implicit pressures and explicit pressures of the 
local and universal functions generates great contradictions in university roles. Explicitly, one 
recognises the debate that HE, particularly universities in developing countries, are confronted by 
various ideologies, such as neoliberalism through its globalisation project articulated in Chapter 2 
of this study, that lead to tensions and contradictions. This simply means that HE, especially 
universities, are situated at the centre of struggles in responding to local needs for transformation 
and international forces of recognition, be they ideological or functional. Nevertheless, I am still 
inclined to the argument that patriarchal beliefs are the prime condition perpetuating internal 
exclusion on the African continent. Thus, before discussing the defining patriarchal conditioned 
beliefs, namely male domination, chauvinism and authoritarianism, I wish to trace the inception and 
conception of patriarchy. 
 
5.2.1 Patriarchy: a conception or misconception? 
The concept “patriarchy” comes from the Greek word “patriakhes”, which means “father of a race” 
or “chief of a race”. Patriarchy is not a new concept, but has been deliberated upon in gender 
relations by different generations. It has largely dominated most of the world's social systems until 
the contemporary period. Different scholars have conceptualised it differently, but mainly as a 
social system in terms of which the rule is by fathers and sons, and all arrangements are to their 
advantage (Green, 2010: 969). In this system, the male is the dominant figure and possesses the 
primary authority in social organisation, and plays the central roles of political leadership, moral 
authority, and control of property. In the same manner, fathers hold authority over women and 
children. It is interesting to note that Aristotle, “the father of virtue”, was himself a patriarch. He 
declared without question that men were superior in all respects to women, which forms the basis 
for his theory of reproduction. For him, “the female is female by virtue of a certain lack of qualities”, 
and his framework regards a “virtuous woman as a person who ought to be active in her house and 
who ought to submit to her husband” (Woodfin & Groves, 2001: 97; 136). This observation 
corroborates that patriarchy is not a new belief.  
Ironically, Aristotle admitted that a woman has rationality, but that she lacks the authority that 
permits her to play a role in and contribute to political community. I am in agreement with Woodfin 
and Groves (2001) when they state that Aristotle was politically incorrect to argue for the 
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subjugation of women, while confessing their rational mind just like that of men. Even though 
patriarchy historically has meant autocratic rule by the male head of a family, in recent times it has 
come to denote a “social system in which power is primarily held by adult men” (Gordon, 1996: 18). 
This means that patriarchy lives through the social, legal, political and economic organisation of a 
range of different cultures. In terms of social system, since HE is a social institution in which people 
interact with one another through education, the patriarchal beliefs has a negative influence in such 
educational practices. Within HE institutions, the patriarchal ideology is exercised by those who 
possess the authority to control others, mostly men, but also some women. This means that 
patriarchy manifests itself in different forms, not only ideologically, but also structurally. That is why 
Bhasin (1993: 9-12) states that patriarchy should be traced through the many layers in which it 
operates and reinforces the patriarchal order at multiple levels. One clearly can declare that there 
are divergent interpretations of what can be taken as a conception or misconception of patriarchy. I 
therefore offer a feminist exploration of the concept of patriarchy. 
 
 5.2.1.1 Feminist conceptualisation of patriarchy 
Tracing the trajectory of the concept patriarchy, feminists have confronted this belief at different 
times, commencing from the ground-breaking frameworks of Simone de Beauvoir, Kate Millett, 
Susan Brownmiller and Adrienne Rich, to mention a few. Although these scholars vary greatly in 
their methods, theoretical approaches and conclusions, they all foregrounded De Beauvoir’s 
question of what is a woman. In attempts to respond to this question, each scholar identifies a 
problem that relates to women in different epochs and proposes a framework to address it. Cudd 
and Andreasen (2005:1-2) point out that early feminist studies exposed patriarchal biases as being 
evident in three mistakes; sexism mistakes, which perceive men to be of greater value than 
women; androcentricism, which takes maleness or masculinity to be the norm for humaneness or 
humanity; and illegitimate cognitive authority, through which males and androcentric theories have 
been accorded the kinds of mistakes that are possibly the most difficult to establish. These 
mistakes bring me to the conceptualisation of patriarchy focusing on Millett’s and Rich's enhanced 
comprehension.  
 
In her book, Sexual Politics (1969), Millett, a French feminist, theorises patriarchy as the 
dominance of men in all areas of social, cultural and political life. For her, patriarchy characterises 
a society dominated not just by masculinity, but also by men, whose primary purpose is to 
construct and maintain a certain power relationship between males and females (Millett, 1969: 72-
73). This does not imply that all men get together to keep women out of power. But feminists 
believe that, in celebration of their privilege and advantage, most men agree to the system that is 
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in place and have no particular interest in changing it. She believes that the patriarchal ideology 
has a significant effect on the psychology of both sexes, whereby women, like men, believe that 
male domination and women’s subordination is the way it should be. To offer a deeper 
understanding, Millett (1969: 76-77) exemplifies sex differences based on gender using three 
interconnected dimensions, namely temperament, roles and status. Using a Manichaeism17 stance: 
from a temperamental dimension, women are regarded as more passive, while men are more 
active; women are dependent while men are independent; and women are emotional, whereas 
men are rational. Resulting from these temperamental differences, women are less comfortable 
with and less likely to seek a life of their own and more likely to rely on their feelings for truth; 
whereas men will concentrate on what is demonstrably true.  
 
I echo that sex differences (either real or constructed) may have pessimistic implications for African 
women’s attempts to thrive in public institutions, and in a world whose values favour men. The 
point is that women who aspire to pursue knowledge that may sustain them in public space might 
not prosper as liberally as their male counterparts. In terms of roles, patriarchy expects people to 
believe that adult role differentiation is natural and in fact grows out of temperamental differences. 
Millett (1969: 76) offers the analogy that women’s desire to marry, to mother and to make a home 
is natural, just like men’s desire to make their mark in the outside world. This simply means that 
women and men may end up internalising the above ideology through systems or institutions 
according to which a woman is regarded as a private entity, unlike a man, who is a public figure. In 
this manner, a gender role difference is focused on how men celebrate their superior status to 
women. The status dimension between women’s and men’s separate positions or ranks reveals 
how the gendered roles, which categorise women as role players in private (home) and men as 
dominant figures in public, have an immense influence on individuals’ status in society. Such 
beliefs and influences are then reproduced in people’s daily practices at all levels of society, 
including in HE.  
 
In providing further evidence of how patriarchy perpetuates internal exclusion in AHE, I draw from 
various women’s experiences in the study by Bhana and Pillay (2012), who exemplified through 
interviews the challenges women face as they navigate their academic environment. This study 
draws from the experiences of women academics who also mothers are regarding how they 
navigate research-led AHE, particularly in South Africa. These authors argue that there are 
inequitable gender relations in such institutions that fuel women’s marginalisation in AHE. One 
respondent states, (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 82): 
 
                                            
17
 The doctrine that the world is not governed by one perfect being, but by a balance of the forces of good and evil (Blackburn, 2008: 
222) 
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…this system has really used and abused academics, you come in with a lot of 
hope that this is going to be very empowering and facilitative environment, and it 
really just does the opposite. It tramps you down and makes you feel as if you are 
not good enough, all the time whatever you do is not good enough….  
 
This exhibits how women struggle as they enter HE in Africa and how they try their best to prove 
themselves in a system that does not appreciate their efforts, no matter how much they work. 
Novice academics enter AHE with the hope of being empowered, but what they encounter rather 
are disempowering practices that hinder their progress. To show how women in AHE negotiate the 
inequitable gendered relations due to patriarchal influences within the academic environment, and 
how this contributes to their subordination, another academic participant narrates that: 
 
…our department is very poorly managed and there is not enough support given to 
female staff…there are only three academic female members…the rest of them are 
all male…all of their wives have been at home… I just absolutely firmly believe that 
no extra support is given to us and they just load us with the damn work… I actually 
get very cross and yesterday I even phoned one of them and I actually said…” I’m 
not doing this anymore”, then he phoned me back at 11 o’clock at night and said 
“Ok…forget about the marking, I’ll do it tomorrow”…six males and all fuddy 
buddies… (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 89). 
 
This practice of male staff overloading their female colleagues with marking responsibilities is a 
case of injustice that robs women of productive time in which to do research and write academic 
papers. Expressing a similar sentiment, another woman academic shared her dismays about how 
her university department did not accord her enabling conditions to work while at the same time 
completing her degree. She argues that 
 
 In our department we ‘ve talked about how we can assist younger academics in 
terms of accomplishing their PhDs but…it will mean the senior academics need to 
absorb your work in order to assist you…may be they could be supportive but there 
is no support, and you can tell especially in our school people are busy planning 
their retirement…my PhD supervisor who’s a known feminist and I said “I cannot 
cope” and the response that I got was, “Well…, we’ve all had it hard” and I think 
possibly it was…an abortive attempt at kind of being empathetic…think almost there 
is such a level of disillusionment that people just don’t care…the truth is women who 
move up the ladder very often do move because they also have decided to comply 
with the patriarchal structures and we see it in the university…at the end of the day, 
the kids are your problem (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 89).  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
 
 
Taking into account these views of women academics who are mothers and their experiences of 
AHE manifests how patriarchal attitudes and gender relations pervade social institutions, which 
then ruin the well-being and progress of the subjugated staff members. The above encounters tie 
in with the struggle shared by colleagues at the university where I study. These students narrate 
how they navigate academic tasks while being expected to complete their PhD degree without 
being afforded leave of absence. These women, without the desired qualifications and knowledge, 
might struggle to assert their voices and make meaningful contributions to knowledge. In this 
respect, I further agree with Millett's position that patriarchy's fundamental goal is to maintain the 
superiority of males over females, and leads men to crave dominance and authority to control all 
people and things. Although there are patriarchal ideologies and practices prevalent in African 
society and its social institutions such as HE, I am not fully convinced about whether one can 
generalise that all men hold power and practise domination over women.  
Millett clarifies that patriarchy assigns roles to women that isolate them from other adults and 
deprive them of opportunities to acquire the ability to compete (1969: 78-79). By so doing, whether 
intentionally or not, a patriarchal system keeps women busy with mothering, care-taking and 
housekeeping, and denies them the opportunity to acquire relevant abilities for public engagement. 
Even contemporary studies (Kwesiga, 2002; Paterson, 2001; Pillay, 2007; Ramphele, 1995) echo 
similar concerns about how such patriarchal beliefs continue to shape current practices in HE. In a 
similar vein, Millett (1969: 79) underlines that gender roles are taken as norms. People preserve 
them through their daily doings as professionals, social and behavioural scientists, therapists and 
educators, and by their direct contribution to patriarchy in defining what is normal and what is not.  
In the same discourse, but a decade later, Rich confronts the notion of patriarchy by bringing in the 
controversial and complex dimension of homosexuality. In her text, Compulsory Heterosexuality 
(1980), she argues that a patriarchal system portrays woman as a rigid category with no 
differences. This category of woman expects all groups to adhere to gender roles, which can be 
discriminatory to others such as lesbians, transgendered, bisexual and intersexed. In this sense, all 
groups within the category of woman are expected to conform to heterosexual roles, which are 
oppressive and do not consider their differences. Thus, conceptions of patriarchy, from the rule of 
the heterosexual father figure to social structures and organisations that reinforce the beliefs of 
male domination and chauvinism, are the dominant conditions that perpetuate women’s 
subjugation.  
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5.2.1.2 Patriarchal male domination in relation to women  
In Africa, a host of studies demonstrate how patriarchy operates in many societies. Nwoko (2012: 
70) indicates that the practice of gender roles (patriarchy and matriarchy) is controversial. In some 
societies, for instance the Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria, the Zulu in Southern Africa and the Nuer in 
East Africa, matriarchal practices are evident, which makes an understanding of the flexibility and 
dynamics in practice insightful. Such social gender roles are viewed as flexible and dynamic, 
because some societies practise matriarchy but sustain patriarchy. Despite such dynamics, it was 
normal for authority to go with function. This means that patriarchy as practised in Africa has 
assigned authority and all powers to men in the system. A dominant function bestowed on men by 
the patriarchal system was the headship of the family, which permitted them by extension to 
become leaders of society (Nwoko, 2012: 70). The point is that, since men are recognised or 
tasked to be the head of the family, they are also suitable to rule and speak for those under them 
including his properties, women and children alike. Chinweizu observes this when he argues that 
“the patriarch zone of function and authority includes the physical protection of the homestead and 
its territory, the male economic sphere ... the spiritual sphere ... the social sphere” (cited in Nwoko, 
2012: 71).  
Poignantly, the matriarchal zone of function restricts women to the kitchen, and embraces and 
supports the female economic sphere, which is mostly perceived as demeaning for men to 
interfere in or engage with. Such kinds of socially ascribed roles and functions inhibit women's 
participation in public life, as they are to be seen and not heard. I surmise that it is not important for 
women to participate in public issues, given that men will speak for all those under their headship, 
including women. This further shows how the matriarchal practices in African society never change 
the condition of women, but patriarchy continues to dominate all public spheres. Kwesiga (2002: 
56-58) affirms that patriarchal ideologies permeate every society through different categories, such 
as kinships and lineages, religious practices and marriage institutions. In this way, all cultures and 
religions uphold patriarchy, whether in Greek and Roman antiquity, Judaism, Christianity, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, or African tradition (Mikell, 1997: 18). I agree that, although religion and 
culture have positive effects on the well-being of the people, their sustenance and preservation of 
patriarchy is undeniable. Alongside this, there also are external patriarchal forces that pervade 
African societies and HE through policies and media that influence prejudicial attitudes, namely 
male chauvinism. To this end, my argument is that African societies represent patriarchal-
dominated cultures that permeate public institutions including AHE, and stir women’s internal 
exclusion, which I argue against throughout this study.  
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5.2.1.3 Male chauvinism in relation to women’s internal exclusion 
The concept of male chauvinism involves a man with an aggressive and unreasonable belief that 
his own sex is better than all others. Millett (1969: 44) epitomises male chauvinism18 as a condition 
of patriarchy and as a province of the lower class or immigrant male, which absorbs and takes on 
certain glamour through a number of contemporary figures. For example, a patriarchal approach 
sustains male domination over female subordination through acquired power, according to Rich’s 
(1980) framework19, which delineates eight characteristics employed to sustain men's power. 
These characteristics can clearly be connected to the dilemma of equality confronting women in 
AHE. Incontestably, male domination and chauvinism are determinant conditions that symbolise 
power over the other in terms of gender. Such repressive practices influence men to discriminate 
against women, as corroborated by their experiences of AHE. For instance, Familusi (2012: 301) 
acknowledges that the Yoruba nation, like many other African societies, is essentially patriarchal. 
Male chauvinism is stimulated by women’s victimisation as distinct from their male counterparts, 
who receive special treatment from birth. Olabode posits that: 
 
Immediately a child is born, the question that will be posed will centre on sex, not 
minding of health of the mother. If the baby is a female, the mother will be scolded 
and treated as a lazy, good for nothing woman. On the other hand if the child is a 
male, praise will be showed on the mother, not considering the fact that Biology has 
shown it is the father who determines the sex of an offspring (cited in Familusi, 
2012: 300). 
The citation above exhibits how a person (female child) is treated with inferiority right from birth, 
and how she is perpetually caught up in a web of ill-treatment until adulthood. It should now be 
clear how a person who receives special treatment might enjoy the same throughout life, in this 
case a man. With a close look at these differences in treatment of the sexes, one wonders how this 
belief could not affect HE. In this light, Badinter (2006: 27) suggests the justification used for how 
such treatment of the sexes, especially the issue of male domination, receives thorny criticism in all 
spheres of human life. For her, in such spheres, being that of their sexual relations and in the 
unconscious (ideology or beliefs) including institutions – private and professional as well as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) – women are at the receiving end. She argues that this belief 
is everywhere and can mutate like some viruses and replicate in different forms when it is mature. 
                                            
18
 Ramphele (1995: 154) illustrates how the African patriarchal cultural beliefs influenced both women and men in her community in their 
approaches to gender roles in domestic spheres, in this case her husband. She refers to an incident when Desmond Tutu paid them a 
visit and ‘tried unsuccessfully to get the chauvinists amongst her male colleagues to regard domestic chores as part of the 
responsibilities of being adult.  
19
 Rich’s eight characteristics: men's ability to deny women sex or to force it upon them; to command or exploit their labour to control 
their produce; to control or rob them of their children; to confine them physically and prevent their movement; to use them as objects in 
male transactions; to cramp their creativeness; or to withhold from them large areas of society's knowledge and cultural attainments' 
(1980: 638).  
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And as soon as you think you are done with it, new developments transpire. It is clearly stated that 
“men will never willingly abandon the material and sexual privileges their domination of women 
affords them” (Badinter, 2006: 27). If I follow Badinter’s argument well, the point is that men cannot 
act if not assisted in changing a patriarchal mind-set or the belief that shapes human practices 
particularly that favours them – which necessitates education. Yet I am sceptical about this view, 
since it implies that all men are patriarchs and not one might support women’s liberation. This 
perspective is nearly uncritical in generalising that all men support male domination.  
A different observation is that of, bell hooks, representing an example of how a middle-class white 
woman’s experience of patriarchal domination differs significantly to that of a middle-class black 
woman’s experience. The former may claim social equality with men of their class: some women 
ask for an alternative equal pay for equal work, while others want an alternative lifestyle, the latter 
lies on the recognition equality (hooks, 2005: 63). Therefore, she is pessimistic about the 
assumption that women everywhere suffer the same form of oppression. I agree that diverse 
groups’ experience and different forms of oppression are due to the ways in which such oppression 
interacts, for example in the form of racial, economic, sexual and even ethnic oppression. Equally, 
oppression experienced by a heterosexual woman differs from that experienced by a homosexual 
woman. In this it is clear how patriarchy poses a danger to the category of woman, as the same 
attitudes could pervade the practice of HE.  
The above contextual reflection of male domination of women and chauvinism are not only 
“transcultural”, but eternal. Badinter (2006: 29) argues that the above beliefs are transmitted not 
only through the practise of customs and norms, but reinforced to become an embodiment of both. 
In her view, “locking men and women into opposing camps closes the door to any hope of 
understanding their mutual influence and of measuring their common humanity” (Badinter, 2006: 
30). Concerted efforts are necessary to confront patriarchal beliefs of male domination and 
chauvinism by re-educating men as a way of transforming their authoritarian practices, rather than 
to “fight against the abuses of some men” (Badinter, 2006: 30). I am attracted to Badinter’s 
advocacy of re-education, but this should enable both women and men to advance an inclusive 
educational community. The foregoing perspective highlights that patriarchy is socially constructed, 
reinforced and transmitted through cultural practices across generations. With this understanding, I 
proceed to probe internal exclusion.  
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5.2.2. Cultural practices in relation to internal exclusion 
Cultural practices are believed to give impetus to patriarchal beliefs of male domination and 
chauvinism in society, which in my view provokes women’s internal exclusion in AHE. The concept 
culture simply could be understood as a way of life of a people and everything about them. It 
constitutes people’s customs, traditions, beliefs, behaviours, dress, language, works of art and 
craft, attitudes, values, science, modes of perception, and habits of thought and activity among 
others (Familusi, 2012: 299). This suggests that each context has cultural values that are largely 
relative and peculiar to specific contexts. Noticing these contextual differences, my argument is 
that patriarchal beliefs are enclosed within cultural practices and taken as norms that incite 
women’s oppression in AHE. In addition, culture, explains Benhabib, is derived from the Latin 
origin colare and is associated with activities of preservation, of tending to and caring for (2002: 2). 
For her, culture is a contestable concept and has also become a ubiquitous synonym for identity – 
an identity marker and differentiator. Ever since the ancient period, culture has been the mark of 
social distinctions, although it has changed its meaning. This change was sparked by the 
emergence of western modernity, a capitalist commodity economy, rationalised scientific 
worldviews, and bureaucratic administrative control (Benhabib, 2002: 2). In Benhabib’s 
interpretation, there are different lines of thought regarding culture, both conservative and 
progressive.  
Conservatives offer different reasons for why cultures should be preserved. Huntington, for 
instance, calls for preservation with the intention to keep groups separate, because cultural 
hybridity generates conflict and instability. This is proposed with the hope to avoid the “clash of 
civilizations” by reinforcing political alliances that closely follow cultural identity rifts (cited in 
Benhabib, 2002: 4). The progressives, on the other hand, claim that cultures should be preserved 
in order to rectify patterns of (male) domination and symbolic injury involving the misrecognition 
and (women’s) oppression of some cultures by others. On the above view, I agree that cultural 
preservation is harmful and may be a nuisance to democratic (higher education) institutions and 
civil society. For this reason, Benhabib (2002: 7-8) argues that cultures are clearly delineable 
wholes, that is cultures are congruent with population groups, a noncontroversial description of the 
culture of a human group is possible and, even if cultures and groups do not stand in one-to-one 
correspondence (even if there is more than one culture within a human group and more than one 
group that may possess the same cultural traits), this poses no important problems for politics or 
policy. Considering how patriarchal cultures perpetuate women’s internal exclusion in AHE, such 
preservation might be catastrophic to a democratic society. 
In what follows is practical evidence based on women’s experiences of how patriarchal cultural 
norms influence relations that undermine women’s internal inclusion in AHE. There are a multitude 
of documents in the literature exposing how AHE excludes women internally (see Assié-Lumumba, 
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2006; Mabokela & Magubane, 2004; Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1; Ramphele, 1995). For instance, 
Mabokela (2003) states that the marginalisation of women as administrators and scholars, and the 
institutional privileging of their male counterparts and of masculinists’ expectations and practices, 
all continue to be the norm. Similarly, Assié-Lumumba (2006b: 19) refers to studies by Gaidzanwa 
and Mlama, who assert that the university is an unfriendly and overtly gender-based hostile 
environment for both female students and staff members, while there are many indicators of the 
unwelcoming sphere of HE characterised by its “maleness” and sexual harassment. Further, there 
are the shortcomings of the lecturers, whose poor preparation and lack of awareness makes it 
practically impossible for female students to benefit fully from their learning experiences, especially 
in hitherto male-dominated subjects, in which the few enrolled female students have to endure 
loneliness and a lack of support from fellow female students. In order to engender the internal 
exclusion perpetuated by patriarchal attitudes and practices in AHE, I cement Benhabib’s (2002) 
argument that we need to recognise diversity and plurality when we contemplate issues of culture.  
I am attracted to this argument, which I consider convincing and relevant to AHE, where women 
are relegated to subordination and inferior positions. Benhabib (2002: 8) suggests that we should 
view human cultures as constant creations, re-creations and negotiations of imaginary boundaries 
between “we” and “other(s)”. In her view, the “other”, that is the excluded woman, is always within 
us and is one of us. The self is a self only because it distinguishes itself from a real, or more often 
than not imagined, “other”. In this way, the struggles for recognition (of women) among individuals 
and groups are really efforts to negate the status of “otherness”, as otherness is taken to lead to 
disrespect, domination and inequality; hence her call for cultural dialogue. In this process, 
individuals and groups struggle to attain respect, self-worth, freedom and equality, and 
simultaneously retain some sense of selfhood. Her call is for the self to recognise the “other” and 
accept their differences, in recognition of human equality and dignity. The point is that the task for 
democratic equality is to create an impartial institution, that is HE in the public sphere and civil 
society where this struggle for the recognition of cultural differences and the contestation for 
cultural narratives can take place without male domination. It therefore is necessary to reconsider 
the way we treat people, who throughout creation have been subjugated to inferior positions, and 
to begin to respect their human dignity in a democratic society, especially at the HE level. More 
importantly, people who are reared in patriarchal cultures sustain male domination over female 
subordination as a norm, and could embody their dominant cultural codes in AHE. This implies that 
there are power relations among people, that is women and men, which trigger internal exclusion.  
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5.2.2.1 Power relations between women and men with patriarchal cultures 
The concept of power is attributed to the French scholar Michel Foucault, who underscores that 
power is “disciplinary”, that it is “everywhere local, in the minute details of everyday life” (1977: 27). 
For him, power produces knowledge, whereby power and knowledge directly imply one another. 
This simply means that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge. In other words, power infiltrated by patriarchal culture in AHE works like a surveillance 
camera to monitor people’s conformity and functions by observing and regulating behaviour in 
various institutions. Disciplinary power is not only “repressive”, but also “creative”, and determines 
what is “normal” and acceptable. In other words, almost all aspects of human behaviour are 
governed by norms (male domination over female subordination), which stand as powerful tools to 
control peoples’ responses. Resistance to “normalisation” is resistance to the networks of power in 
which prison has existed (Foucault, 1977: 126-142). For example, normalisation enforces a belief 
that a woman is a man's property or object within the private sphere, and has no agency to contest 
or decline. From Foucault’s perception, patriarchal conditions that perpetuate women’s internal 
exclusion are unchallengeable and threatening to those who may decide to contravene the norm. 
This shows the imbalances of power relations that exist among people caused by a taken-for-
granted patriarchal norm, which poses a threat to democratic society, particularly in AHE.  
 
In his book, Critical Social Science (1987), Brian Fay, a social theorist, expands on the idea of 
power relations based on the patriarchal norm that exist among people in African society, including 
in HE. He argues that critical social theory should work with a dyadic conception of power. The 
term “dyadic”, according to Blackburn (2008), entails a two-place relation. In these power relations, 
unlike those of Foucault, Fay expresses that both the dominant and the subordinate agents 
possess a degree of responsibility for the existence of the power relations between them. Put 
lucidly, Fay argues that: 
 
Something as crucial in social life as power involves the activity of those being led 
or commanded as much as those leading or commanding. Power must arise out of 
the interaction of the powerful and powerless with both sides contributing something 
necessary for its existence (1987: 120). 
 
By implication, the dyadic conception of power ensures justice, because it arises out of the 
interaction of the powerful and the powerless, in this case powerful men and powerless women in 
AHE. To put clearly, without a dyadic conception of power, the role of the disempowered would not 
be recognised. As a result, this makes it difficult, if not impossible, to articulate strategies by which 
the disempowered could try to find ways to change the power relationships in society, particularly 
in higher education (Fay, 1987: 121). The premise is that, in contrast to a model that conceives 
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power as something that can be possessed by a dominant agent, the dyadic conception of power 
affirms the fact that power is always the outcome of social relationships. I find Fay's argument 
astounding in terms of the role of the disempowered groups, in this case women, in constituting the 
very relations in which they lack power and in stressing the contested nature of power 
relationships. Principally, his standpoint epitomises my position that women, who are already 
discriminated against, disempowered, marginalised and excluded within their cultural contexts, 
tend to submit to their usual or normal position in AHE. Powerful voices will be privileged to the 
detriment of powerless women, who may succumb to the power of men. In the main, women are 
manipulated and conceived by the other, and men become more powerful not because they are 
powerful, but more so because women give up their power by being powerless. The point is that 
women can also be responsible for their own powerlessness, which is internal exclusion in the 
case of AHE. It is clear that power relations play a critical role in determining who tends to 
dominate, and whom.  
 
Cementing Fay’s standpoint, Bhana and Pillay’s (2012: 92-93) study exposes that, although HE in 
Africa has created new pathways for women academics, this formal recognition of equality has not 
provided women with an indisputable agency. In their view, gender functions in ways that 
reproduce and contest how women position themselves within these patterns. This means that 
women’s agency is at the core of equality and, without it, women’s presence in AHE is rather 
disempowering, since they cannot exercise their freedom as equal agents. The point that these 
authors are making is that women’s ability to negotiate and work with the demands of academia 
and the demands of child care and home arrangements depend on their ability to exercise power in 
both contexts (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 93). I agree with these authors’ position that AHE needs to be 
aware of the perpetuation of patriarchal, masculine academic identities, which position women in a 
marginal way. For them, women are not merely acted upon by patriarchal systems, but they 
reproduce (as they challenge) unequal gender relations, which are indicative of how both women 
and men are culprits of internal exclusion. Therefore, I argue that women themselves, as a 
disempowered group, have a role to play in such relations when they succumb to dominant and 
authoritarian norms that propel their internal exclusion in HE.  
Abu-Lughod (2006: 162) points out that “we may want justice for women, but can we accept that 
there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want or choose different 
futures from what we envision as best?” We must consider that they might be called to 
personhood, so to speak, in different ways. That is to say, what counts as inclusion or equality 
somewhere (say, in the USA) might be exclusion (say, in Africa). Paradoxically, what looks like 
patriarchal injustice (for example female circumcision) in one culture, might be perceived as a 
noble act of justice to another culture. The point Abu-Lughod is making is that there are different 
issues arising from patriarchy, such as the conflicting relations among women’s groups 
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themselves, either in separate or similar contexts. Traditional women tend to defend patriarchal 
male domination over women’s subordination, while the other group advocates for women’s 
liberation from all unjust practices, including female genital mutilation/circumcision. Another group 
defends this cultural practice and regards female circumcision as a way of life and beneficial to 
women. I find this standpoint appealing, since there are different cultures evident in African 
societies, and the dilemma lies in the fact that there is no homogenous African type of culture, and 
as such it constitutes several others. Within cultural diversity, my contention is that, with a fast 
growing society, change is vital, especially in relation to the universal call for women and other 
groups to exercise their democratic human rights as equal beings despite their differences. For the 
internally excluded women to halt the dichotomy of patriarchal oppressive beliefs and practices 
embedded within AHE, I turn to Okin’s perception of whether “multiculturalism is bad for women”. 
 
5.2.2.2 Beyond women’s right to exit towards intercultural dialogue 
Considering the fact that women’s experiences of internal exclusion are widespread in AHE, as 
alluded to throughout this study, the question is: “what should they do?” Okin (2009) problematises 
patriarchal cultural beliefs and their conditions of male domination, chauvinism and 
authoritarianism. To her, since women are more than half of the world’s population, any theory 
based on the liberty or well-being of individuals cannot afford to ignore them or to pay relatively 
little attention to discrimination against them − in this case internal exclusion (Okin, 2009: 134). Her 
argument is that, in many cultural or religious groups on whom liberal theorists have drawn for 
special rights or exemptions, women are far less likely than men to be able to exercise “the right to 
exit”. Okin (2009: 135) compellingly argues that, when some individuals (girls and women) are 
unable to oppose oppressive practices or choose an alternative mode of life, for instance refuse to 
marry or to live as a lesbian in many African societies, while others are far more likely to be able to 
do so, this is a serious violation of the equality of persons that is basic to liberalism. I echo her 
viewpoint that, when women are treated unequally in various important ways within their cultural 
groups, it can affect their capacities to exercise the right of exit. In this way, the excluded women 
will end up having fewer chances to change the group’s norms and practices, including being able 
to remedy their status and to achieve gender equality in AHE.  
As a result, Okin calls for “the right to exit” for the excluded groups namely women as a solution to 
the problem. However, I am sceptical about whether African women who are raised in traditional 
patriarchal cultures can easily decide to exit their oppressive society, such as in AHE. Some may 
lack the capability to articulate and be normalised by the set norms, which entail an impediment to 
exiting their cultures, however oppressive these cultures might be. Secondly, if a woman decides 
to exit, where will she exit to? I agree that to exit one’s culture, in this case AHE, is a very risky 
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option, since such disobedience may be punished by rape, honour killing, passion killing, or even 
being excommunicated from society (Benhabib, 2002; Familusi, 2012). Women who decide to exit 
may need to migrate to other areas, other than their places of birth, in order to avoid alienation and 
punishment, which in itself is a non-liberating practice. In my view, only when all women are 
empowered and capacitated to transcend the set of norms that thwart their quest for equality and 
internal inclusion, the right of exit might not be realised.  
Efforts to debunk the oppressive patriarchal culture that perpetuates women’s internal exclusion, I 
examine Benhabib’s notion of intercultural dialogue in order to find appropriate ways through which 
the internally excluded groups could be retained, rather than exiting their society, including AHE. 
Benhabib proposes intercultural dialogue that will enable women not to dismiss and be disobedient 
to their patriarchal cultures, the act that may exposes them to ramification. Thus, for Benhabib 
(2002: ix-x), culture is a complex human practice of signification and representation, of 
organisation and attribution, which is internally driven by conflicting narratives. She is of the opinion 
that cultures are formed through complex dialogues with other cultures. As such, the dialogue 
between and with others is internal rather than external to the culture itself. Only when we accept 
the internal complexity and essentialness of cultures will the struggles for recognition that expand 
democratic dialogue by denouncing the exclusivity and hierarchy of existing cultural arrangements 
deserve our support. For her, what matters is the preservation and safeguarding of the minority 
cultures within liberal-democratic institutions which in a way may expand the circle of democratic 
inclusion.  
Democratic theorists like her defend the political incorporation of new groups (minorities, including 
women) into established societies, which results in hybridisation of the cultural legacy on both 
sides. I am inclined to Benhabib’s (2002: xi) argument of calling for the recognition of minority 
cultures as a way of democratic inclusion. From the viewpoint of respect for others’ identity, 
Waghid (2011b: 31) elaborates that “the point about respecting the life world of others is that it 
involves experiencing them as they present themselves and not fitting into some kind of 
preconceived picture of one’s own imaginings – that is, what others should be like”. To put it 
differently, it could be said that, to include others internally, one has to demonstrate respect for 
others, not just for being women but as equal human beings, while considering their divergent 
identities in AHE. I am endeared to the above view of democratic inclusion and respect that 
potentially may happen when AHE endorses democratic deliberative practices via cultural dialogue 
as a plausible option in addressing the patriarchal culture of domination. 
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5.3 How do patriarchal beliefs undermine internal inclusion in African higher education? 
This analysis shows how a patriarchal cultural belief reflects through male domination, chauvinism 
and authoritarian practices – all conditions that perpetuate internal exclusion in AHE, of which 
further evidence will be provided in the next section. Each condition might have a distinctive 
character, but all are interconnected in fulfilling a particular goal to dominate women and other 
groups, not only in their homes, but also in HE. Paterson (2001) observes that the idea of male 
fundamentalists and female inexpressiveness, based on gender roles, perpetuates inequality. I 
agree with her critique of the understanding that “women function better as nurturers and 
caretakers because they were naturally well suited for it, given their biologically determined 
reproductive capacity; thus, women’s roles were termed expressive”. Men, in turn, are regarded as 
better suited to the workplace because “they were thought to be physically and emotionally better 
suited to the harshness of the working world; thus, men’s roles were labelled instrumental” 
(Paterson, 2001: 42-44). Paterson also highlights how this belief can be traced to the 1950s, when 
women who acquired employment outside their husbands’ homes were blamed for male 
unemployment and were called “castrators”. With this in mind, one can say that, when women 
access senior leadership positions in HE they are perceivably considered as a threat to men. The 
fact that patriarchal cultural norms of male domination over female subordination are socially 
learned through reinforcement influences people’s (women and men) ways of doing things, even in 
HE. These gender roles, taken as norms, normalise people’s way of life and their daily practices, 
eventually influencing women’s internal exclusion in AHE.  
 
5.3.1 Women as students 
Since patriarchy denotes rule by the father or sons, people from such traditional cultures see a 
female person as submissive and subordinate to men. The same mechanism is applied to exclude 
female students internally in HE. Such attitudes are mostly associated with Millett’s (1969) three 
dimensions of understanding women: temperament, gender roles and status. Within this 
framework, women are characterised as the weaker sex and more emotional than rational. It is 
assumed that such ideas prejudice women in deliberations. Again, regarding gender roles, 
women’s power is limited to the private realm (home and reproduction) and is used as a standard 
for their level of engagement, and their voices are marginalised in democratic processes in higher 
education. Rich (1980: 40) avers that male-constructed sex roles are stereotypical and discourage 
women's access to courses like engineering, science and technology, and other masculine-
oriented pursuits. Offering an example of some female students, Akin (2011:1) asserts that 
women's participation is limited due to their social navigation of the structures of power through 
relationships with men; even their representation can only reinforce the very basis of women's 
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subordinate status. On conflicting power relations in higher education, women in academia at a 
rural South African institution report:  
 
Sometimes you find that I am here working with people who are friends with my 
father. Instead of talking to me as a professional, they will go home to my father and 
say, 'talk to your daughter. She is not behaving well. She is rude to me'. So you find 
that people who have no business interfering with your work come to you and say, 
'Professor so-and-so says you are rude to him. You must be careful how you talk to 
him'. Now I have to explain myself. With us women, we have to explain ourselves all 
the time. Otherwise our professional actions are misinterpreted (Mabokela, 2003: 
141). 
This shows how women in academia are not regarded as individuals with agency, but those from 
whom male intervention is sought, in this case her father, to discipline her, which means that family 
ties can determine one’s functioning in academia. In my opinion, the status of women affects 
their participation even in political and social deliberation on policy making and decision making. 
More so, my contention is that patriarchal cultural beliefs influence students’ attitudes towards one 
another in HE. I connect these views to chauvinistic questions posed to me on why I had decided 
to study philosophy and whether I would make it or would ask my supervisor to conduct the 
research for me. This led some colleagues (women and men alike) to begin to doubt my 
completion of a Master’s degree in Education Policy Studies cum laude and the credibility of my 
work, and some even asked whether my supervisor did the research for me. This is due to the 
patriarchal belief that women cannot undertake philosophical studies because they are emotional, 
unless favours are paid towards the completion of their studies. Another example is that of an older 
woman, beyond the age of 60, who in her quest for knowledge is presumed to have exceeded the 
limit of acquisition of knowledge in Africa. Moreover, when she was widowed, her culture expects 
of her to wear a black mourning outfit for a year. Her presence therefore in the university would 
trigger several comments and questions about “why not stay home and come back after a year?” 
Quite clearly then, one can connect such questions to socially constructed gender roles, that is, 
mothering-by-women and leading-by-men, which cause this imbalance of power between males 
and females. As a result, such patriarchal biases inhibit women from seeking to study and work in 
the intellectual professions, as they are usually regarded as incapable and unfit to do so.  
Some questions about why one cannot fulfil one’s role as an African woman and mother and being 
accused of running away from the gender role of bearing and rearing babies and looking after the 
house, readily come to mind. These prejudicial remarks stir internal exclusion, making women feel 
intimidated and discriminated against or causing them to decide not to participate in educational 
deliberations. Here I restate the argument I made elsewhere, namely that female students from 
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traditional cultural practices are exposed to great limitations imposed by patriarchy, including 
limitations on accessing HE in Africa (Shanyanana, 2011). This is tied to how a colleague, referred 
to above, suffers multiple exclusion and stigmatisation because she decided to break the cultural 
norm of how women of her age in particular are expected to stay home, work in the field and look 
after the grandchildren. Different voices enquired why she was “wasting her time in higher 
education rather than looking after her grandchildren, etc.” At the same time, although she met a 
professor who was willing to supervise her research, she could not access funding for the study 
because she was considered too old and there seems to be no funding catering for mature 
students of her age in Africa. Intricately, women’s internal exclusion is experienced differently by 
different groups and from diverse backgrounds. This leads to some female students in institutions 
of higher learning being confronted with prejudicial attitudes due to their sexual orientation, as a 
result of living in a heterosexist and homophobic society. One student states: 
 
One of my lecturers, Ms Adam, will always refer to me as “he”. Whenever she 
makes examples she would use my name and say “he this” and “he that” and the 
whole class would laugh. There was also Mr Hugo who did not seem to be sensitive 
about how he would refer to me in class. He would call me a “tomboy” and I dislike 
being referred to as such. One day I became courageous and I asked Mr Hugo to 
spare me a few minutes. I explained to him that there is something that I would like 
to convey to the class. I told my classmates that I do not appreciate it when they 
laugh whenever Ms Adam refers to me as “he”. And to Mr Hugo I am not a “tomboy” 
but a lesbian. I politely asked him to refer to me with my first name (Tati, 2009: 65). 
Tati further asserts that this is a projection of gender stratification and an intolerance of a gender 
identity that is perceived to be “abnormal” and deviant from the dominant heterosexual norms. It is 
not surprising that any dominant group (men) will try hard to keep subordinate groups (women) 
away from knowledge (see Mabokela & Magubane, 2004; Paterson, 2001; Pillay, 2007). It is clear 
by now, as I have tried to show, that an increase in knowledge brings with it not only increased 
status, but also increased power, exactly what the entire patriarchal structure is designed to 
prevent. The above encounters are not only peculiar to students, but also to staff members. 
 
5.3.2 Women as staff members and academics  
Although women are statistically represented in HE, the patriarchal gender roles determine the 
kind of positions they occupy and what contribution they make in educational engagements. 
Meanwhile, women who participate encounter discriminatory attitudes and treatment from both 
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women and men (Akin, 2011; Barnes, 2007: 11; Kwesiga, 2002: 140; Pillay, 2007). It is, however, 
worthy to note that even women themselves might discourage others to pursue a higher position 
on the basis of the patriarchal belief that men are leaders and women should be servers. Women 
who dare to get beyond the norms will be categorised as radicals and militants. Moreover, 
Mabokela (2003) exposes how patriarchy undermines women administrators, who experience 
resistance not only from their male colleagues, but from their female counterparts. She states that 
some women are more tolerant of male power and readily accept male authority. Yet they 
constantly question and undermine rather than support women in positions of seniority. This is a 
phenomenon one female administrator described as the “PhD syndrome”, that is, the “pull her 
down” attitude. Mabokela (2003: 138) illustrates the analogy of the “pull her down” attitude: 
  
You know, we as women don’t always support each other. That’s a problem. If you 
are a successful woman, it’s not like everybody will be supportive. There is a lot of 
that here. A male boss can tell you where to get off, but a female can’t. My 
supervisor is having a tough time up there. She is a woman and our society is very 
patriarchal. You often hear people say “what’s wrong with this auntie?” That’s how 
they respond to her. They don’t give her the respect and deference that a person in 
a very senior position at this institution deserves … As a woman, you get these 
snide remarks but you just have to rise above that. When you do something good, 
don’t expect good feedback and acknowledgement. That’s the attitude. 
The “PhD syndrome” attitude expressed above shows how women are cynical about their fellows’ 
viewpoints and contribute to their own internal exclusion, which connects to the patriarchal belief of 
domination and subordination. The point is, women in general, especially those from traditional 
African cultures, have been perceived as less privileged, subjugated and largely subordinated, and 
as being placed to carry out inferior jobs aligned with their traditional gender roles, even in AHE. 
On the dual roles of being academics and mothers in Africa, Barnes (2007: 8) poses rhetorical 
questions: “Who has hewn the wood, drawn the water, and who is now being paid to think? Where 
are the lines of power and exclusion?” These questions are very relevant in understanding 
patriarchal effects on women’s research and publications in AHE. She posits that colonialism 
transmitted the traditional European distinctions between men and masculinity as being directly 
linked to the labour of the mind, while women and femininity are associated with labour of the 
body. The idea is that learning in HE is a combative and aggressive process – that is, the worthy 
candidate is the one who survives attacks and beats her foe(s) and whose experience of 
intellectual combat is intrinsic to intellectual life and production. This categorisation of women as 
being labourers of the body and men as labourers of the mind manifests how patriarchal beliefs 
and conditions of male domination permeate HE.  
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On the question of patriarchal interpretation, Davids (2012: 160-162) confirms that, inasmuch as 
Muslim women – like other women in AHE – have the right to seek the knowledge they pursue, 
they have the responsibility to make informed choices about the type of knowledge they pursue, 
with what they agree, and with what they disagree even through research. The challenge for 
Muslim women, like other women of other belief systems, rests in their willingness to take control 
of their own identity construction and enactment, hence a need for respect for the diversity and 
multiple identities that women uphold (Davids, 2012: 160). This augments my viewpoint that 
change will come only when women in AHE begin to redefine their identity construction through a 
voice and propose new norms through research and publication. More so, the main concern is not 
solely patriarchy, but the way such beliefs are seen as rigid norms that cannot be challenged. Also, 
the fact that women have shown dual images and roles, of domestic responsibility and public 
obligation, means that their research and publication might be negatively affected. Barnes, taking a 
cue from other African scholars, asserts that scholarship can be a threatening and hazardous 
place to call home (2007: 12-13). In other words, African universities should not be seen as static, 
gender-neutral spaces, but are marked with codes for man-as-thinker, man-as-aggressive-debater, 
man-as-athlete, boys-becoming-men, etc. The point is that women are challenged by perceivably 
men dominating work environments, not only statistically, but also through social and symbolic 
processes. Ogundipe, in recounting her experience of academia in Nigeria, states the following: 
  
Most men do not like women concerned with social transformations that shake the 
roots of their male dominance. As a colleague of mine said to me at Ibadan 
University, “No man wants a revolution in his kitchen”. This was in the eighties, and 
a female college professor's space was still considered to be the kitchen ... When I 
began talking and writing feminism in the late sixties and seventies, I was seen as a 
good and admirable girl who had gone astray, a woman whose head has been 
spoilt by too much learning (cited in Barnes, 2007: 15).  
In light of the foregoing, universities remain men-dominated spaces, which mean that women have 
to struggle to acquire internal inclusion. Looking at women's experiences of internal exclusion, one 
may ask: how much childcare do African males do and how many African female academics are 
responsible for childcare? (Barnes, 2007: 21). Undoubtedly, these gender roles contribute to 
women's internal inclusion, since their dual roles − caring for the family and academic work − are 
not considered in HE, which hinders their contribution to knowledge production. As an academic, 
mother and executive, Ramphele (1995), in her memoir, Mamphela Ramphele: A Life, shares her 
experience of being one of the first black women executives at a university in South Africa: 
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Black women executives have to fight cultural stereotypes held by many people in 
society, including their own colleagues, about the place and role of black women. 
Black women executives fit the role of the witch perfectly: they are the ultimate 
transgressors. One way in which people attempt to deal with the transgression is to 
find a male connection with whom to identify the woman executive. The male 
connection resolves the enigma of a successful woman – she is seen as acting 
because of, or on behalf of, him. Her own discomforting agency is thus denied 
(Ramphele, 1995: 178-179). 
The above quotation shows how substantially patriarchal cultural beliefs undermine the agenda of 
women’s internal inclusion in AHE as researchers. Ramphele further describes her encounter 
during her first presentation to the Anthropology Department seminar in 1987, when she engaged 
on the concept of patriarchy. Her conceptualisation was informed by feminist literature from the 
United States and research on the dynamics of gender in the migrant labour hostels of Cape Town. 
For her, “patriarchy is the system of male-dominated power relations I saw in operation” (1995: 
167). She narrates what seems to be an appalling experience, when one of her colleagues 
objected to the use of the term “patriarchy”, because the concept was not commonly used in South 
Africa at that time. “He told me that anthropologists did not like using such terms, whereupon I 
reminded him that I was not there to become an anthropologist, and that I would continue to use 
the term anyway”. In her words, she reflected that “the exchange between my colleague and me 
was indicative of the tensions which existed between traditional and non-traditional approaches to 
social science in our discipline.  
As a newcomer to academic life, I could go where angels feared to tread” (Ramphele, 1995: 167). 
My interpretation of her memoir in relation to the concept of patriarchy manifests an experience of 
patriarchal culture: first, as a black African woman brought up in a patriarchal society. Secondly, it 
tells of her encounters in a patriarchal marriage, where her husband had chauvinistic attitudes and 
refused to share house chores, and expected her (a medical doctor) to fulfil both her duty as a 
medical doctor and her role as a wife (Ramphele, 1995: 154-157). Thirdly, it reveals her being the 
first black South African woman to occupy a leadership position (Vice-Chancellor) in a typical white 
male-dominated university, where she learned to fit in regardless of being a woman. The 
aforementioned instance exemplifies the reality of patriarchal influences in HE in Africa. 
Given the above, I contend that patriarchal beliefs negatively influence relations between people, 
including women academics and especially in their contribution to research and the theories they 
adopt. In the same vein, Lewin (2006: 48) criticises the assumption that “women are too busy with 
the realities of childbirth and child-rearing” and thus “have less time for or less propensity towards 
the making of models of society, for each other, for men, or for ethnographers”. This ties in well 
with how women are silenced by cultural norms that undermine their ability to articulate public 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
133 
 
issues. Lewin (2006: 42; 47) argues vividly that male domination characterises most cultures, and 
also applies to research in HE. Women’s voices are thus discounted because they do not seem to 
respond to research or they are simply presumed to have nothing to offer because they are at the 
marginal both politically and economically. Thus, the influence of male power interests, gender-
differentiated roles and state control assists in perpetuating gender inequality in education. This 
picture shows how the gendered power relations prevent women’s access to knowledge production 
because of the temperament, role and status of women in HE.  
However, Pillay (2007: 158) suggests that “women should critique patriarchal thought, ways of 
being, construct new ways of thinking and being, but to also reconstruct internal and external 
oppressive ways of being and thinking”. This argument supports my central concern, because 
women in HE in Africa could express their distress and dissatisfaction through research and 
deliberation with their fellow human beings. I echo her argument that women, particularly academic 
mothers, require a lot of learning in order to exercise their freedoms in HE. In the light of this, I 
contend that patriarchy and its norms of male domination and female subordination impede 
inclusivity in AHE. Even though AHE has made strides in attaining external exclusion, the dilemma 
of internal inclusion remains. Thus, I proceed to debunk gender advocacy for inclusion. 
 
5.4 The effects of a gendered response to internal exclusion 
Before examining the effects of patriarchal beliefs, let me draw from a few concepts of gender in 
order to establish a premise for this debate. Gender is essentially a social construct and largely 
denotes the social and historical constructions of masculine and feminine roles. In addition, the 
entire range of institutions, values and practices are inherently built to sustain, deepen and, 
certainly, undermine it (Imam, 1997: 2). On the impact of gender as socially constructed, Obi 
(2003: 6) highlights that there is nothing natural about gender roles and that they could be static or 
dynamic, based on the equilibrium of social forces and the influence of factors of history, culture, 
power and production. In this section, I work in consonance with Obi’s assertion that the reality of 
the patriarchal condition of male domination is reproduced, thereby intensifying its salience to 
social mobilisation. This implies that the analysis of gender, in Obi’s words, “invariably focuses on 
women, and the ways the architecture of social power tend to subordinate the female to male 
power” (2003: 6). With this in mind, gender relations are therefore engaged as social constructs 
that reflect the dominant power relations among people. The systematic patterns of internal 
exclusion, the impact of other forms of relations with other groups, cannot be ignored. This is 
because different people experience internal exclusion differently, based on their level of 
confidence and ability to disrupt the power relations confronting them. The point is that no one 
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should rely on gender as a standard or an approach to engender internal inclusion, considering the 
fact that it is socially constructed.  
As I argued earlier, gendered roles lead women to be relegated to specific fields, courses, jobs and 
positions that correlate with their assigned or socially constructed roles. In this way, women may 
continue to encounter internal exclusion instigated by patriarchal beliefs and structures. And this 
will jeopardise the AHE agenda to attain substantive inclusion. With the same concern, Akin (2011: 
3) reemphasises that advocating for feminisation or the gendering of equality and development (in 
this case internal inclusion) is a roundabout way of campaigning for a reverse domination of men in 
the development agenda. At the same time, “the role construction sets men as a perpetual 
aggressors, the ‘doers’, and women as the perpetual victims, always innocent may influence 
hatred between the two categories” (Akin, 2011: 3). In affirmation of the above point, there is 
evidence that the patriarchal condition of male domination is not only reinforced by men, but 
women are also culprits, since these norms are learned through cultural practices and inherently 
transmitted from generation to generation. As a consequence, the gendered call for equality, 
inclusion and development will impede the transformation of the current higher educational system.  
Although some feminists have made giant strides in addressing forms of external exclusion in HE, 
the gender equality approach overlooks the diversity and dynamism of the category of woman. The 
socially constructed category woman constitutes issues such as status, race, class and even 
sexual orientation. It is clear that the advocacy of equality and inclusion based on gender leads to 
further internal exclusion, rather than inclusion. This is so because the same category is used to 
exclude, especially those who fall out of the category of woman. Attempts to denounce the 
ideologies that perpetuate such a disaster, Badinter (2006: 93) asserts that, no religion or culture 
can ever have the last word against the equality of the sexes. Simply put, equality is best 
guaranteed by a universal law that everyone has to observe, rather than by relativism, which opens 
the door to all kinds of exceptions. It is within this understanding that I concur that we need to 
deconstruct the African cultural norms that perpetuate the marginalisation and oppression of other 
people, in this case women, in HE, hence my call for a “move beyond the norms” that stir internal 
exclusion. 
In transcending the gender category – woman and man – I agree with Harding (2008: 110) that 
gender is not just about women, but also about men and, most importantly, the social relations 
between them. In other words, gender characteristics, including patriarchal beliefs, mark a woman 
and man differently based on their gender relations in each culture. One can identify attributes, 
behaviours and attitudes of both women and men in different cultures, depending on their nurturing 
and experience. For example, if a woman was raised in a traditional rural community where a man 
is the only provider, such a practice would shape understanding accordingly – that is, males would 
be privileged. Likewise, a man who experiences a less patriarchal environment, in which a woman 
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is the primary sources of income, might shape understanding in a way that alleviates the situation. 
Having said this, it is clear that there are many ways in patriarchal structures that influence an 
understanding of both women and men, in particular where gender is used to favour particular 
interests that promote gender segregation. In my view, AHE requires a non-gendered approach to 
inclusion that is equalisation of voice. Here it is necessary to take a cursory look at different studies 
in Africa on the dilemma of male domination and chauvinism prevailing in the society to advance 
the point I am making.  
Contrary to the popular idea of gender, Oyewumi (1997) challenges the usefulness of gender as an 
analytic concept for Africa. She argues that, amongst the Yoruba of Nigeria, language is gender 
neutral and social roles and relations between men and women are based primarily on the notion 
of seniority. In this way, men and women can assume powerful positions by virtue of their age and 
seniority within a family. It is then questionable whether the notion of gender relations and roles is 
indeed biologically based or not. One can argue that the concept of gender in the African context is 
controversial and that different groups view it differently. The given example attests to my 
argument for a non-gendered approach that potentially can respond to the needs of all people. 
Notably, Ampofo, Boeku-Betts and Osirim (2008: 6) stress the tensions and contradictions that 
question whether there is a broad or otherwise “African” woman or man, and that African women’s 
and men's lives, like those of all people, are fluid and change over time. Secondly, the generalised 
assumption that perceives all women, like men, as heterosexuals is exclusive, and ignores 
differences within the category of women, just like that of men. I argue that a gendered response to 
internal exclusion and inequality will create what I call “women’s self-exclusion” rather than 
inclusion (Butler, 1990; Paterson, 2001; Tamale, 2011). More importantly, since many higher 
education institutions in Africa are heterosexually orientated, reinforcing male domination through a 
gendered response will stir conflict between heterosexual and homosexual women. On these 
grounds, a non-gendered approach is imperative for Africa, in terms of which all human beings 
celebrate equality irrespective of gender within an enabling environment in which they can air their 
voices with the hope to engender substantial inclusion in AHE. 
 
5.5 Beyond a gender divide: towards a non-gendered approach to internal inclusion 
The non-gendered framework rests not only on what women should not do, but on what women 
and men alike ought to do as human beings. In order to reconstruct the norms that oppress women 
in higher education settings, there is a need to interrogate such norms in order to enable women’s 
emancipation. In my view, a gendered approach strives to include all people in higher education, 
irrespective of their gender differences, and treats them as respectable human beings. With this 
approach, women who experience internal exclusion and injustice will be treated like other human 
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beings, rather than as subordinated women, as a way to become agents of change. In all efforts 
made to transform HE, women, like men, need to contribute to what counts as norms, instead of 
the socially constructed gender roles, which lead to internal exclusion. Ignoring these oppressive 
cultural norms that reinforce patriarchy, we shall keep working within the definitions that someone 
else provides. On the need to reconstruct norms, I draw on Butler’s words: 
 
To say gender is performative is to say that it is a certain kind of enactment; the 
‘appearance’ of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth; 
gender is prompted by obligatory norms to be one gender or the other (usually 
within a strictly binary frame), and the reproduction of gender is thus always a 
negotiation with power; and finally, there is no gender without this reproduction of 
norms that risks undoing or redoing the norm in unexpected ways, thus opening up 
the possibility of a remaking of gendered reality along new lines (2009: i).  
This seems relevant in understanding the influence of patriarchal conditions, such as male 
domination and chauvinism, within the gender norms that perpetuate women’s internal exclusion in 
AHE. With this in mind, I revisit the argument that a gendered approach to inclusion means 
working within what norms have been prescribed for men and women. It is evident enough to 
argue that working within this norm is counterproductive, since we are dancing to the tune of 
someone else’s music. Hence the need to create another tune by going for non-gendered 
approaches, which, in Butlerian terms, would be an attempt at setting a new norm (Butler, 2009). I 
find Butler's argument compelling as it reemphasises the need to dismantle the current norms and 
suggest possible new norms relevant for the African context. Familusi’s (2012: 310) suggests on 
the need to challenge the oppressive African cultural beliefs and practices that are detrimental to 
women and encumber the transformation of educational institution in Africa. Only when the current 
structure and norms are disrupted, debunked and challenged might we expect legitimate 
transformation towards democratising higher education in terms of a non-gendered approach, 
which I endeavour to discuss in the following chapter. 
 
5.5.1 Why patriarchal conditions are undesirable acts that undermine our humanity 
Patriarchal conditions have been shown to be discriminatory and to subjugate the category of 
woman. This leads to the question of how AHE can engender transformation in the midst of diverse 
influences, especially male domination over women’s subordination. If women were treated 
differently in post-independent HE, can the production of knowledge in such democratic public 
institutions be credible? Okin’s (1992: 65) sceptical observation regarding this is that educational 
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institutions as associational networks of civil society can also teach deference to authority and 
intolerance towards others' faiths, prejudice against other races, and male dominance over 
women. Nonetheless, despite the latter observation, the question whether there are possibilities for 
transformation in HE from Waghid's (2004: 34) position shifts my focus to the point that, even 
though HE institutions have often been used to promote difference, male domination, chauvinism, 
xenophobia, and illiberal and undemocratic practices, there still is hope that they could promote 
transformation. This calls us not to be distracted from the fact that schools and HE can be 
reorganised, particularly in Africa, to be effective in what Glendon (1991: 109) refers to as 
“seedbeds of civic virtues”.  
The above ideas support and redirect us to the thinking that HE holds the authority to re-educate 
and nurture students, female and male, to respect one another’s differences and treat one another 
as equal human beings. For this reason, there is a need to reconsider an appropriate approach to 
achieving equality in AHE. On the question whether people’s cultures must be discarded or 
preserved in order to achieve equality, Appiah (2006) clarifies that cultures are internally diverse 
and constantly changing; they express scepticism about whether cultures have anything like an 
“essence” that could be or needs to be preserved. Although I seem to agree with Appiah’s position 
above, my query of his view is that it limits women’s liberation and equality as such that there is 
need for serious scrutiny of this kind of assertion. This line of argument is relevant in defending the 
premise that a patriarchal belief such as male domination, which threatens an AHE transformation 
agenda, requires alteration, but not the right to exit culture as Okin advocates.  
Gyekye (1997: 135) cautions that, in order to address local problems, we need a Western view 
(democratic inclusion) to be rooted in an African cultural way of life. Gyekye argues against both 
“the wholesale, uncritical, nostalgic acceptance of the past tradition and the wholesale rejection of 
it on the grounds that cultural tradition, however ‘primitive’, would have positive as well as negative 
features” (1997: 135). It must be clear by now that one cannot totally exit his/her culture, since it is 
a way of life with exceptional values. Rather, oppressive beliefs such as male domination should 
be challenged. In the same manner, Davids (2011: 16) posits that individuals, for instance Muslim 
women, who are also victims of men’s subjugation in the guise of religion, have the right to be 
valued, since their value is determined by what they do. And what they do can neither be 
separated from who they are, nor from the community that has shaped them.  
Given the complexity of HE, in which women live multiple identities – private and public – 
patriarchal beliefs cannot be taken as rigid norms that are unchangeable. The problem lies when 
the taken-for-granted norms, which are oppressive, make us believe that all we are doing is 
normal, without realising how hostile and perpetual we are to internal exclusion. Simply put, my 
concern is not necessarily with the concept of patriarchy, which has been conceptualised through 
generations, but with the identification of the subtle forms of patriarchy that we regard as normal, in 
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spite of the fact that they are oppressive. If HE, especially universities in Africa, do not take issues 
of internal exclusion seriously, then legitimate transformation will remain a dream. The issues of 
patriarchy explored here are not only peculiar to the African context, but to all cultures that 
identified to be patriarchal. 
While African cultural practices reinforce patriarchy through male domination and chauvinism, 
Western cultures sustain it through colonialism, education, religion and media in African societies, 
particularly in HE. In sum, HE scorecard in Africa has always been and still is a gendered element. 
I agree with Assié-Lumumba’s argument that African realities require those engaged in basic and 
applied research to take into account the social dynamics of the interaction between men and 
women in order to refine the concept of gender. Given the specific social context of Africa, “the 
gender approach in research must demonstrate vigilance against all forms of sexism and at the 
same time against epistemological imperialism” (Assié-Lumumba, 2006b: 41) Considering the fact 
that such institutions constitute people from different cultures, backgrounds and levels of 
understanding, the effects of patriarchy vary greatly. In sum, transformation can potentially take 
place when higher education institutions transcend the boundaries of the patriarchal cultural 
conditions of male domination.  
 
5.6 Summary  
In this chapter, I argued that patriarchal beliefs as reflected in male domination and chauvinism are 
fundamental conditions that perpetuate the subjugation of women. Such conditions give impetus to 
internal exclusion, which hinders the whole project of transformation and social justice in AHE. I 
claim that patriarchal beliefs are embedded within cultures and taken as norms that normalise 
people. I contend that patriarchal cultural practices are strategies that preserve male domination, 
chauvinism and authoritarianism and stir internal exclusion. I also argued that the gendered 
response to internal exclusion, which employs the traditional gender category of woman and man, 
is worrying. This is because defenders of gender equality ignore women’s multiple identities and 
diversity within that category – for instance women from poor backgrounds and traditional 
patriarchal cultures, lesbians, gays, intersexed and transgendered. My conception of patriarchy is 
foregrounded in Millett's and Rich's analysis of the role of women in society, while culture is 
connected to Okin's right to exit, Benhabib's idea of intercultural dialogue and Butler's calls for new 
norms towards an inclusive democratic HE. This analysis exhibits that women live in an array of 
images that is their gender roles within the cultural understanding of living in the private and the 
democratic rights of the public. I argue that such women envelope themselves with multiple images 
as they navigate through their patriarchal society and HE. I call for a non-gendered framework that 
bridges the gender divide without leading to internal exclusion. I call for a non-gendered approach 
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that possibly may disrupt antagonistic and unsympathetic cultural patriarchal beliefs that thwart 
women’s internal inclusion. I am under no illusion that disrupting such conditions inevitably may 
avert internal exclusion. Yet, its disruption may prompt HE to begin rethinking the fixed patriarchal 
cultural norms, which are anomalous to transformation in Africa. The ensuing chapter will answer 
how HE can engender internal inclusion while respecting diversity and recognising people as equal 
human beings, rather than gendered beings. The focus is on a reconstruction of a non-gendered 
approach as a new norm that potentially may engender substantial inclusion in AHE.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
ETHICS OF CARE RECONSTITUTED: AN APPROACH TO INTERNAL INCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter has shown that patriarchy (i.e. male domination over female subordination), 
chauvinism and authoritarianism are conditions that perpetuate women’s internal exclusion in AHE. 
The problem, it is shown, lies in the dominant and gendered character of power relations between 
women and men. Within such relations, women encounter internal exclusion and unjust practices, 
as they are denied full participation in democratic deliberative processes in HE. In this case, 
excluding others, primarily women, is an unfavourable and pernicious practice, which is appalling 
in efforts for the transformation and development of Africa. This chapter explores the conception of 
an ethics of care that could meaningfully advance pertinent democratic ideals, namely inclusion 
and equality towards justifiable HE in Africa. The key issue is to establish what constitutes an 
ethics of care, and how such a concept can be reconstructed and brought to the fore to address 
women’s internal exclusion in AHE. To accomplish this goal, the chapter begins with some 
preliminary remarks on an ethics of care, from antiquity to the contemporary epoch, in order to 
trace its history.  
The first section centres on the conception of an ethics of care based on the influential ideas of Nel 
Noddings, Michael Slote and Alasdair MacIntyre. The second section is a reconstitution of an 
ethics of care prompted by the polemical notions of some of the renowned scholars, namely 
Jacques Rancière (intellectual equality), Seyla Benhabib (iterations), Martha Nussbaum 
(compassionate respect) and Stanley Cavell (acknowledging humanity). The third section defends 
a reconstituted non-gendered ethics of care that appears to possess enabling conditions for 
transforming the power relations among human beings, such that they treat one another in a just 
and humane manner. The aim is to adopt the culture of an ethics of care that may disrupt internal 
exclusion and make it impossible or unlikely to happen. This framework could invoke caring 
relations among those who recognise the other not according to gender, but as respectable human 
beings with dignity.  
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6.2 Ethics of care: from an ancient to a contemporary account 
Before examining the conception of an ethics of care, I like to delve into the discourse on ethical 
virtue traced from the works of ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle. As a philosopher of 
virtue, Aristotle regarded caring as legitimate for rational beings, in this case men, unlike women, 
who were disregarded in the public realm. In a collection of his writings, The Nicomachean 
Ethics20, Aristotle focused on an ethical virtue that concerns the lives of men who were born well, 
were politically free, and were very much concerned with a well-lived life. His emphasis on ethical 
virtue was on the public nature of the agora, which characterises Aristotle’s portrait of the ideal 
moral man, the man with a great soul, a deep voice and long strides (Ross, 2009; Thomas, 2011: 
135). Ross remarks that “Aristotle accepts slavery and a lowly status for women, without question, 
though his remark on women’s love for their children is telling and sympathetic” (2009: xxviii). Even 
though Aristotle failed to acknowledge women’s public roles, one can concede that caring for their 
children and husbands and for the elderly is inevitable. In an Aristotelian view, caring for and about 
others is a central issue. It is further argued that care is both an attitude towards others as well as 
a skill to be acquired. In other words, care entails not only treating people with respect, but it is an 
attempt to empathise with them and act to help them by all means (Ross, 2009). Therefore, one 
can conclude that Aristotle’s virtue of ethics focuses on the caring relationships between younger 
and older men and the responsibilities involved, but seemingly discriminates against women.  
However, the early feminist scholars started to debunk the masculine dominant approach and 
called for the recognition of women’s caring domestic roles, which has become one of the topical 
ideas of the 20th century. This response began as a critique of the prevailing ethical traditions, 
which privileged only men, and also constructed a distinctly feminine ethics of care. As a result, the 
idea of an ethics of care as a feminine feature can be traced to the women’s movement, which 
called for the recognition of women and the attainment of equality. One of the first theorists to 
challenge the masculine approach is Carol Gilligan, who questioned the view of her supervisor 
Lawrence Kohlberg that boys are caring beings. She critiqued the Kantian ethics expanded by 
Kohlberg, with his use of an all-male sample that might not apply to women. Gilligan (1982: 74) 
argues that the appeal to universal principles of rights, contractual reciprocity, or justice is more 
typical of males than of females.  
Drawing from a feminine experience21, Gilligan posits that girls and women are more likely to 
conceive moral issues in terms of a concern for people's well-being in the act of caring. The point 
                                            
20
 The book is a practical manual for preparing the free-born young men of Athens for practical life lived in the public realm, which was 
considered the social and political space of the agora. The public forum was for men of high social standing, and the only vulnerability 
within that space was that between older men, who were assumed to be wiser on the grounds of experience, and younger men, who 
lacked that experience. This was a vulnerability of an entirely different order from that which existed between all of the men, and the 
women and slaves who lived in the same society (Ross, 2009; Thomas, 2011:135). 
21
 Gilligan further regards the ethics of care as “a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human 
relationships… [which] informs the development of an ethic of care”. To her, ethics which reflect a cumulative knowledge of human 
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is that women have a duty to care for those who are in need, which then connects with their 
unrecognised domestic roles of caring for children, husbands and the elderly. Maathai (2009: 2) 
clarifies Gilligan’s view and adds that society suggests women ought to perform caring duties 
because that is their role. For example, if a woman has children, then her duty is to care for them. 
However, while Gilligan calls for the recognition of such kinds of caring roles, her view echoes 
Aristotle and Kant’s idea that human beings are rational beings, and attentiveness to the relational 
aspect of human nature makes care ethics unique among all previous ethical theories and 
traditions. The claim that humans are relational is a claim about the nature of human beings, which 
is a personal relationship with others. The suppositions of these studies stimulate and set up an 
oppositional view between women and men, which can be connected to a gendered kind of caring, 
which this study opposes.   
Nonetheless, the ancient perception of an ethical caring is unavoidable in gaining a deeper 
understanding of the contemporary view of an ethics of care. Thus, tracing the discourse of an 
ethics of care could facilitate a construction of a more plausible approach to AHE. The questions 
behind this analysis are: What does an ethics of care entail? Who should care or who do we 
expect to care? Why should women’s acts of care be carried out outwardly rather than inwardly? 
Could an ethics of care address internal exclusion perpetuated by patriarchal dominant power 
relations in AHE? To answer these questions, different perspectives on an ethics of care will be 
examined that consider the historical understanding of care in relation to women. In this regard, it 
is helpful to consider Virginia Held’s (2006: 3) exposition: 
  
In the past few decades, the ethics of care has developed as a promising alternative 
to the dominant moral approaches that have been invoked during the previous two 
centuries. It has given rise to an extensive body of literature and has affected many 
moral inquiries in many areas. It is changing the ways moral problems are often 
interpreted and changing what many think the recommended approaches to moral 
issues ought to be. With interest in normative perspectives expanding everywhere – 
from the outlines of egalitarian families and workplaces, to the moral responsibilities 
of parents and citizens, to the ethical evaluations of governmental and foreign 
policies – the ethics of care offers hope for rethinking in more fruitful ways how we 
ought to guide our lives. It has the potential of being based on the truly universal 
experience of care … Understanding the values involved in care, and how its 
standards reject violence and domination, are possible with the ethics of care. 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationships is about the idea that the self and the other are interdependent (1982: 74). In her view, it is impossible to be in a concrete, 
loving, personal, and caring relationship with all human beings. 
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Held (2006: 5) further notes that an ethics of care is only a few decades old, a very short time in 
the history of human attempts to evaluate how we should live our lives and to recommend what we 
ought to do. An ethics of care therefore, at this stage, still has many limitations and lacunae, but its 
development is an on-going, cooperative project. This approach predominantly privileges well-born 
men, with no consideration for women, and this forms Aristotle’s ethical ideal. Bearing in mind the 
above, one can concede that an ethics of care is a contested and complex concept which requires 
deeper reflection for a better understanding. At this point, I turn to the conception of an ethics of 
care that is central to this discussion. 
 
6.2.1 A sympathetic relational approach to caring  
This section will focus on one of the pioneering conceptions of an ethics of care espoused by the 
prominent American feminist scholar Nel Noddings. She is closely identified with the promotion of 
an ethics of care in American schools. Caring, as well as its place in ethical relations, is central in 
her ground-breaking text Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984). 
Noddings categorises caring into two forms: natural and ethical. Natural caring is referred to as 
sympathetic caring and develops out of maternal relationships. Although her early position 
considered caring as distinctively feminine, she acknowledges, however, that this does not mean 
that men are incapable of thinking in such terms or should be discouraged from doing so. This 
implies that both women and men have the inherent capacity to care. It is interesting to justify 
Noddings’ advocacy for caring as a human capacity, taking into account her experience as a 
mother who cared for ten children – five biological and five adopted – which speaks volumes about 
her prominence in a home as a starting sphere for nurturing caring attributes. As a care ethicist, 
Noddings, like Gilligan, advocates for equal rights for women as caregivers, not only caring for 
families but also other human beings. Noddings (1984: 5) formulated the term “the one-caring” and 
“the cared-for” as role players in the caring relationship. This simply means a caring relationship 
constitutes two parties and each has a role to play. Portraying the caring relationship, she identifies 
mother and child as a perfect example. The mother is perceived as the one-caring for and a care 
giver to a child, whereas the cared-for or the person being cared for is the child.  
Noddings categorises natural caring as a simple example of a caring relationship, but cautions that 
it not be applied as a model for general moral relations or an institutional political theory (1984: 46-
48). In her view, natural caring occurs in circles of intimates and friends who are engrossed and 
immersed in one another. These circles may be linked through chains of affection when members 
of one circle form relations with members of another circle. Considering the identified fundamental 
roles of the carer and cared-for, the carer ought to listen and attend to the expressed and inferred 
needs, opinions and expectations of others, whereas the cared-for is expected to respond in the 
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light of Buber's account of ethical relationships of I-Thou (Noddings 1984: 32; 2006a; 2006b). 
Thus, the I and Thou relationship is depicted as one of direct connection between two persons. If I 
understand this account well, the presumption is that the carer ought to establish the needs of the 
cared for and act to address them, whereas the cared-for is required to respond to the care, which 
is so ethical.  
Unlike natural caring, ethical caring requires people to act permissibly if our actions express or 
exhibit an attitude or motive of caring for others (Noddings, 1984: 128; 2006a). Noddings admits 
that, because ethical caring is regarded as a particular and situational morality, we may care about 
strangers in the sense of maintaining “an internal state of readiness to try to care for whoever 
crosses our path” (1984: 18). In this way, caring should be carried out by and to all human beings, 
based on their initial experience of caring received from home, school or elsewhere. From this 
compelling position, it therefore is helpful to explore her argument further in order to determine the 
possibility of applying this perspective of ethical caring to social institutions such as AHE. 
Furthermore, Noddings (2006a: 239-241) classifies this relationship as a form of engrossment, 
which entails an action in which people draw themselves into the particular world of the other, 
rather than meeting others on their own terms. To be precise, caring demands that one moves out 
of individuality into others and requires one to imagine the others (in this case the excluded 
groups) and act to improve their situation. In my view, when we care, we consider the others’ point 
of view, their objective needs (tangible materials, for instance a computer or funding), and what 
they expect of us when they are physically represented in democratic deliberation without 
articulating their views and making a meaningful contribution.  
A care ethics therefore does not stipulate any substantive norms, but rather consists merely of an 
attitude of attending to their wants and needs. Therefore, it is vitally important to say that the goal 
“lies in trying to discern the kinds of things I must think about” in caring for others (Noddings, 1984: 
13-14). This kind of caring is an “ethical relationship of care” and is distinct from the more direct 
natural caring, in terms of which an individual may only care for so many particular others, and 
each of these individuals must be treated particularly, without general rules or principles. In the 
main, an authentic act of caring involves other people in particular, as one is concerned about the 
situation a given person is in, and one’s focus is on the individual herself, rather than on any 
general moral principles. In my view, this form of ethical caring seems restrictive and ignores the 
autonomy of the cared-for.  
In her book The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education (1992), 
Noddings revised her earlier position of caring from a feminine approach and encourages 
educators to practise caring as a perfect form for education and schooling. Her viewpoint is that, 
when students are cared for, they can learn to care for themselves, for others (those known to 
them and those unknown), and for plants, animals and ideas (Noddings, 1992: 174-175). To put it 
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succinctly, our strangeness or differences within AHE should not prevent us from caring for each 
other, especially those in the excluded groups. I echo Noddings’s viewpoint that if we cannot have 
caring relations with those we do not know personally, then our moral relations with them demand 
that it would be wrong not to help people in a distant country who are victims of famine, HIV and 
AIDS, rape, sexual harassment and other forms of marginalisation, including internal exclusion 
encountered by women in AHE.  
A decade later, in her publication Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy (2002), Noddings 
extends her idea of caring to schools and social policy. She argues that an ethics of care, rather 
than being viewed as natural caring, can in fact guide schools and social policymaking. Taking into 
account this radical move, one may concede that Noddings realises that ethical caring, unlike 
natural caring, is paramount in cultivating caring in learners (human beings), hence the need for 
every human being to care. Despite this shift, Noddings (2002: 13) argues for caring social policies 
to be developed by “starting at home” and examining the types of practices that characterise the 
best or most caring home environments. It is observed that the most caring homes attend to the 
needs of dependants, respond to their wants (even though not always positively), promote 
independence and growth, avoid causing pain or using coercion whenever possible, and cultivate 
the ability to care. Caring in this context is associated with “sympathy rather than empathy since 
the former signifies feeling with nearly capturing the effective state of attention in caring, while the 
latter is a peculiarly western masculine feature” (Noddings, 2002: 14). The point here appears to 
be that there are particular ways of caring that are different from the caring offered by women in 
the home.  
Nevertheless, she insists on the supreme moral value of directly caring-for others, but now adds 
that indirect and general forms of caring, or caring-about, deserve much more attention (Noddings, 
2002: 22-23). Most profoundly, she argues that caring-about ought to be the predominant means of 
creating the necessary conditions in which the cared-for thrive, which seems not to be stipulated 
here. In view of this, this study establishes that, although we may not directly care for everyone, we 
can care “indirectly for others by working to establish social conditions in which care can flourish”, 
and anyone who fails to do so is truly not caring (Noddings, 2002: 48). On this score, I contend that 
social conditions should be established to address the necessities of the internally excluded groups 
so as to articulate their standpoints, like those of other members. Thus, social structures like AHE, 
if not well thought of, might be disempowering rather than empowering.  
Noddings undertakes constant reflection of her initial position and expands the idea of the caring 
relationship. In her articles published subsequently, namely Educating Whole People: A Response 
to Jonathan Cohen (2006a) and Educational Leaders as Caring Teachers, (2006b), Noddings calls 
for ethical caring that educates the whole person, since such caring has a significant effect on the 
individual and is a “must-do” in a democratic society. For her, by cultivating ethical caring in 
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students, teachers need to demonstrate through their “own actions and attitudes, that we care 
about what our students are going through and that we are partners in search for meaning” 
(Noddings, 2006a: 238). One can infer that this viewpoint that it demands the carer not only to 
address the needs of the cared-for, but also to have a sense of imagination in these encounters. 
She restates that students’ responses to care should not be in the form of gratitude, or a laid-down 
expectation to respond, as this limits the possibility to think anew and identify better ways of 
acquiring knowledge (Noddings, 2006b: 341). To achieve this, there are strategies that both the 
teacher and students ought to follow. Firstly, people involved require exposure to a variety of 
competing views and a willingness to discuss, analyse and evaluate them. Secondly, they require 
the exploration of emotions that accompany various views, namely facts and interpretations that 
contribute to the constitution of meaning (Noddings, 2006a: 238). It is argued, however, that for 
schools to achieve the above, reflection and critical thinking is fundamental features in social, 
emotional and ethical learning.  
More importantly, our focus should be on nurturing relationships between educators and students, 
and also among students themselves, rather than focusing on tests, narrowly defined competency, 
curricula, assessments, surveys, questionnaires and so forth. To put it clearly, when creating 
relationships between students, we should focus on enacting in them possibilities to care for the 
other, which is the predominant aspect in Noddings’s idea of an ethics of care. In the absence of 
such caring relations, education will produce test-takers rather than complete caring persons. The 
point is that, without caring teachers, there is the danger of producing predominantly uncritical 
human beings whose practices require them to respond to the given and adhere blindly to 
assessment tools. Equally, treating students like mere technicians will hinder their probability to 
reach their fullest potential that is attaining inclusion. I concur with Noddings (2006a: 242) that 
education should integrate participation and responsive virtues into caring if we are to produce 
lifelong learners who desire to learn more, and to become competent, caring, loving and lovable 
people. This position connects to my acknowledgment that Noddings, like Gilligan, has made 
substantial contributions to care practices in education and debunked the taken-for-granted 
narratives of ethical theory. Significant to this argument is that the cared-for cannot just be 
expected to respond to the carer in some uncritical way for the sake of showing gratitude. Rather, 
the cared-for should be allowed to enact their gratitude in a critical way, whereby she or he might 
even begin to disagree and take issue with the carer as a consequence of having had his or her 
critical attitudes evoked, although not necessarily by the carer. On this score, it should be stressed 
that Noddings’s approach of ethical caring demonstrates the importance of caring as both an 
educational goal and a key aspect of education; however, it restricts the autonomy of the cared-for 
agent, since the cared-for is expected to be responsive to the carer in a particular way, and may 
not assist in addressing internal exclusion. Since this caring requires autonomy between the carer 
and the cared-for, there is a need for supplementing views to halt the gap in caring relations. 
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6.2.2 Ethics of care as an empathetic action: a paradoxical response 
Offering a contradictory approach to the argument advanced so far in this study, Michael Slote, in 
his text The Ethics of Care and Empathy (2007), perceives moral issues in terms of emotionally 
involved caring for others and connection to others, instead of autonomy from others – that is, the 
cared-for should merely be responsive to the carer as Noddings holds – and the just and rational 
application of rules or principles as problematic. His study seeks to show that a care-ethical 
approach makes sense across the whole range of normative moral and political issues that 
philosophers have sought to address. For him, the motivation for caring is based on and sustained 
by our human capacity for empathy with others (the primary mechanism of caring, benevolence, 
compassion, etc.). This approach attends to issues such as obligations to distant people, 
deontology, the relational character of autonomy and paternalism, as well as social justice and 
practical rationality. One may concede at this stage that there are various ways of caring, and a 
person’s intention to care determines the approach to be employed, either for justice or 
paternalism, etc. Also, we could conclude that a person’s act of caring is not only by virtue of 
experience, but also by virtue of a human being’s capacity to care.  
Most noticeably, Slote’s empathetic caring can provide its own plausible take on justice. He 
maintains that “caring has to do with our obligations to distant people in other nations” (2007: 8). 
Moreover, the relation between caring and empathy can also be used to explain why our 
obligations to those who are currently suffering or are in danger are stronger than to those whom 
we know will suffer or be endangered in the future. In this respect, it is only when we acknowledge 
that our attitudes toward strangers or distant others can amount to caring that the way is open for 
such people within an ethics of care, or even to understanding justice as a whole in terms of caring 
(Slote, 2007: 11). It can be said that caring must be readily applicable to personal and public 
relationships, and justice must be relevant to political issues, including the internal inclusion of all 
people in social institutions, including women in AHE, as is the case in focus in this study. Slote 
also criticises the notion of paternalism, a process when someone – the caring person – acts for or 
against another person's wishes “for his or her own good” (2007: 95). I share the sentiment that a 
paternalistic form of caring is unacceptable, especially when women are brought into HE as 
subjects by means of tokenism or affirmative action, without being prepared to assert their voices 
and make a meaningful contribution to democratic processes, such as in decision making.   
Slote is cynical about Noddings’s sympathetic caring approach, which he regards as being of an 
emotional type; therefore, he proposes an empathetic caring that respects the autonomy of the 
cared-for. In his view, a morality of empathetic caring calls for “respect [for] other people's 
autonomy and not just or simply [being] concerned with their welfare” (Slote, 2007: 57). To put it 
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plainly, the cared-for is autonomous in one’s own right and does not have to merely respond to the 
carer, but engages with him as an equal human being. Therefore, autonomy as a pertinent element 
of empathetic caring should not only be understood as casually relational, but it is also 
constitutively relational in an ethics of care (Slote, 2007: 74). The dual roles of empathetic caring, 
which is casually and constitutively relational, is foregrounded on the kind of morality that 
conceives caring for others and letting their needs supersede one's own. I find this argument 
appealing, since the cared-for − the internally excluded groups – ought to take responsibility 
equally for her caring process as an agent. Central to this caring relation is that all people are 
rational beings; hence the need for their critical thinking in establishing and proposing what is 
good. Emphasising a Kantian view, Slote argues that “we owe people respect on the basis of their 
autonomy – (or their moral worth or dignity) as rational beings, and so their respect for individuals 
as respect for their autonomy” (2007: 55). In this regard, respecting other people and their 
autonomy is an innermost feature of Slote’s conception of caring.  
Epitomising the ideals of empathetic caring, Slote (2007: 95) categorises respect for the need of 
others, whereby the autonomous individual – that is the cared-for agent – is considered as not 
being frightened of his or her own desires or aspirations; where empathic caring realises the initial 
human capacity for thinking and deciding things. Importantly, what matters in his framework is the 
individual’s ability to express his or her liberal ideas (particularly women) in AHE. In this empathetic 
caring relationship, the cared-for can actually challenge the autonomy of the carer – which means 
that the cared-for is autonomous. This is what I understand Slote says to complement Noddings’s 
perspective. The question to ponder here is how this can happen in AHE institutions, where there 
is a discrepancy in power relations among role players? In this respect it can be surmised that 
Slote’s study challenges the sympathetic and non-autonomous form of caring and offers an 
extension to a mutually respectful form of caring that considers the agency of the cared-for. Thus 
far in this study, I have concurred that autonomy is essential in a caring relation, but given that the 
previous chapter has shown how power relations infiltrate HE in Africa, the excluded groups might 
still encounter similar exclusionary practices. With this in mind, I now illustrate the limitation of the 
sympathetic-empathetic caring relationship.  
 
6.2.2.1 Restriction of Noddings’s and Slote’s ethics of care in addressing internal 
exclusion 
I argue here that Noddings’s and Slote’s notion of caring are worthwhile in themselves, but 
restricted in addressing the internal exclusion permeating AHE. Similarly, the same approach 
seems to be detrimental to women from traditional African societies who are raised and expected 
to care for others to the extent that they do not care always for themselves. Offering a depiction of 
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this form of caring relation, I draw from my experience22 of the caring practice that lays emphasis 
on subordination and inferiority. This kind of caring is driven by patriarchy’s gendered roles, which 
see women as care-givers who are considered emotional, while men are viewed as having 
empathetic caring. In their joint publication, Noddings and Slote (2003) acknowledge that caring is 
both inherent and experienced; however, they argue that direct caring for other people is morally 
less advanced than a conscientious concern for principles of justice and human rights.  
The analysis coming out of this joint paper is that only when the two forms of caring, that is 
sympathetic and empathetic caring, are incorporated, may create the possibility to cultivate 
autonomous and mutual respect between the carer and cared-for. The argument is that “drawing 
upon the naturally developing sympathy and empathy of children makes children aware of the bad 
(and good) effects of their actions on others and thereby leads [sic] them to be more considerate or 
caring in their actions” (Noddings & Slote, 2003: 355). Interestingly, the combination of Noddings’s 
and Slote’s positions of caring reflects my call for filling the divide with a sympathetic caring 
relation. This amalgamated approach is a novel shift in which the carer identifies the needs of the 
cared-for, but also creates enabling conditions for him/her to engage autonomously, to the extent 
of questioning the form of caring as well as ideas. The idea of enacting a complete human being is 
central with the understanding that “the better world ... depends on better people rather than on 
better principles” (Noddings & Slote, 2003: 356). What seems to come out clearly is that a 
relational and experiential form of caring is fundamental to shaping caring attributes in all people, 
especially in AHE, as opposed to the gendered form of caring expounded by the two dominant 
theorists.   
In efforts to conceptualise the notion of an ethics of care, I have taken issue with Noddings’ view of 
sympathetic caring, which is too ethical and prescriptive, since it merely expects the cared-for to 
respond in a particular manner. I endorsed Slote’s idea of empathetic caring, which considers the 
relationship between carer and cared-for as mutually respectful, because both carer and cared-for 
have the autonomy to treat one another justly. Thus far I have used Slote to address and fill the 
gap left by some of Noddings’s limitations. However, taking into account the foregoing depiction of 
caring as articulated by Noddings and Slote (2003), it can be said that there are varieties of caring 
relationships in social institutions such as AHE. Therefore, I proceed to explore Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s notion of caring in order to expand the horizon of caring relations and take a position 
on the form of caring appropriate for eliminating internal exclusion. 
                                            
22
 My experience of an African traditional society in which a girl-child is instilled with the idea that only the vicinity of the home is suitable 
for her and is discouraged from performing tasks regarded as challenging, while a boy-child is encouraged to spread his wings and take 
risks in order to grasp all available opportunities in life. I would argue that the form of caring received by the girl-child in such a setting is 
debilitating rather than capacitating. Kwesiga (2002) and Ramphele (1995) confirm that, in many African societies, girls are seen to be 
safe in the private space which is the home and discouraged from participating actively in public roles. However, the kind of caring 
practised in some homes is deficient and may fail to cultivate in women the kind of caring that nurtures assertiveness, awakes their 
cognitive ability and independent thinking, and enables them to flourish in high education. 
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6.2.3 Caring as evoking people’s rational potentialities  
Defending human dependency in a caring relation, Alasdair MacIntyre (1999: 1-5), in his book 
Dependent rational animals: Why human beings need the virtues, identified two factors in relation 
to which human beings need the virtues. Firstly, it is our dependency on each other due to our 
vulnerability; and secondly, it is based on our potential for reasoning, as it is our independent 
capacity. In other words, it is our human dependency on each other as vulnerable species, i.e. 
prone to sickness, disability and ageing on the one hand, and our independent practical rationality 
on the other. His viewpoint is that people are also dependent on each other not only when they 
experience physical vulnerabilities, but in evoking people's potentialities for reasoning. The 
assumption is that there are two forms of human dependence – material needs on the one hand 
and rational needs on the other. In answering why human beings need these virtues, MacIntyre 
(1999) clarifies that the fact that we are dependent animals, our "human vulnerability and 
disability", is the "central feature of human life", hence the need for the "virtues of dependency", 
which is deeply required for individual human beings to flourish in their stages of development from 
infancy to adulthood, including old age. MacIntyre (1999: 5) posits that: 
 
If we are to develop from our initial animal condition into that of independent rational 
agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are to confront and respond to 
vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in others, belong to one and the 
same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of dependent rational animals, whose 
dependence, rationality and animality have to be understood in relationship to each 
other.  
This citation depicts that caring for one another ought to be a core virtue that we uphold if we are to 
excel, not individually, but as human beings. Principally, MacIntyre’s intention is to challenge what 
he perceives as the narrative of the disembodied, independent reasoner who determines ethical 
and moral questions autonomously, and in what he calls the "illusion of self-sufficiency" (1999: 
127). I concur with his view that, the focus on self-sufficiency as the core idea of the liberal project 
encouraged by the contemporary world, including African higher education institutions, is 
pernicious to the virtue of dependency that human beings profoundly requires.  
What is more, he postulates that the prime roles of the caring relation ought to stimulate people’s 
rational capacity to become independent practical reasoners. Problematising the emphasis on the 
autonomy of individuals and their capacity for making independent choices, MacIntyre (1999: 8) 
states that the virtues of independent rational agency need recognition of the virtues towards 
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human acknowledged dependence. In other words, the dual sets of virtues – rational 
independence and acknowledged dependence – are required in order to advance the distinctive 
potentialities that are specific to the human rational animal. Independent rationality is a 
fundamental virtue that will enable individuals to comprehend how and why the internally excluded 
groups are to prosper in human life. For me, acknowledging our human dependence links well to 
how the carer educator strives to evoke the cared-for’s rational potentialities. MacIntyre (1999) 
identified reasons why the carer ought to instil such virtues through caring relations that is caring 
pedagogical encounters. Furthermore, he clarifies the reasons why a carer educator needs to act 
out caring for the sake of that individual or these individuals at whose good it was directed. He 
gives an example that an act of caring requires to be done not for the self, but for the sake of 
others and being worth doing in and for themselves. So the carer educator may confidently answer 
questions like: "why did you do that?" by saying, "because it was just, because it was courageous, 
because it was what a decent human being would do” (MacIntyre, 1999: 112). This exposition 
clarifies why the carer educator may decide to act with belligerence and provocation, not 
necessarily to offend the cared-for, but as a way of respecting the dignity of the cared-for. 
Therefore, such a caring may not be understood or even liked at the beginning; but if this process 
is well thought for, may enable the cared-for student to appreciate this valuable form of caring in 
the long run. To this, it can be said that, if the cared-for fails to reach her or his rational level, then 
a proxy is suggested to act on his/her behalf. MacIntyre (1999: 141) identifies the role of the proxy 
as a representative of those without the capacity to speak for themselves as a second self. Insofar 
as those without the ability to engage, in this case the excluded groups, are to expect a proxy, the 
caring relations might not address the dilemma of exclusion. What is necessary is ensuring that for 
the excluded, whose confidence to articulate is limited, other means of caring would be required. 
For rationality to be invoked, citizens (both carer and cared-for) need to engage in the social 
community of practices such as in higher educational institutions. This clearly shows how each 
party should feel some sense of belonging to that community as equal members. The process of 
listening to each other may lead the carer and cared-for towards dialogical action (MacIntyre, 1999: 
14). If I follow the aforementioned argument well, it could mean that both the carer and cared-for 
are obligated to understand why a particular caring act is occurring, and to act out their roles in 
fulfilling the goal. MacIntyre (1999: 81-83) identifies dialogical action as a means to assist both the 
carer and cared-for to become good listeners, but also to make us more deliberative in the sense 
that we become open to revising or abandoning our own reasons in the light of what others (to 
whom we listen and with whom we engage) have to offer. Here, engaging and listening are central 
if acts of caring are to be comprehended. MacIntyre’s argument is that “coming to know” involves 
not just evaluating our own reasons as better or worse, but also detaching ourselves from the 
immediacy of our desires in order to “imagine alternative realistic futures” through engaging 
collegially that is dialogically (MacIntyre, 1999: 83). For that reason, only when the cared-for 
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student listens and understands the carer-supervisor’s critical and meticulous comment, such as: 
“this work is muddled and I cannot be read further” to a submitted essay or chapter, fruitful 
dialogical action may take place. I agree that, the cared-for may find this feedback very 
discouraging; however, critical thinking and listening are means to sustaining the dialogical action.  
In my view, it is necessary for the cared-for firstly to identify and acknowledge a rational awakening 
that is a lack of scientific writing, logical presentation and argumentation, before being judgemental 
of the carer. In this way, the cared-for student may realise that the carer educator is not making a 
personal attack on them, but rather being critical of the work and caring through meticulous 
comments with the intention of improving it. So doing, the cared-for can begin to rethink, 
reconceptualise and rework the argument. What strikes me is MacIntyre’s call for a caring 
relationship that takes cognisance of another’s rationality in social institutions like AHE which 
surpasses other needs. This perception of caring substantiates my call for an ethics of care beyond 
Noddings’s and Slote’s position.  
 
6.2.3.1 How do we invoke a caring relationship? 
According to MacIntyre, the acts of caring by both the carer educators and cared-for play a crucial 
role in invoking the other’s capacity as independent practical reasoners. What I found appealing is 
the fact that human beings need each other in invoking humanity which differentiates us (people) 
from animals that is our level and practices of rationality. Therefore, if caring is an ultimate virtue 
that needs to be enacted in higher education, then such caring should also consider what makes 
human beings human, which is rationality. In MacIntyre’s (1999: 80-84) view, rationality can be 
invoked by fostering in students the capacities for independent rational reasoning through social 
relationships within a caring pedagogical community, such as in HE. In pedagogical encounters, 
students’ needs acquire, first of all, the ability to evaluate, modify or reject their own practical 
judgments, to ask, for instance, whether what we take to be good reasons for real action are 
sufficiently good reasons. Secondly, there is a call to foster in students the ability to imagine 
credibly alternative and presumable prospects that may enable them to make rational choices from 
various others. Lastly, a look at the ability to stand back from our desires is needed in order to 
enquire rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires, and how our desires must 
be directed and, if necessary, be re-educated, if we are to attain independent rational reasoning.  
Considering the foregoing perspective, I draw from my own experience23, as an internally excluded 
person, of caring that evoked my rational potentiality through an encounter with my carer 
                                            
23
 I reflect on how, upon entry, I grappled with a lack of assertiveness, reluctance to speak my mind and fear of interacting freely with 
men. I could see that my struggles in the new environment stemmed from my background, where it was a taboo not to answer a man, 
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supervisor in an AHE setting. This is the kind of caring relationship in which the conditions are 
created in a university environment for invoking the possibility of a reasoning voice. In my view, 
when we understand that we, as human beings, are dependent on each other as a community and 
that none of us is entirely independent, we begin to recognise that our fellow human beings, whose 
voices are internally excluded and not heard, need to be given a voice. In my view, only when 
caring relations pay more attention to people’s dependency (evoking their rational potentialities) 
and transcend the mere response to their material needs, we may possibly engender genuine 
transformation in AHE. With reference to MacIntyre, Waghid (2006: 434-345) advocates the kind of 
caring that evokes students' rational potentialities. He classifies the roles24 the caring supervisor 
can play in creating conditions for the cared-for student to reach his/her potential.  
For Waghid, authentic learning can be reached when the carer educator acts caringly, so that the 
caring "supervisor creates conditions whereby students learn authentically, which requires the 
following: encouraging students to imagine situations in and beyond the parameters of their 
research interests, where things would be better-that is, to be caring towards students; 
democratising our interactions whereby students can take initiative to imagine possibilities not 
otherwise thought of, that is, to be responsible towards students; and connecting with students' 
storytelling with the aim to discovering untapped possibilities – that is, to be respectful towards 
students" (2006: 434). In other words, the caring for people’s potentialities should not expect 
specific outcomes, but rather expect what potentially is going to happen and what might not 
happen.  
By so doing, when the carer educator does not expects outlined outcomes, students possibly may 
experience authentic learning through these caring acts from a "friend-who-loves". Similarly, 
students may become as "friends-who-love” that is, acting caringly in a quest for achieving 
authentic learning. This form of friendship requires that the cared-for provide drafts on a regular 
and agreed upon basis that would make it possible for the carer-supervisors to engage critically 
(and not dismissively) with their work though of a tentative nature. Secondly, the cared-for “rework 
their earlier drafts in the light of their supervisors' critical comments; and resubmit their revised 
                                                                                                                                                 
and where men were expected to do all the talking on one’s behalf when one found it difficult to do so. Apart from my inability/hesitance 
to express my ideas, I observed that the care I received from my supervisor was different from the kind of caring I had received 
throughout my life, which made me (a woman) understand the limitations placed on me with respect to certain tasks. What I am saying 
is that my exposure to an ethics of care that was concerned primarily with evoking my rational potential enabled me to secure a voice, 
engage in deliberation and justify my argument without fear of intimidation. This developed through rigorous engagement with my 
supervisor/promoter and scrupulous feedback on my work, and created opportunities to engage with fellow students through tutoring, 
lecturing, marking students’ assignments and making presentations at various conferences. Initially, it was a challenging task, but it 
honed my reasoning skills and enhanced my confidence. I was not treated as an inferior woman, but as a human being with rational 
potential that needed to be cultivated. 
24
 “Meet students regularly and encourage them to give an account of their progress (both conceptually and structurally); advise 
students to undertake journal article and book searches on issues related to their research interests, and make suggestions on the 
availability of the relevant literature, such as sharing international proceedings with students in order for them to get some 
understanding of the most recent debates in the field of study; facilitate regular seminars in which doctoral and master’s students can 
present their work-in-progress in the company of others (fellow students and academics); offer opportunities for students to tutor or 
teach undergraduate or even postgraduate students; And support students to present papers at local and international conferences with 
the aim to improve and later publish their papers" (Waghid, 2006: 434-345). 
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drafts" (Waghid, 2006: 434). Waghid (2006: 345) clearly notes that "although being "friends-who-
love" might seem to be quite a compelling and time-consuming process that students and I have to 
embark on, I cannot begin to see how authentic learning would ever be achieved without invoking 
such an idea of friendship". From this conception, it is clear that caring relationships can be framed 
and experienced differently, depending on how caring is conceptualised and on the intention of the 
carer. Here, I adopt Waghid's approach to caring, which clearly illustrates the conditions that the 
carer ought to create. What comes out explicitly, that is; firstly, the carer should have identified the 
rational need of the cared-for. Secondly, the carer has thought deeply on how to assist the cared-
for to unleash his/her potential as a form of empowerment.  
Thirdly, because the carer is also a human being with emotions and feelings, provoking them ought 
to be accompanied by compassion imagining on how painful it is to be agitated and confronted. 
Nonetheless, because the aspiration is to create conditions that evoke the cared-for student’s 
potentialities, the carer takes a risk with the hope to awaken critically thinking and expect the 
unknown. Likewise, the cared-for may express autonomy in releasing rationality and possibly act in 
accordance with achieving authentic learning. The novelty here rests on the autonomy of both 
parties, especially where the cared-for may choose to either endure in this caring relation or quit. 
The point is that the carer should not expect the cared-for student to take caring as it is, but rather 
reflect on it with a desire to learn. The result of this caring relation is determined and driven by the 
carer’s intrinsic interest, rather than extrinsic, with intention to strives for the cared-for authentic 
learning. In contemplating the foregoing view and my own experience, I recognise different types of 
caring relations. However, I defend caring relations that evoke people’s rational potentialities, 
which is inescapably required in AHE.  
 
6.2.3.2 Debunking a gendered form of caring and situating the ideal caring relation 
Here I interrogate the thoughts that equate caring expressed by women and men as well as 
between women, which trigger the following questions. How do people genuinely demonstrate 
caring that empowers the internally excluded groups? Are some people really uncaring, or are we 
yet to understand their ways of caring? To respond to these queries in justifying my claim, I 
acknowledge the primary kind of care I received from home, as I argue that what we may call the 
best form of caring could be disadvantageous and debilitating in enacting a citizen who needs 
internal inclusion. Similarly, caring that merely responds to tangible needs is limited, hence the 
need for caring that recognises rational potentialities that empower the excluded person to air her 
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voice. In explaining the caring experience in African higher education, Ramphele25 (1995: 182-183) 
states that not all caring practices by women are useful for nurturing individuals who are articulate 
and assertive in a democratic higher education setting, and that not all men are uncaring. It can be 
said that higher education in Africa excludes women due to patriarchy, male chauvinism and male-
dominated institutions, but there also are caring males who support the internally excluded groups 
in celebrating the citizenry’s rights to a voice.  
Clearly, internal exclusion cannot be blamed entirely on one group, in this case men, but also lies 
in the complexity of the power relations among people. It is evident that some women in the higher 
education system in Africa, especially those in leadership positions, demonstrate a disempowering 
and debilitating form of caring towards their fellow women, just as do some men. I strongly believe 
that caring is relative and can be constituted differently, depending on what the carer regards as 
relevant in mitigating internal exclusion. The above caring encounter substantiates my stance that 
not all women are caring, and that not all men are uncaring. Concluding this section, I want to 
highlight that, in the light of the previous chapter; gendered caring is inadvertently practised and 
reinforced by all human beings. In other words, the perception of women as caring persons and 
men as uncaring is worrying, since it relegates women to specific roles that hinder their potential to 
exercise their rights as equal members of a democratic African higher education institution. To this 
end, I have argued that Noddings’s sympathetic caring is too ethical, and limits the agency of the 
cared-for, since one is expected to respond in a particular way. This establishes an unequal 
relationship between the two. In supplementing Noddings, I endorsed Slote’s empathetic caring, 
which underscores the autonomous relations between carer and cared-for as mutually respectful to 
treat one another justly. Nonetheless, both Noddings’s and Slote’s perceptions of caring restrict the 
addressing of internal exclusion, considering that the marginalised groups may autonomously 
decide to remain silent. Also, I utilised MacIntyre’s caring, which evokes people’s rational 
potentialities to expand the conception of caring. This caring for rational potentialities explored 
above is a definite refinement of sympathetic-empathetic caring. I concur that rationality is central if 
people are to be included and heard in democratic engagement. Nonetheless, MacIntyre’s liberal 
view of caring by proxy limits the rights of the cared-for agents, since they will not exercise their 
equality as citizens; henceforth this does not give sufficient meaning to this kind of caring that may 
disrupt internal inclusion. It is on these grounds that I call for a reconstitution of an ethics of care, 
which I now proceed to evaluate.  
 
                                            
25
 Ramphele notes that “caring on the part of women can be discouraging in comparison to that of men. She argues that to navigate the 
realm of sexist and vicious African discriminatory practices, one need to apply different strategies. It is dangerous and limiting to exclude 
the possibility of real supportive relations with caring male colleagues wherever one goes, for they do arise” (1995: 182)  
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6.3 Towards a reconstituted ethics of care  
This section aims to extend Noddings’ and Slote’s conception of caring by reconstituting an ethics 
of care that transcends the gender divide and may disrupt the internal exclusion that pervades 
AHE. The thrust of the reconstruction centres on how we can give meaning to caring that evokes 
people’s rational potentialities towards inclusion. I shall foreground this framework with Rancière’s 
idea of equal intelligence, which recognises people’s intellectual ability and need to exercise their 
rights through their assertion of voice as a way of disrupting the conversation. The intention is to 
shift from equality based on gender to an equalisation of voice. Central questions that impel this 
exploration are: what would human relations actually look like when they are not distinguished on a 
gender basis? What constitutes a reconstituted ethics of care that could engender equal and just 
caring relations? As a rejoinder to this interrogation, I proceed to explore Rancière’s notion of equal 
intelligence that defends equalisation of voice as a disruption of the power relations that proliferate 
internal exclusion in AHE.  
 
6.3.1 Intellectual equality through an assertion of voice 
The preceding section emphasises MacIntyre’s view of caring that evokes people’s rational 
potentialities; however, his call for proxies requires an extension. At this juncture, I draw on 
Jacques Rancière’s (1992) idea of equal intelligence. Although his conception of equality has 
already been explored in Chapter 3 of the dissertation, I find it apposite to situate a reconstituted 
ethics of care to build on caring for rationality. Rancière’s idea of equality is derived from Joseph 
Jacotot’s idea of an emancipatory method for education founded on the principle that “everyone is 
of equal intelligence”, and “everyone’s similarity, and everyone’s ability to voluntary thinking” 
(Rancière, 1992: 41; 101). For him, human beings are equal in terms of their intelligence, which I 
find vibrant in influencing caring relations between the carer educator and cared-for student as they 
engage in pedagogical encounters. The emancipatory method of teaching “looks for the totality of 
human intelligence in each intellectual manifestation” (Rancière, 1992: 39). The points emanating 
from the emancipatory method of teaching are: a) everyone has similar intelligence, b) everyone is 
able to teach themselves, and c) everything is everything, which means “all power of the language 
is in the totality of a book” (Rancière, 1992: 26). In this respect, taking caring in the same manner, 
the internally excluded groups are to be recognised based on their intellectual equality, which will 
not only instil in them critical thinking skills, but announce their presence via a voice. I am attracted 
to the argument in Rancière (1992) that, since all people can think, we evaluate people’s 
attainment of equality on the basis of people’s voice rather than gender, as has always been the 
case. In my view, equalisation of voice should be employed as a means to ensure that all people 
deliberate in higher educational conversation as the best tool to disrupt exclusion.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
 
Pessimistic of democratic processes, which he calls policing, Rancière argues that “there is no 
police without the participation of the people, those people who are politically invisible, each in their 
proper place” (May, 2008: 48). He further states that, for the possibility of ensuring that the invisible 
becomes visible, “there is something in the sensible, then, that can, by expressing itself, disrupt the 
sensible that it partially constitutes” (May, 2008: 49). For such people to express themselves 
require a democratic environment in which they can exercise their equality, expressing their voices 
can be the suitable way of disrupting the status quo. Radically, the question is, “when does it, in 
fact, manifest the internal disruption of the sensible, the distance of the sensible from itself”? (May, 
2008: 49). It could be deduced that democratic politics, unlike policing, takes place when such 
manifestation occurs. This does not imply that the disruption and the manifestation are constantly 
happening, since for Rancière, “politics doesn’t always happen … it happens very little or rarely. 
But happen it does” (May, 2008: 29). The idea of a disruptive voice through confrontation between 
various interests and views is essential in ascertaining that all people’s voices are acknowledged.  
Evidently, one may question the credibility of equalisation of voice either as a negative disruption 
or as an intervention of the internally excluded. In this regard, Rancière argues that democratic 
politics happens when all people engage each other such as the demos that intervene upon 
internal exclusion of the demos26. This is not a mere disruption to bring chaos to conversation, but 
an intervention in which the discussion takes account of those who are excluded in the democratic 
politics (May, 2008: 49, 57). The profound questions that demand answers here are why should 
disruption be seen as a form of caring, considering its negative connotation? To what extent can 
disruption be considered as a form of caring? In response, we could say, of course, that caring can 
be regarded as disruption because of the problem at hand, which is internal exclusion. Although 
the idea of disruption has a negative connotation, I argue that we can only justify caring as 
disruption for the sake of transforming a hitherto exclusionary HE for the benefit of the internally 
excluded groups.  
For this reason, I call for caring as disruption based on Rancière’s notion of equal intelligence, 
which connects to MacIntyre’s position that caring relations should emphasise the evoking of 
people’s rational potentialities. Going by this position, it must be clear by now that there is a link 
between disruption and rationality. As a way of disrupting the exclusionary police order, that is 
structures that control others, this study expounds that people’s expression of equality is 
demonstrated to those denying them genuine equality. Simply put, disruption of the police order 
and a call for the equality of politics is the marginalised groups’ refutation of the position and status 
to which they are assigned, “not for the sake of another or different position, but for the sake of 
                                            
26
As a Greek concept, signifies the populace as a political unit especially in a democracy. It is a political subject 
with the appearance of which the existing political order (Rancière, 2006). 
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nothing at all other than one’s own equality” (May, 2008: 49). There supposedly is not a particular 
group that qualifies to be called demos, but for Rancière, the people, the demos, comprise of those 
groups that fall in a given classification, those who are unequal to others in a specific category, 
such as women and so forth (May, 2008: 50). In Rancière’s view, the demos are people without 
any claim to making a meaningful contribution to public deliberation and conversation, who are 
invisible – in this case the internally excluded groups in AHE. It is in this light that I utilise his idea 
of equal intelligence, which epitomises how all people need to be viewed as equal human beings 
by the assertion of their voice, which may disrupt the exclusionary practices in AHE. 
Similarly, I am of the view that for the internally excluded groups to exercise their right to equality 
would require the capacity to assert their voices, like other human beings, as a way of making a 
meaningful contribution to educational deliberations. Exploring the care relations incorporated in 
Rancière’s notion of equal intelligence, which suggests that people have equal ability to exercise 
their voice, we could justify why caring for other’s rationally is vital. Rancière (2006: 97) continues, 
“But among those who know how to share with anybody and everybody the equal power of 
intelligence, it can conversely inspire courage, and hence joy”. This idea becomes important for a 
reconstructed ethics of care, which one has to act on one’s own terms with one’s own equality, 
which is “evoking your sense of intelligibility” (Rancière, 2006: 97). The point is that democracy 
needs to be contested by expanding citizens’ deliberative horizon in order to include all people in 
their own right. Clearly, equality cannot be achieved only when those who are deprived of it receive 
it through others. Therefore, one cannot merely claim to include others without creating a caring 
space for all to engage in educational deliberations in their own capacity as exercisers and 
receivers of equality. On this score, I agree that equality of voice has a potential to disrupt African 
higher educational discussion and lead to the attainment of justice, whereby the carer educator 
conducts him/herself as an “amateur” or “ignorant master” rather as a highly knowledgeable citizen 
than the student (Rancière, 1992). This would instil in the excluded cared-for some sense of 
confidence and ability to utter her voice, grounded in her claim for equality in democratic 
educational deliberation.  
The idea of having everyone engaged as equal citizens in higher educational activity, rather than 
waiting as passive recipients for a distributed pack of equality, is significant. I argue that, when 
caring relations incorporate the assertion of voice as a way of exercising peoples’ rights, this 
stands as a potential element for disrupting power relations. Inasmuch as people have equal 
intelligence that needs to be exercised through a voice, caring relations should aim at kindling 
citizens’ rationalities to enable them to think and offer reasons for their arguments. So, if a voice 
can assist in disrupting the exclusionary engagements, then caring relations should incorporate 
Benhabib’s idea of democratic iterations, whereby people engage each other with scepticism to 
augment and incite their intellectual capabilities. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
 
 
6.3.2 Caring as iterations 
I have argued above that a reconstituted ethics of care recognises people’s intellectual equality 
and requires others to invoke intellectual awakening in order for the excluded groups to assert their 
voice evocatively. Such caring relations need Benhabib’s cosmopolitan norms of iterations that aim 
to invoke confrontation in deliberation. In her most recent book, Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights 
in Troubled Times, Benhabib (2011) challenges cosmopolitan norms, which have often been 
misunderstood. The concept of cosmopolitanism and its norms has negative historical 
connotations, yet Benhabib regards it as “a place-holder for thinking beyond the confusing present 
towards a possible and viable future" (2011: 2). For her, cosmopolitanism celebrates our common 
humanity, whereas it concomitantly helps us to deal with diversity and differences, that is, those 
people who are experiencing some form of exclusion need to be considered. The term 
cosmopolitanism stems from the concept cosmopolites, which constitutes kosmos (the universe) 
and polites (citizens). To exemplify her identity as a cosmopolite, Benhabib (2011: 3-4) uses 
Montaigne’s recounting of Socrates’ response when he was asked where he came from:  
   
… not 'Athens’, but ‘the world’. He, whose imagination was fuller and more 
extensive, embraced the universe as his city, and distributed his knowledge, his 
company, and his affections to all mankind, unlike us who look only at what is 
underfoot. 
This citation affirms how Socrates rejected his citizenship because of its association with and 
restriction to a small part of the world, by saying that "he was no Athenian or Greek, but a 
Cosmian" (Benhabib, 2011: 3-4). However, there are also negative inferences associated with 
cosmopolitanism when viewed "as a form of nomadism without attachment to a particular human 
city”, as espoused by Diogenes the Cynic27. This argument is relevant when we ask how a human 
being can live in a borderless world without attachment to a particular nation, and what kind of laws 
will guide and protect such? The dual dimension of cosmopolitanism in Greek and Roman thought 
perceives "a kosmopolites [as] a person who distances herself either in thought or in practice from 
the habits and laws of her city" (Benhabib, 2011: 5). Thus, due to its transcendence of city borders, 
these human beings are required to be treated with scepticism and suspicion by those who claim 
their identity to a particular city.  
                                            
27 Diogenes, one of the Greek philosophers, when asked where he came from, identified himself by declaring, "I am a citizen of the 
world" (cosmopolites). By this, Diogenes meant he refused to be defined simply by his local origins and insisted on identifying himself in 
terms of more global aspirations and concerns (Nussbaum, 1997: 50-53). 
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More importantly, because of this claimed borderless world, Benhabib calls for a move from human 
rights to cosmopolitan rights. She intensifies Kant's view of cosmopolitan rights to hospitality, which 
aims to invite and welcome all people (strangers) in the cities of the cosmos. She claims that 
hospitality is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one 
may show to strangers who come to one's land or who become dependent upon one's act of 
kindness through circumstances of nature or history; rather, hospitality is a right that belongs to all 
human beings insofar as we view them as potential participants in a world republic (Benhabib, 
2011: 6). In my view, the notion of belonging is crucial in engendering internal inclusion for all 
people as citizens in a pedagogical community, not only as Africans, but also as citizens of the 
world. Only when all people, specifically the currently internally excluded groups, are recognised 
and their voices make a meaningful contribution to democratic processes, will caring relations in 
AHE achieve their goal of an ideal democratic society.  
However, the fact is that we are not certain of strangers in our cities (i.e. women whose voices are 
not asserted); consequently, Benhabib (2011: 6) employs a Derridian idea to call for treating 
strangers with "hostipitality". The notion of hostipitality facilitates a process described as a 
"dangerous moment when the cosmopolitan project can get marred in hostility rather than 
hospitality" (2011: 7). I find Benhabib's rephrased cosmopolitan norm of hostipitality to connote a 
necessary condition that needs to entrench democratic iterations in which the internally excluded 
and the dominant others engage belligerently. Furthermore, Benhabib (2011: 15) calls for 
cosmopolitanism without illusions, especially what she calls a "jurigenerative effect" that may 
create democratic iterations whereby all people can claim rights across borders and be able to 
reinvent and re-appropriate valuable norms that were misinterpreted and abused. In her view, 
democratic iterations guided by the jurigenerative effect permit the "new actors (resultant of the 
Human Rights Declarations and Treaties – such as women and ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
minorities – to enter the public sphere, to develop new vocabularies of public claim-making, and to 
anticipate new forms of justice" (Benhabib, 2011: 15).  
The idea of democratic iterations, in Benhabib’s words, depicts "how the unity and diversity of 
human rights is enacted and re-enacted in strong and weak public spheres". This is practised “not 
only in legislatures and courts", but also by "social movements, civil society actors, and 
transnational organisations working across borders" (2011: 15). To cement the above, I argue that 
if African states are signatories to World Human Rights Declarations, including the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW, 1979), as world citizens, public institutions, including in African higher 
education, require the idea of cosmopolitanism in their attitudes and practices. This simply means 
that iterations entail bringing to the fore aspects of engaging in a provocative and belligerent 
manner in order to learn how to offer reasons for an argument.  
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Since democratic iterations are essential for institutions, this approach requires “communicative 
freedom”, in terms of which all people are informed of their freedom of expression and association, 
not only as citizens with voting rights, for instance, but as recognised individuals and citizens with 
legitimacy to be convinced with good reasons (Benhabib, 2011: 15-16). The point is that people 
should not be seen merely as subject to the law, in this case educational policies, but also as 
authors of the law in all realms of society, including higher education institutions. Thus, democratic 
iterations are in a better position to ensure that all people as citizens engage in complex processes 
of public argument, deliberation and exchange, through which universalist rights claims are 
contested and contextualised, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout all realms 
of society, including legal, political and civil.  
Nevertheless, this study acknowledges how democratic iterations can also infiltrate the exclusion 
and marginalisation of the new actors, rather than expanding the public sphere, due to the 
appearance of new vocabularies of claim-making (Benhabib, 2011: 17). In iterations, people need 
to treat each other with scepticism as they engage in and propose new ways of claim-making. It is 
insightful to call for hostipitality as a way to invoke change and disrupt the status quo, which has 
favoured the dominant groups. Such a caring relationship may open up the possibility for the 
internally excluded groups to find their spaces in AHE, irrespective of their background, gender, 
status and so forth. I am of the opinion that iterations should embrace African higher educational 
processes, thereby engaging them in provocative and disruptive manners. This disruption of caring 
deliberation revolves around creating conditions and a probable atmosphere for the excluded to 
reach a level of learning and thinking that enables them to speak their minds. Only when all people 
can act and engage in democratic iterations, could painful matters such as marginalisation and 
other vicious discrimination be uttered in what Waghid (2010) calls a process of “talking back”. In 
such a distressful manner, the excluded may speak their mind and ask the reasons why they 
should be excluded in pedagogical encounters. On this point, I am attracted to Benhabib's 
compelling idea of hostipitality to accompany the reconstructed ethics of care, since it seems to 
create enabling conditions for the internally excluded to engage provocatively. Such distressful 
encounters may incite those who usually are without a voice to speak their mind as a way of 
attaining internal inclusion.  
 
Importantly, caring relations in such distressful encounters are aimed at empowering the internally 
excluded groups to air their voice. In this way, people engage in provocative and belligerent 
deliberation with the intention of soliciting each other’s frank views about issues of concern. This 
approach is worth looking into, because realising the unthinkable (rationality or knowledge) 
requires some disruption, whereby the carer moves the silenced cared-for out of the comfort zone, 
not necessarily to offend, but to maximise their potential. The above optimisation of the 
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unimaginative connects very well with the theory of the zone of proximal development28 (ZPD) of 
Levy Vygotsky, a renowned psychologist. According to this theory, the human mind has a tendency 
to do and repeat things that the person knows and avoid those things that are unfamiliar to the 
person due to fear of the unknown. Here, one can sense that the idea of caring for people's 
rational potentialities connects very well with the third assumption in Vygostky’s ZPD theory 
considering intellectual equality. Therefore, the excluded rational potentialities can be unleashed 
through distressful encounters with the intention to get the best out of a cared-for student (attaining 
the unthinkable). From this psychological perspective, one can argue that it seems to be the nature 
of human beings to learn when agitated and begin to unlock in an unusual zone or environment.  
Given the above situation, one can imagine a situation in which a cared-for student cannot 
construct an argument resulting from the form of education received. Such a student might regard 
the carer as being insensitive to his/her circumstance and history, unless the carer exhibits some 
sense of compassion. One should understand that the ideal caring relation that I support here 
emphasises rationality as a human trait. In other words, engaging the cared-for student in a 
distressful iteration without listening to their lived experiences and ill-prepared education, such an 
encounter might fail to evoke their desired rational potentialities. Although a distressful encounter 
can be a discouraging exercise, it is still relevant both for the dominant and the excluded to hear 
each other’s views in an attempt to address injustice. At this point, we could ask the following 
question: how does a caring relation take into account the different backgrounds and experiences 
that limit the rational ability of excluded groups? To answer this question, Nussbaum’s idea of 
compassionate respect to encompass a reconstituted ethics of care becomes relevant. 
 
6.3.3 Caring as compassionate respect 
For a reconstituted ethics of care to encourage the cared-for to become an independent rational 
citizen, compassionate respect is necessary. In her work, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence 
of Emotions, Nussbaum (2001) calls for emotions, namely compassion, to embrace democratic 
deliberation. The notion of compassion entails that people − in this case the carer and cared-for – 
recognise one another’s vulnerabilities and misfortunes. For her, compassion is a significant 
emotion to cultivate in preparing people to engage in deliberation and just action, in public as well 
                                            
28
This theory can be conceptualised to mean 'the distance between the actual development level as determined by independent 
problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration 
with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978: 86, cited in Chaiklin, 2003: 1). Giving a simpler interpretation, Chaiklin clarifies that the ZPD 
"presupposes an interaction between a more competent person and a less competent person on a task, such that the less competent 
person becomes independently proficient at what initially a jointly-accomplished task" (2003: 2). The identified three assumptions of 
learning, namely (a) the generality assumption (i.e., applicable to learning all kinds of subject matter - person is able to perform a certain 
number of tasks alone, while in collaboration, it is possible to perform a greater number of tasks), (b) assistance assumption (learning is 
dependent on interventions by a more competent other - an adult/teacher/more competent person interact with a child), and (c) potential 
assumption (property of learner, which enables best easiest learning - it is possible to greatly accelerate or facilitate a child's/less 
competent's learning, if the zone can be identified properly). The latter assumption in Vygotsky's phrase is "for the individual's current 
potential for further intellectual development, a capacity not ordinarily measured by conventional intelligence tests" (Chaiklin, 2003: 3).   
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as in private affairs (Nussbaum, 2001: 299). Likewise, I concur with Nussbaum that enacting caring 
in students requires compassionate respect as a guiding act in AHE deliberations. To her, 
emotional impetus should underlie democratic iteration in order to treat students justly and 
humanely, which is treating them with compassion. The case in point is that a caring relation 
should consider the students’ limitations, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds – be 
these educational, social or financial.  
Needless to say, some students might find it challenging to engage in a provocative and belligerent 
manner due to patriarchal cultural norms that reinforce subordination. As argued elsewhere, most 
women from African societies are reared not to speak in the same manner as their male 
counterparts (Shanyanana, 2011). Therefore, in considering the foregoing view of their limitations, 
engaging distressfully might help the excluded groups to articulate their views and develop 
reasoning abilities. Thus, caring relations need to consider such misfortunes as the carer strives to 
inculcate people’s rational potentialities. It is for this reasons that the emotion of compassion 
becomes an imperative constituent for acting upon with care and deliberating about such matters, 
since compassion not only prompts in people an awareness of the misfortune or suffering of 
others, but also “pushes the boundaries of the self” outward by focusing one’s attention on the 
suffering of others (Nussbaum, 2001: 299). I am of the conviction that, in order to act in a caring 
manner, the carer needs to have regard for the other person that is being compassionate towards 
the cared-for.  
In answering the question on how and why human beings ought to become compassionate, 
Nussbaum (2001) conceptualises compassion as an agonising emotional judgment that comprises 
two cognitive requirements. The first requirement demands that there is a belief or appraisal that 
the suffering of others is serious and not trivial, and that the cared-for student, like other citizens, 
does not deserve to suffer. The second requirement is that there is a belief that the possibilities of 
the person (carer) who experiences emotion are similar to those of the sufferer (cared-for). Looking 
at the two requirements of compassionate emotion, I proceed to show how the cared-for students 
and carer educator ought to apply compassion to rational deliberative engagement, which 
concomitantly enacts caring, that is being compassionate, with a concern to be just and humane 
towards others in AHE. I reckon that one needs to be compassionate in the caring relation by 
recognising that the misfortune, that is internal exclusion and limited rationality, is not of their fault, 
hence the need to act to address it. The point I am making is that compassion can be expressed to 
all people suffering either through their own fault or otherwise. However, this study centres on the 
internally excluded due to myriad forms of injustice experienced. 
The point Nussbaum (2001: 317) makes is that human beings need to be compassionate by 
recognising that those who experience misfortune, in this case the excluded groups, do not do so 
due to their own fault, but that their plight needs to be addressed. On the other hand, compassion 
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can be enacted if one acknowledges a caring relation as a form of community between the carer 
and cared-for, particularly understanding what it means for one to experience vulnerabilities similar 
to those of the victim. In her words, “(One) will learn compassion best if he (she) begins by 
focusing on their sufferings ... (I)n order for compassion to be present, the person must consider 
the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends. She must 
take that person's ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, she must make herself vulnerable in 
the person of another” (Nussbaum, 2001: 317). This recognition of one's  vulnerability require the 
carer educator to have a deeper understanding of what it feels to be excluded internally to the 
democratic processes where one is said to be part of.  
The excluded people may become uncomfortable with the dominant groups, who tend to ignore the 
presence of those whose voices may not have made any meaningful contribution. The carer, 
embracing compassion, can begin to imagine what it would be like if it was they who was 
experiencing internal exclusion, especially knowing that their difficulties to express themselves 
eloquently and rationally are due to their long history of a segregated education system, the current 
unequal access to quality education, as well as patriarchy. A compassionate carer educator will do 
everything possible to enable cared-for students to grasp the relevant concepts and theories that 
may enable them to acquire deeper understandings of how structures and ideologies, namely 
patriarchy, male chauvinism, authoritarianism and a gendered response to equality, can be viewed 
as liberating on the one hand, and debilitating on the other. Nussbaum's notion of compassionate 
respect in this case relates to Maxine Greene's (1995) call for carer educators to begin releasing 
their imagination. In Greene’s (1995) view, pedagogical encounters require educators to begin 
releasing their imagination if genuine education is to take place. The idea of releasing imagination 
expects people to begin to think differently about themselves as individuals, and about their roles in 
a democratic (educational) community and society (as in Africa).  
To think differently in this case, caring demands that educators should not be technocrats and 
students should not be empty vessels that need to be filled with deposits, i.e. knowledge. Rather, it 
is to rethink ways of teaching: "we who are teachers would have to accommodate ourselves to live 
as functionaries if we did. Not have in mind a quest for a better state of things for those we teach 
and for the world we all share" (Greene, 1995: 1-3). She cautions that we should avoid reproducing 
the way things are, that is enacting compassionate imagination as a way to care. In Greene's view, 
imagination is a means through which we can assemble a coherent world, because imagination is 
what makes empathic caring possible. Imagination enables us (carers) to cross the empty spaces 
between ourselves and those we call the other to experience their difficulties. One could say that 
Waghid's (2006) view of caring is a form of imaginative approach to teaching and learning. Greene 
(1995: 3) further posits that, of our cognitive capacities, imagination is the one that permits us 
(educators) to give credence to alternative realities.  
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Here, the carer may not necessarily spoon feed the student, considering such person’s difficulty to 
comprehend the readings and know-how, but rather engage critically by asking deeper questions 
that may challenge the student’s thinking possibly to learn more to shape their reasoning. 
Nussbaum posits that “the recognition of one's own related vulnerability is then an important and 
frequently an indispensable epistemological requirement for compassion in human beings” (2001: 
317). What is evident from Nussbaum's perspective is that compassion invokes the intellectual 
emotions of people that is the carer and cared-for engage in ethical and compassionate 
deliberation. Hence, it is insufficient to cultivate caring by focusing merely on educational 
deliberation without embracing compassion. This means that caring goes hand in hand with being 
compassionate.  
We cannot claim to care for a student who is struggling to offer reasons for her argument without 
being compassionate of her inability and doing something to change the situation by thinking of 
better ways to empower the student. Moreover, like Nussbaum (2001) and Greene (1995), Waghid 
regards a compassionate act of caring as an ideal tool to enhance deliberative argumentation. For 
him, a compassionate act creates conditions that enable students and educators to question their 
ways of thinking, and their meaning of the taken-for-granted narratives, and to imagine alternative 
possibilities, to modify practical judgements, to foster respect, and to develop critical engagement 
(Waghid, 2005: 336). As we engage critically we listen to the lived experiences and stories of the 
excluded and may establish ways of assisting such students to unravel hidden but useful lessons 
of life (Waghid, 2005). Taking into account the above perception, I argue that the carer should not 
only provoke but also be compassionate towards the emotions and feelings of the cared-for in the 
process of evoking her rational potentialities. Similarly, the cared-for, in thinking and reflecting, may 
imagine how discomforting it is for the carer to witness tears and confusion in the confrontational 
process as a way to release one’s imagination. In a caring process, the carer begins firstly to put 
the self in the shoes of the cared-for, the case in point for those encountering internal exclusion. 
Secondly, the carer creates conditions to enable the cared-for to achieve what is never thought, a 
way of disrupting the status quo. 
This form of caring may be difficult to grasp at the beginning, but may reveal the favourable 
outcomes. It could also be said that, for a sustainable caring relation to be attained, both parties 
should strive to comprehend the intended goal. Even so, for this critical engagement to surface, I 
contend that caring relations require not only blind, compassionate actions, but a cosmopolitan 
norm of hostipitality as a way of invoking provoking engagement. Welcoming people and treating 
them with scepticism may help us become attentive to each other’s point of view and be ready to 
shift from parochial ideas. However, being the carer educator we must identify what the cared-for 
needs to be addressed, in this case internal exclusion encountered in HE. This form of provocation 
can be the best tool for evoking potentialities. It is clear that caring cannot always be as favourable 
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as the cared-for desires, but it has the potential of un-imagined performance and leads to a 
sustained caring relationship. Nonetheless, taking into account the lived experiences of some 
students, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, and their grave experiences of 
internal exclusion, caring requires some form of compassion. Consequently, caring relations that 
constitute compassion as an emotional intelligence feature in which people put themselves in the 
shoes of the excluded and become imaginative may lead to recognising humanity in people. This 
leads us to Cavell’s idea of acknowledging humanity as an accompanying feature in caring 
relations. 
 
6.3.4 Caring as acknowledging humanity   
The idea of humanity is central to the reconstituted ethics of care if those internally excluded are to 
assert their voice and offer justifiable reasons as equal citizens. In his book, The Claim of Reason, 
Cavell (1979) calls for acknowledging humanity, which entails showing respect of people’s dignity 
as human beings, a Kantian view made eminent by Cavell. According to Cavell (1979: 438, 440), 
acknowledging humanity “in Other and oneself” means that I see myself through the Other – that 
makes the Other a mirror that casts my image towards me, and suggests that there is some 
interconnectedness between the Other and me. Being a mirror image of the other in Cavellian 
terms requires me to be “answerable for what happens to them”, that is, to enact my responsibility 
towards them. In this sense, the Other – the actual Other as well as the Other in myself – confronts 
the self and therefore s/he is turned back upon her or his own self; therefore the Other is not simply 
the friend, but becomes the teacher, the possibility of self-transcendence. The ability of the self to 
move beyond those known to us is central to Cavell's argument that “the Other is like oneself, that 
whatever one can know about the other one first has to find in oneself and then read into the other 
... (that is to) conceive the other from the other's point of view” (Cavell, 1979: 440). The notion of 
acknowledging humanity in others and in oneself is therefore a salient feature for enriching the 
proposed framework. Even though equal intelligence is at the core of equality, I contend that only 
when we begin to respect individuals as persons with dignity and as worthy citizens through their 
voices can justice be enacted.  
This notion of acknowledging humanity links to Waghid and Smeyers’s (2011: 8) idea of 
considering our human interdependence and interconnectedness, for the well-being of all human 
beings. The same idea connects intensely with Ramose’s (1999) idea of African Ubuntu discussed 
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which presumably intends to include but rather internally excludes 
women in AHE. In Cavell's terms, caring for the other requires self-reflection of what you as the 
self might expect from the other, in this case the students. This implies that both the carer and 
cared-for need to reflect on their roles in such a relationship, and not necessarily to understand the 
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reason for committing to the task. Underlining the role of committing to the pedagogical encounter 
shows an understanding of why caring ought to be expressed in this way; that is, engaging in a 
distressful manner is not necessary, since both carer and cared-for may fail to understand each 
other at that point. Nevertheless, Cavell underscores acknowledging humanity in the self and the 
other as an approach that could drive, especially the carer-educator’s commitment towards a 
caring relation, which can be delineated below.  
Firstly, if those (men) in AHE can see in women mirror images of themselves as human (and not 
treat them as subordinate or inferior citizens), the possibility of patriarchal belief, male chauvinistic 
tendencies and power relations could be eliminated – a process that would engender internal 
inclusion. Seeing the other as a human being demands that the dominant others who possess all 
the power to control and dominate the Other (women) depart from their authoritarian and inhuman 
practices of exclusion, and begin to treat the Other as an equal human being. To put it clearly, the 
assumption is that those with power (i.e. men in this context) may begin to demand internal 
inclusion for women by creating conditions to empower them, rather than women having to appeal 
continuously for inclusion. The argument I am defending her is that, treating certain human beings 
at face value and having them in institutions of HE without a voice is an injustice against humanity. 
The point is that, by allowing some people to achieve formal access (physical representation) 
without giving them epistemological access – in Morrowian terms referred to in Chapter 1 of the 
study – while subjecting them to internal exclusion and discrimination in AHE is an unjust act and 
cruelty to “human possibility” (Cavell, 1979: 378). This caring relation requires that men begin to 
establish ways to express their responsibility by including women and treating them as human 
beings, rather than as subordinate beings. In other words, men are expected to begin advocating 
for women’s internal inclusion due to the fact that the exclusion of the other becomes a challenge 
to their own humanity. 
Secondly, caring with respect underlies how the carer educator begins connecting to the Other 
(cared-for student), which demands that one acknowledges humanity in the Other; and the basis 
for such action lies in oneself:  “I have to acknowledge humanity in the other, and the basis of it 
seems to lie in me” (Cavell, 1979: 433). In the same spirit, given that women's voices are internally 
excluded in higher education, it demonstrates that there are uncaring relations among people, 
especially when those in authority (mostly men) fail to acknowledge the humanity in them. To care 
in the Cavellian sense ought to begin from the point of acknowledging others’ inclusion and acting 
by challenging internal exclusion – an act that undermines humanity. In other words, the act of 
bringing women into higher educational deliberations and expecting them to assert their own 
voices is in itself a form of denying your own and other's humanity. To exclude the other is to 
confirm that one (the dominant group) does not owe the other (internally excluded) respect as 
human beings. In such a situation, Cavell says, the failure of humanity with others reveals the 
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failure of one's own humanity (Cavell, 1979: 434). In the same way, failing to include women's 
voices, especially those who are articulate and able to make positive contributions, due to illiberal 
patriarchal and cultural influences, is to despise their dignity as human beings. People with 
authority to control internal engagement need to acknowledge themselves as humans and to 
consider others as humans who are equally worthy, as a matter of caring. In other words, respect 
for persons as a way of caring requires one with a voice to acknowledge the other as a person 
alongside her/himself.  
What strikes me about Cavell’s exposition is the point that, if one remains silent about the 
marginalisation and internal exclusion of the other, one affirms their being unworthy, a way of 
renouncing one’s humanity. Augmenting my call for a need for confrontational iterations in a moral 
caring relationship, I refer to Cavell (1979: 326), where he posits that “we may mistake someone’s 
cares and commitments” in evoking their rationality. In his words, “what is required in confronting 
another person [between the carer and cared-for] is not your liking him or her but your being willing 
to take his or her position into account, and bear the consequences, that is confronting others in 
position of which one will not imagine the acknowledgement” (Cavell, 1979: 326). This is a 
captivating standpoint, because acknowledging humanity requires taking risk, and not being liked 
or favoured by the cared-for, but striving towards enabling him/her to attain unimaginable results. 
In the main, the argument for acknowledging humanity in the self and the other and to respect 
them as persons with dignity is a probable act of caring. Without this very act, any caring act 
exercised in AHE will remain a harmful practice and continue to thwart citizens from exercising 
their equality.  
Thirdly, to identify exclusion as a harmful practice provides a door through which someone 
alienated [by dominant men] can return by the offering and the acceptance of explanation, excuses 
and justification, or by the respect one human being will show another who sees and accepts the 
responsibility for a position which he himself would not adopt [women who remain silent despite 
their physical representation] (Cavell, 1979: 269). In this way, those with authority to dominate 
others will acknowledge internal exclusion as an unhealthy act and take responsibility to ensure 
that no deliberation may take place in higher education without consideration of women's voices. 
The carers are expected to initiate suitable ways of alleviating any act of internal exclusion, not 
only to speak for them but to create conditions for empowering them through a voice. At this point, 
one may ask if caring in a Cavellian sense is asking for “too much”, knowing that women’s physical 
presence is evident in AHE. We may also need to consider the question of how much is “too much” 
when it comes to acknowledging the humanity of another (Cavell, 1979: 438). Respecting one's 
fellow human beings (inclusion of others’ voices) is never “too much”, or else how much is enough 
when we talk of our answerability to the other or what happens to them? Thus, the reconstituted 
ethics of care in a Cavellian view should be framed as an acknowledgement that, in respect of our 
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fellow human beings, tells us not only why we are answerable for what happens to them, but also 
why our answerability is not unlimited (Cavell, 1979: 438). In other words, without seeing humanity 
in the other, the act of caring will not work. More importantly, what I think Cavell’s call for 
acknowledging humanity contests is the predisposition that rationality is an abstract thing living 
somewhere in the air rather than in the human body. This is a common perspective – that when we 
talk of rationality, we are talking of an abstract element of the human being. This approach to 
rationality has a tendency to take it as rigid framework that can be applied homogenously, without 
considering a human being’s physical needs and circumstances.  
Taking into account this assumption, I echo Cavell’s standpoint that, when engaging in caring 
relations, the carer should consider and acknowledge humanity in the self and in the other. The 
point is that if a carer believes that she/he is a human being with feelings, desires and fears, the 
same needs be acknowledged in the Other cared-for, hence responsibility, accountability and 
answerability are required if rationality is to be attained. One therefore concedes that this is an 
apposite thought by Cavell against the perception of rationality as an abstract. He seems to remind 
us that rationality is a crucial part of our humanity, and is within us rather than outside us. 
Therefore, caring for people’s rationality is an undeniable and inevitable act, if the voice of the 
internally excluded groups is to be heard in democratic deliberation in AHE. With reference to 
Cavell’s notion of acknowledging humanity, Waghid and Smeyers (2011: 6) advocate for a positive 
ethics of care that demands the perpetrators to be answerable to the affliction of others – in their 
case, the Hutu militants killing the Tutsi in the Congo. In their radical approach, Waghid and 
Smeyers call for the Hutu to give reasons why they should treat the Tutsi inhumanely and expose 
them to murder and the daily rape of women and girls (2011: 6). I find their argument compelling, 
since questioning the perpetrators may cause them to begin some reconsideration of and reflection 
on why others are being treated maliciously. In their view, answerability and reasoning direct the 
perpetrators to think deeply about their inhumane acts and to justify their actions to the public. 
Echoing this position, I call for the dominant others, predominantly men, to engage in self-reflection 
and give their reasons why women should continue to be internally excluded and treated as if they 
were not equal citizens. The assumption is that those instigating internal exclusion would have a 
chance to recognise the injustice done to others and give reasonable justification for their actions, 
which possibly could lead to caring relations. In a nutshell, Cavell’s idea of acknowledging 
humanity profoundly heightens the reconstituted ethics of care in the efforts to disrupt the cycle of 
power relations among people that stir internal exclusion. On the basis of the preceding exposition, 
I pose the question whether human beings can do without caring. In answering this question, 
MacIntyre (1999: 83-84) highlights the two vigorous reasons why human beings need to care.  
Firstly, because we are dependent animals in the sense of caring for our physical needs 
(vulnerabilities; disabled, and ageing etc.). Secondly, we are also dependent on each other to 
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conjure up each other’s rationality. However, addressing people’s vulnerabilities, including our 
physical needs, is not a guarantee that our rationality will be invoked to the extent that will enable 
us to be independent reasoners. It is only when we pay close attention to care for each other’s 
rationality that we can attend to our humanity that is both our physical and our rational needs. This 
approach takes account our humanity, which is that our being human connects very well with 
Cavell’s (1979) call for acknowledging each other’s humanity. The core of this viewpoint is that our 
sense of being human is what we have in common and share – which is rationality. In other words, 
our physical differences alone do not characterise our humanity, but rather it is our commonalities 
that characterise our humanity. This simply means that human beings are complete when they 
encounter each other. My conviction is that an individual cannot survive without each other, 
evoking each other’s rationality as a way to recognising our humanity. From the above, it is clear 
that, when we care, we begin to encounter the otherness of others through iterations that is both 
our physical and our rationality – a way of advancing humanity – which is unavoidably salient of 
our being human. 
Thus far, I have extended MacIntyre’s notion of caring that creates space for evoking potentialities, 
noting that this kind of an ethics of care needs to be reconstituted with Rancière’s idea of equal 
intelligence, which offers a potential base for the internally excluded groups to assert their voices. 
This can only happen when the excluded announce their presence in democratic deliberations via 
a voice as a way of disrupting the taken-for-granted conversation of the dominant group. In other 
words, equality is based on the voice of worthy human beings, rather than on gender, when looking 
at this from Benhabib’s hostipitable iterations. Through belligerent engagement, the patriarchal 
norms, chauvinistic tendencies and authoritarian encounters might be put to scrutiny. In the same 
way, interrogation and agitation may stir distress, while iteration should give room to 
compassionate respect (Nussbaum, 2001) by listening to other’s stories and recognising their 
fates. Doing something for the excluded and acting for the common good affirms humanity in each 
other. This suggests that caring relations that acknowledge humanity in the self and in others (in 
Cavell’s idea) may advance an authentic form of democratic higher education deliberation. 
Therefore, I contend that the reconstituted ethics of care as sketched above possesses sufficient 
conditions to disrupt the power relations among people by means of an equalisation of voice, 
rather than of gender, as contended by this dissertation. Given the above, I proceed to defend an 
appropriate form of caring.  
 
6.4 Caring as a human capacity – in defence of a reconstituted ethics of care 
At this point I acknowledge various forms of caring offered in AHE aimed at creating spaces for the 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups in fulfilling universal human rights declarations such as the 
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CEDAW and MDGs. I also acknowledge the commitment of educators in ensuring that the 
deprived groups gain formal access to HE as citizens. Nonetheless, I defend caring relations that 
recognise people as human beings with equal intelligence and rationality, namely compassionate 
imagining, responsibility, and reasoning. These three features hold salient conditions for 
inculcating a culture of caring that transcends the material needs of rational, independent beings. 
My argument is that the pedagogical community, which is AHE, is incomplete without caring 
citizens invoking each other’s humanity in deliberative encounters. Hence, there is a need to 
engage in democratic deliberation if the otherness of the others is to be invoked, that is human 
rationality (MacIntyre, 1999). I incontestably acknowledge that evoking potentialities is a 
complicated task and requires risk taking in empowering the other. Yet this proves to be a viable 
mechanism to enable the potentialities in other to be unleashed – not in a prescribed way, but by 
expecting the unimaginable expression of equality. 
Caring relations that are concerned about humanity are without doubt sufficient to disrupt and 
overturn the internally exclusive patriarchy, male chauvinistic practices and authoritarian attitudes 
among people in HE in Africa. This robust caring approach challenges the universal views that 
claim gender equality and defend intellectual equality through a voice for all human beings. The 
reconstituted, non-gendered caring transcends the patriarchal norms that dictate what males can 
do and what females cannot, which undermines democratic ideas of citizenship. However, an 
authentic caring relation perceives people – both women and men – as human beings who are 
worthy of respect, who can express their minds, and who should be treated in a non-gendered but 
dignified way. I contest the assumptions that men are more patriarchal than women or that women 
are more caring than men, in the light of the discriminatory experiences recounted by others (i.e. 
Ramphele, 1995), and the kind of caring I encountered in a male promoter. On the basis of these 
accounts, I contend that caring is a human capacity and can be expressed by all human beings, 
irrespective of their gender or class. What I found salient is the kind of caring relation that enacts 
rationality and is reciprocally caring, not for its own sake but for the sake of humanity.  
The point is that, only when we begin to recognize all people as citizens of Africa and world, AHE 
caring relations may instil in citizens a sense of compassionate imagining, responsibility and 
reasoning. In this way, individuals could exercise their citizenship through a voice as equally as 
possible in educational iterations which can potentially engender substantive inclusion. In sum, 
caring relations should constitute three salient features: firstly, the caring relation needs 
compassionate imagining, where people listen to each other’s lived experiences and put 
themselves in the shoes of other’s misfortunes and act to alleviate internal exclusion. Secondly, the 
caring relation requires responsibility that enables the creation of conditions for people to exercise 
their equality via a voice. This can happen when the dominant others take responsibility to 
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recognise humanity in themselves and the other by invoking their potentialities and being 
remorseful when others are internally excluded.  
Thirdly, the caring relation calls for reasoning abilities that enable people to become assertive and 
announce their presence as equal citizens. By engaging in provocative deliberation, people might 
interrogate issues of concern with the intention to challenge the exclusionary structures and 
ideologies in themselves and others that thwart transformation. I acknowledge that, if this 
reconstituted ethics of care is cultivated in HE, Africa could have caring democratic citizens who 
will not only be deliberative, but also stand against anomalies on the entire continent. In view of 
this, an apt caring offers a philosophically rich account that can both disrupt and possibly eliminate 
the power relations between people in HE. Unless higher education institutions, especially 
universities in Africa, promote this form of caring in their pedagogical encounters, it will be difficult, 
if not impossible, to cultivate caring citizens. Notably, this caring will not only help in attaining 
substantial inclusion, but may engender social justice, which Africa and the entire world require. 
 
6.5 Summary 
I have shown that the conception of an ethics of care as a sympathetic caring relation espoused by 
Noddings is worthwhile, but that it limits the autonomy of a cared-for agent. In supplementing 
sympathetic caring, I adopted Slote’s empathetic caring, which invokes autonomy and mutual 
respect. Even so, considering the deprived groups that might not be able to assert their voices 
autonomously, Slote’s, like Noddings’s caring approach, is restricted in addressing internal 
exclusion. I then endorsed McIntyre’s startling caring approach that evokes citizens’ rational 
potentialities. Although caring that evokes rationality is apposite, the fact that his liberal caring 
depends on a proxy for the non-eloquent requires further reconstitution. In the quest for an 
appropriate type of caring, I adopted equal intelligence (Rancière) to set the grounds for a caring 
relationship that may disrupt internal exclusion, whereby the excluded begin to announce their 
presence via a voice. This disruptive approach creates a space for people to engage in provocative 
iterations (Benhabib), with compassionate respect (Nussbaum) and humanity (Cavell). I then called 
for a framework of a reconstituted ethics of care for AHE that possibly may enact in people 
compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning.  
I have also posited that caring relations that goes beyond gender equality to the equalisation of 
voice of all human beings stand a chance to engender social justice and, inevitably, humanity. 
When all students exercise their equality as citizens, they may become compassionate, 
imaginative and responsible reasoners, not only asserting individual voices, but taking account of 
others. Without each of these facets, a viable manifestation of caring would be unlikely, and even 
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impossible to advance. Therefore, unless AHE employs this reconceptualisation of an ethics of 
care, which constitutes compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning, internal exclusion 
will continue to undermine the project of democratisation in Africa. The subsequent and concluding 
chapter will provide the implications of a reconstituted ethics of care for a re-imagined university 
education, that is, teaching and learning, governance and management. At the same time, I will 
show the contribution of the study to research, reflect on the research journey, respond to potential 
criticism and offer possibilities for future studies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPLICATIONS FOR A RECONSTITUTED ETHICS OF CARE FOR UNIVERSITY 
EDUCATION AND IT’S RELEVANCE TO RESEARCH  
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I have been preoccupied with a reconstruction of an ethics of care that 
might potentially disrupt the exclusionary practices in AHE. In the final subsection, I defended an 
all-encompassing reconstituted ethics of care with its related concepts – compassionate imagining, 
responsibility and reasoning – as an appropriate framework to disrupt internal exclusion in AHE. 
This concluding chapter aims to demonstrate the implications of the defended approach for a re-
imagined university education. It will also offer the contribution of the study to research; respond to 
potential criticism; and offer possibilities for future studies. I also reflect on my journey of 
educational research. Meanwhile, before engaging a re-imagined university education, let me offer 
a synopsis of the project by consolidating the core findings and arguments.  
 
7.2 A synopsis and foundation of the dissertation  
In the foregoing chapters of this dissertation, I explored why AHE excludes women, as evidently 
revealed throughout the study, and the underlying causes of such exclusion, thereby proposing 
how an ethics of care could disrupt this dilemma. The investigation was propelled by the 
hypothesis that AHE excludes women, premised on my lived experience and observations of 
statistical representation from various higher education institutions on the African continent. To 
substantiate the above assumption, I attempted to respond to the primary and secondary questions 
of the study: “Do exclusion and gender inequality undermine the pursuit of higher education in 
Africa? Can the production of knowledge be credible if higher education in Africa is permeated by 
patriarchal ideology, practices and gender inequality which perpetuate the exclusion women? 
Would an ethics of care be a feasible notion for remedying exclusion, gender inequality and social 
injustice, which perpetuate women’s lack of access to higher education institutions in Africa?”  
  
To answer these research questions, the analysis started by setting the agenda for the research in 
Chapter 2, which offers a historical account of AHE, depicting women’s involvement in three 
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epochs. The analysis revealed that HE was in Africa before Western colonialism, yet during these 
periods women were assigned to non-recognised and trivial gendered roles within the private 
space, which were their husbands’ homes. I have shown that women in Africa remained without 
rights to engage in the public space and contribute to development. Nonetheless, from the 
postcolonial period, African states and international agencies (i.e. the IMF and the World Bank) 
made drastic shifts in advocating for women's inclusion and gender equality. Although I 
acknowledged the major strides AHE made in widening access in redressing the past 
colonial/apartheid systems, the contemporary portrait, which is the focus of this study, exposed 
how such social institutions, especially universities, are confronted with competing demands of 
responding to local needs for transformation and international ideologies of liberalism and 
globalisation. This project emphasised the production of knowledge for the global market economy 
and educating people who can compete favourably. This is what Castells (2001: 16) asserted by 
showing that international demands overpowered the autonomy of AHE to educate for social 
justice, leading to four inhumane conditions in human existence: inequality, poverty, polarisation 
and social exclusion. Similarly, Divala (2008: 200) affirmed that AHE had to negotiate a position 
between international recognition and local needs. The assumption is that these structures left HE 
without freedom and space to care for its deprived citizens, especially women. Nonetheless, I 
argued that if Africa was serious about reaching genuine transformation, it was essential to explore 
other aspects that hold and impinge the continent’s liberation agenda. 
Within the above understanding, Chapter 3 conceptualised the notion of inclusion as the African 
philosophy of Ubuntu and equality in relation to AHE. I identified that HE adopted gender as a 
standard to attain inclusion and equality. My conceptualisation of inclusion and equality as 
democratic values revealed that an equalisation of voice, rather than a gendered approach, is the 
ideal one. Thus, the chapter showed the incongruence between AHE’s proposition for inclusion 
and equality based on gender and the democratic theorist’s notion of equalisation of voice. 
Similarly, this analysis exposed that there are subtle forms of exclusion that stir women’s internal 
exclusion in spite of their statistical representation. I contend that, although Ubuntu is equal to 
inclusion, the portrayal of women’s internal exclusion is unjust and shows a limited understanding 
of Ubuntu. I agree with Waghid and Smeyers’s (2012) argument that “Knowing Ubuntu is not acting 
with care”, hence a need for reconceptualisation. 
By probing women’s inclusion, Chapter 4 offered evidence of women’s experiences of higher 
educational discourses to substantiate the internal exclusion identified in the previous chapter. 
Data was constructed from purposely sampled HE discourses in countries where evidence of 
women’s exclusion is readily available (both statistically and experience). I argued that such 
exclusion and inequality are pernicious, as they undermine transformation, development and the 
democratic agenda Africa requires. This analysis exposed that, apart from international demands, 
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there is a culture of patriarchal beliefs, male chauvinism and authoritarianism that form the 
conditions that perpetuate internal exclusion. In Chapter 5, I investigated how patriarchal ideology 
is a taken-for-granted and static norm that normalise both male and female categories and 
influence internal exclusion. I discovered that there are power relations among people, and that 
both the excluded and the dominant ought to be held accountable for their sustenance. I also 
argued that a gendered approach to inclusion and equality provoked more exclusion, especially for 
people who fall out of the heterosexual category. In my view, African people and their social 
institutions ought to reflect on and take responsibility for injustices happening on the continent, 
rather than blaming external structures such as the globalisation project exclusively.  
In Chapter 6 I explored the conception of an ethics of care to offer an appropriate means of 
addressing internal exclusion. Taking a cue from Noddings’s conception of caring, the study 
discovered that caring is relational between the carer and the cared-for. I extended her conception 
of caring beyond sympathy towards empathy, which recognises mutual respect for and the 
autonomy of the cared-for. In an effort to identify an appropriate approach, I endorsed MacIntyrean 
caring, which evokes people’s rational potentialities, because of the fact that human beings are 
dependent beings for both vulnerabilities and rationality to become independent rational beings. In 
view of the above, I drew the conclusion that caring can be constituted differently based on the 
carer’s agenda, specifically whether it is aimed to debilitate the cared-for or emancipate them. I 
then advocated a non-gendered, all-encompassing approach that harmonises the conception of an 
ethics of care based on a Rancièrean emancipatory approach that views all people (the carers and 
cared-for) as equal intellectuals who need to announce their presence via a voice. To give 
meaning to this approach, I employed the cosmopolitan norms of iteration, compassionate respect 
and humanity to reconstitute an ethics of care. This approach espoused three re-imagined features 
– compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning – as sufficient conditions to address 
internal exclusion. I argued that this approach is pertinent to disrupt the exclusionary power 
relations among people in AHE, whereby people, irrespective of their differences, possibly could 
celebrate equality and inclusion through a voice.  
Considering the findings of this study, the next section of the chapter will exhibit the implications of 
a reconstituted ethics of care for a re-imagined university education, that is teaching and learning, 
as well as governance and management. The thrust of the chapter is to show the potentiality for a 
re-imagined university education to engender substantive inclusion. 
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7.3 Compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning: implications for substantive 
inclusion 
Here, prior to the manifestation of what a re-imagined university looks like, I want to highlight why 
university education cannot be divorced from local needs. The crucial question that gives impetus 
to this exposition is: why are people excluded internally in HE in Africa? The response could be, 
because people are not really taught and do not grasp what it means to be a citizen of a 
democratic society, especially through acts of deliberation. Thus, it is a university’s responsibility to 
educate its citizens to be democrats. The same idea is advocated by different scholars, namely 
Benhabib (1996), Dunne & Pendlebury (2003), Enslin, Pendlebury and Tjiattas (2001), Gutmann & 
Thompson (2004), Waghid (2005), Assié-Lumumba (2007), Frank & Meyer (2007), and Smeyers 
(2011), who argue that HE, mainly the university, is an integral site where democratic values such 
as inclusion, equality, respect and caring are cultivated and experienced. In other words, Africa 
ought to educate people how to deliberate as a way of exercising their rights and responsibilities, 
with the purpose of finding amicable solutions and answers to others’ deprivation and 
marginalisation. I argue that it is through deliberation that students could potentially disrupt the 
taken-for-granted patriarchal narrative and challenge the practices that impede a transformational 
agenda.  
My conviction is that we cannot expect people to care if they are not educated to do so. It is 
important to recount Abdalla’s view in Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 19), alluded to in Chapter 1, that a 
university is but one of the institutions of HE in which men and women are educated with high 
levels of intellectual development in different fields. This pedagogical community is seen as vital 
where people are engaged in study and research. I argue that only when a university takes its 
democratic responsibility of cultivating caring characters seriously, internal exclusion and other 
forms of injustice may be alleviated. Similarly, a university, as an integral social institution of 
democratic society, should not only produce competitors in the world market, but citizens who can 
strive for just society. Augmenting this view, Nussbaum (2010) is concerned about treating 
education as if its main goal is to teach students to be economically productive, rather than to think 
critically and become knowledgeable and empathetic citizens. Her argument is that nations, 
including those in Africa and their social institutions must resist efforts to reduce education to a tool 
of gross national product, but rather work towards education for a more inclusive type of citizenship 
that offers all students the capacity to be true democratic citizens of their countries and the world 
(Nussbaum, 2010: 6-7).  
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I echo the above view that university education should move beyond educating for profit making, 
but rather should inculcate democratic values like inclusion, equality, respect and caring, to 
mention a few. In what follows I present the manifestation of a re-imagined university education 
within the reconstructed ethics of care for substantive inclusion. 
 
7.3.1 Implications for university teaching and learning 
In this subsection, before exploring what teaching and learning encounters could look like within a 
reconstituted ethics of care, I want to make some preliminary remarks on what constitutes teaching 
and learning. One of the renowned philosophers of education, the late Terence McLaughlin, 
responded to the critical question of “How should practices and communities of practice be 
properly conceived in the context of teaching and learning?” by saying that the concept of teaching 
and education ought to be used interchangeably with an understanding that teaching ought to be 
an “educative teaching” (McLaughlin, 2003: 345). From the above it is clear that there are various 
interpretations and conceptions of what the notion of education entails; however, for him, teaching 
as a practice or community of practice should consider MacIntyre’s exposition. McLaughlin (2003: 
346) cautions that teaching that restricts itself or ignores the MacIntyrean and Aristotelian elements 
or questions of coherent, overall, holistic vision, virtues, is insufficient. The point is that there is a 
danger of over-emphasising “skills” and being disconnected from dispositions, virtues, values, 
motives and other personal qualities of the teacher widely seen as central to teaching. With 
reference to Richard Smith (cited in McLaughlin, 2003: 346), “to put ‘skills’ at the heart of our 
conception of a teacher is to come close to conceding that teachers have nothing to say about the 
ends of education, no vision of human potential or of the way life might be lived to communicate to 
their pupils, but are experts in means only”. McLaughlin therefore asserts that there is a need for 
trainee teachers to be invited to consider and develop a broad, overall vision of education.   
Like McLaughlin, Waghid (2008a) advocates the Aristotelian concepts of phronises (practical 
wisdom) and techne (technical know-know) as encompassing university teaching and learning 
(pedagogy). Waghid (2008a) reconstructed what he calls a critical pedagogy for university 
education with Dunne and Pendlebury’s (2003) view of practical reasoning. From within this 
viewpoint, Dunne and Pendlebury (2003) posit that education could achieve its goal by inculcating 
in students both practical wisdom and technical know-how. The idea of practical wisdom entails 
procedures (means) aimed at cultivating in citizens the ability and disposition or willingness to think 
critically, to assess, to evaluate, to question and to offer reasons for one’s position, and to be able 
to identify and address social problems in society, whereas technical know-how involves facts 
(ends) of education.  
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Waghid’s interpretation promotes McLaughlin’s argument, which urges educators not to ignore or 
favour one of these, but to advance both strands if education is to achieve its mission. With this in 
mind, I argue that university teaching and learning ought to prepare students with facts on the 
subject matter, but also with practical wisdom, that is, the ability and disposition and willingness to 
engage actively in deliberation on pressing issues like internal exclusion, and to take responsibility 
for offering reasons why others should not be treated unjustly. For a university to produce students 
with technical skills and practical reasoning abilities, i.e. caring traits, it should consider Benhabib’s 
(2002: 162-164) suggestion to educate for democratic citizenship. In her view, for democracy to 
flourish, university education requires three interrelated public attributes when educating citizens: 
collective identity, privileges of membership and social rights and benefits. These attributes are 
interconnected and require one another to achieve the desired democratic citizens. In other words, 
for citizens to be democrats, these attributes need to be in co-existence, which I find relevant for 
pedagogical encounters in African universities.  
To Benhabib (2002: 169), “democracy is a form of life which rests upon active consent and 
participation”, whereas “citizenship is distributed according to passive criteria of belonging, like 
birth upon a piece of land and socialisation in that country or membership in an ethnic group”. 
Firstly, a university should educate students about their collective identity. This idea expects 
members of a political community who want to educate people to be democratic citizens to pursue 
an approach that takes into account people’s linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious 
commonalities. Collective identity can only happen within the formation of civil spaces in which 
people learn to live with other people from different backgrounds and contexts, while respecting 
diversity or differences. Waghid (2010: 198) points out that collective identity can be achieved by 
establishing civil spaces where democratic citizens are taught how to share commonalities, and 
how to respect differences. He states further that people should not only be taught about their right 
to enter into deliberation, but that this right should be recognised by all others if they are to become 
active participants in an educative process that is informed by democratic citizenship. On this 
score, Waghid (2010: 198) holds that the process of educating people about their civil, political and 
social rights would teach them about the rights to the protection of life, liberty, freedom of 
conscience, and the right of self-determination. In his words, "a democratic citizenship education 
would also educate people to deliberate in such a way as to offer an account of one's reasons and 
in turn listen to the reasons of others, and recognise and respect people's, political and social 
rights" (Waghid, 2010: 198-199). This argument appeals to me because, when students are taught 
what it means to live and act democratically, they may realise the usefulness of engaging one 
another as equal citizens. In this way, the excluded groups, just like the dominant groups, may 
begin to air their views and claim what is right and just, including a demand for internal inclusion.  
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Secondly, the university should educate students about what it means to have privileges of 
membership, whereby people become aware of their democratic citizenry rights to political 
participation, right to hold office, and right to deliberate and be part of decision making (Benhabib, 
2002: 162). All people, especially the internally excluded groups, may realise that to remain silent 
in AHE is to give up one’s citizenship right to be heard and to influence policies. In her view, 
Benhabib (2002: 130) notes that another important argument is educating people to be able to 
deliberate to make their voices heard and to give reasons in civil public spaces without fear of 
intimidation or domination. I say that when people are aware of what is expected of them, not just 
for mere representation, but that their voices can make a meaningful contribution and disrupt the 
taken-granted narrative or status quo, they would be heard.  
Thirdly, a university should educate students about their social rights and benefits. Benhabib 
(2002: 163-164), with reference to T. H. Marshall’s viewpoint, notes that this requires three 
aspects: civil right, political right and social right. Civil right involves students’ right to protection of 
life, liberty and prosperity, the right to freedom of right or wrong, and the right to contract and 
marriage. Political right has to do with educating people about their right to self-determination, to 
hold office, and to have freedom of speech, hold opinions and join political associations. And social 
right entails people’s/students’ right to join trade unions or student bodies, enjoy professional 
health care, and have access to unemployment compensation, old-age unions, child care, housing 
and educational subsidies.  
Profoundly, active consent and participation can only occur when people have a sense of 
belonging and attachment to such a deliberative group. In other words, democratic citizenship 
seeks to promote active participation, whereas citizenship works toward people with a sense of 
belonging when participants engage in deliberations. Thus, Benhabib’s (2002: 133-134) active 
participation is advanced through citizens’ engagement in deliberation as free and equal moral 
beings, in which process they attempt to persuade others about their point of view by explaining 
individual reasons in a reasonable manner. In a nutshell, university education as ingrained in 
Benhabib’s three delineated ideas of democratic citizenship education symbolises a social 
institution in which people are educated about one another’s shared values, meanings, justice, 
signs and symbols. Echoing the above, Waghid (2008a: 4) asserts that people need to be 
educated to be able to deliberate, offer their own reasons, listen to others’ reasons and recognise 
and respect other people’s civil, political and social rights, as well as question injustice without 
being ridiculed and rebuked by anyone. In my view, when students are informed about what it 
means to be democratic citizens, the features of a reconstituted ethics of care, compassionate 
imagining, responsibility and reasoning may possibly be upheld.  
For students to begin releasing their compassionate imagining, as Nussbaum (2001) and Greene 
(1995) urge us to do, teaching and learning encounters must facilitate students to narrate their 
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stories of subjugation and mistreatment by others. By means of engagement, students who are 
educated to be democratic citizens have a better chance of listening to others’ misfortunes and 
maltreatment so that they may become compassionate imaginers and act responsibly to either give 
up or moderate their oppressive tendencies. Through these distressful encounters, the excluded 
assert their voice against the culture of patriarchy, male chauvinism and authoritarian practices that 
undermine others’ opportunity to exercise their citizenship rights.  
Equally, such students (both the dominant and the excluded) might begin to engage provocatively 
in order to hear others’ points of view in order to address the injustice happening in Africa. I echo 
Waghid’s (2005: 340) compelling viewpoint that university classrooms require not only socialising 
students with an inherent/implicit body of facts and knowledge-constructs about society, human 
values and different cultural traditions, but should also initiate them into a discourse of critical 
questioning so that they challenge what they have been taught. Hence, cultivating a culture of 
caring demands that university educators afford all students equal opportunities to engage critically 
and reflexively with each other and with texts, irrespective of gender or how ill-informed their views 
are. In this way, university education produces critical citizens who will keep abreast of what is 
happening in society and vice versa, as a way of educating students to become responsible 
citizens for the well-being of humanity. 
 
7.3.2 How do we inculcate caring traits in students? 
To this end, democratic caring citizens can only be realised when all students are treated with 
equal intellect and are expected to justify their reasons for why a particular view, in this case 
patriarchy, is to be sustained. This means that democratic values should not only be taught, but 
should be experienced through caring encounters that potentially may stimulate critical thinking 
and shape reasoning skills. These kinds of pedagogical encounters that have sufficient conditions 
to disrupt the patriarchal cultural norms of male domination over female subordination are 
important for an amended ethics of care. Unless universities begin to cultivate this imaginative kind 
of caring among educators and students, internal exclusion will not be mitigated and people’s 
minds will not be transformed as we desire. And when people care about the other as themselves, 
they place their taken-for-granted beliefs, such as patriarchal cultural norms that perpetuate 
chauvinism and authoritarian power relations, into contestation. I hold that university encounters in 
which educators and students engage provocatively would question discriminatory beliefs and 
actions towards thinking anew. However, in order for a culture of caring to be promoted, university 
governance and management ought to embrace a reconstituted ethics of care. 
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7.3.3 Implications for governance and management 
As argued above, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to engender a just society if university 
teaching and learning tried to cultivate caring in students without a clear conceptualisation and 
practices. The point is that, unless university governance and management frame their policy and 
practices in a similar manner, inclusion and equality may not be achieved. Firstly, university 
governance and management should pronounce what it means to care as a yardstick for the entire 
institution. This requires policies and an environment that respect all people’s voices and affords 
students, staff members and leaders equal opportunities, irrespective of their differences. 
Secondly, caring relations among management members should also break away from the 
patriarchal traditional cultural norm of male domination over female subordination. The point is that 
university governance ought to transcend the gender divide in its attempts to advance inclusion 
and equality.  
As a result, governance and management should be an example for the rest of the institutions as a 
way of demonstrating pragmatically how caring is enacted. This will be evident when a diversified 
management in higher leadership positions engage staff members and students provocatively with 
the intention to evoke the views of the internally excluded group. By so doing, their voices may 
make a meaningful contribution to democratic processes. Also, seeing some people as the other 
should be discouraged, since such concepts trigger all forms of discrimination and exclusion. 
Thirdly, university governance and management should begin to take seriously issues of 
marginalisation and raise a radical voice against all forms of injustice happening to others, as a 
form of being compassionate and taking responsibility in addressing such encounters. Fourthly, 
university governance and management should sensitise their staff to their democratic 
responsibility as a way of holding people accountable for the excluded group’s voices. In other 
words, it is not sufficient to only formulate democratic policies, but they should be an example of 
what it means to care.  
In the same way, a re-imagined university governance and management should treat all people as 
equal human beings rather than as gendered beings, particularly in its allocation of courses, jobs 
and even leadership positions. In sum, university governance and management ought to fulfil three 
tasks – outline a clear and richer conception of an ethics of care that evokes people’s rational 
potentialities, educate and sensitise staff members on what is expected of them, and ultimately 
speak publicly against unjust practices. By so doing, we may provoke other institutions, like 
schools and the religious, cultural and traditional aspects of civil society to debunk unjust acts that 
undermine democracy and humanity. Augmenting the call for university governance and 
management to begin rethinking and reviewing strategies as they emerge in the 21st century, the 
Rector and Vice-Chancellor of Stellenbosch University, Prof H Russel Botman (2013: 4), asserts 
that: 
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As we go deeper into the 21st century, it has become crucial to position 
Stellenbosch University for this era to benefit from new opportunities. This process 
offers many challenges, but also brings excitement about the future of our 
institution. With rapidly shifting societal needs worldwide, most universities have 
gone into “transformation mode” in order to deal with the pressures of serving more 
people with less space and money and to remain relevant in the knowledge 
economy. This requires a fundamental review of strategies, structures, missions, 
processes and programmes – never neglecting to involve all stakeholders. At SU 
we elected to take proactive steps to ensure that continuous transformation is 
integrated as part of the core “being” of the University – thus not necessity driven 
but rather because we view it as a key prerequisite for success in the 21st century. 
The management of the University therefore foresees this process to be reconciling 
and not divisive. 
It therefore is evident that only when universities take a vigorous standpoint in framing their policies 
and practices within a reconstituted ethics of care, may internal exclusion and other injustices 
encountered in HE institutions and society be alleviated. It therefore is urgent for universities in 
Africa to retain their position as an integral place to produce not only technicians, but citizens with 
compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning who can respond to both new technologies 
and pressing injustices. This requires a university not only to teach the conception of caring, but to 
take it as a way of life. It has been proven that if universities cannot inculcate democratic citizenry, 
other institutions are unlikely to do so. From here, the following section will discuss the significance 
of the study and its contribution to research, reflect on the trajectory of finding a voice, respond to 
potential criticism, and then identify possibilities for future studies.  
 
7.4 Significance of the study and its contribution to research  
This study is significant in the field of Philosophy of Education and Educational Theory for three 
reasons. One main novelty of this study rests in the reconceptualisation of an ethics of care, with 
its related meanings – compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning – which have the 
potential to disrupt exclusionary practices and the status quo. Thus, the study offers a possibility 
for transforming HE in Africa by creating enabling conditions that evoke the internally excluded 
rational potentialities and making it possible to assert a disrupting voice as a way of emancipation. 
It also creates a deliberative and engaging environment in which the dominant groups take their 
taken-for-granted narrative and ideas into scrutiny and begins to think anew, which is a process of 
contributing towards attaining substantive inclusion. 
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7.4.1 How does a study of this nature fit into higher education? 
Taking into account how AHE, especially the university, has become a playing field for competing 
ideologies and leaves learners without the autonomy to care for citizens, this study advocates a 
shift from economically driven education towards an inclusive democratic education for social 
justice. Africa needs to transcend what Nussbaum (2010) and Noddings (2006b: 339-340) assert 
about contemporary education, which serves two complementary aims: to produce competent 
workers on the one hand, and citizens on the other. In Noddings’s (2006b: 339) view, “an 
education worthy of its name will prepare students to develop as persons, thoughtful citizens, 
competent parents, faithful friends, capable workers, generous neighbours and lifelong learners”. 
This startling argument justifies the need for a re-imagined university that cultivates caring traits in 
students, who are lifelong learners and who will recognise that there is more to learn in our 
engagement and encounters with others.  
Locating the place of this study within the emerging 21st century, Ronald Barnett (2012) and others, 
in The Future University: Ideas and Possibilities, offer some claims for the future university. This 
volume's argument is premised on the idea that HE, specifically the university in the world, is 
“experiencing common pressures for fundamental change, reinforced by differing national and 
regional circumstances that also established institutional structures and procedures” (Barnett, 
2012: ix). This leads to HE systems in different regions and nations experiencing pressures 
differently, depending on their socio-economic and political milieu. One infers here that regions and 
nations have specific urgent issues that need urgent responses. However, due to the pressures 
facing it, higher education has made a dramatic shift in its roles and character, its roles to state and 
society. Barnett (2012) posits that the international demands, specifically for the “performativity” 
and “commodification” of knowledge, permeate all practices of universities, including AHE, which 
has changed the understanding of “the idea of the university”, as Barnett puts it. Hence, 
considering the worrying state of Africa, a continent with a long history of colonialism that is facing 
current challenges ranging from ethnic conflict, poverty, sexual harassment and the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic, to vicious discrimination and the exclusion of women, a study of this nature is essential. 
This approach could propel towards a re-imagined university that may cultivate a democratic 
citizenry who are compassionate imaginers, responsible and ready to reason through deliberation 
with others, not only for individual needs but for the sake of humanity. Therefore, I think a study of 
this nature may save the university from degeneration and locate a place for it somewhere in the 
future. 
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The future university, which I refer to as a “re-imagined university”, requires what Barnett (2012) 
calls a re-examination of its “missions” and a re-imagination of its purposes. With this in mind, the 
contribution of my study to the discourse on a re-imagined university on the African continent 
attempts to address internal exclusion and engender equality. Although there are claims of the 
“end of the university”, Barnett's (2012) volume offers possibilities for the idea that the university 
can live on vibrantly through the twenty-first century, which attests to the relevance of a re-
imagined citizenship education in Africa. Thus, unless HE in Africa embraces and cultivates 
compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning abilities in citizens, its knowledge 
production will be for mere technicians, which pose a threat to democracy and humanity. Having 
said this, I now turn to a reflective dimension. 
 
7.4.2 Finding a voice: how, who and what have I become?  
 
PhD students and other researchers need to engage in personal reflection to 
understand themselves in relation to the World and to deliberate about or 
reconstruct their values in relation to everyday situations which constantly demand 
their judgments and their action. In conceptually reshaping the situation, they are 
therefore involved in a reflexive dimension (O’Hanlon, 1994: 282). 
As highlighted above, in thinking through this doctoral degree, I want to reflect on how this study 
has changed me as a person and who or what I have become. In my journey of finding a voice, I 
reflect on the caring relation in which my carer educator recognised potential in me at the end of 
my B.Ed. Honours study. With his assistance, and that of other academics and other students, my 
carer educator moved me out of my comfort zone and challenged me to write a paper and submit 
an abstract for the Education Students’ Research Regional Conference (ESRRC) in 2008, which 
established a caring relation for my M.Ed. supervision. This caring was intensified during the two 
years of study in 2009 and 2010 that enabled me to complete my study within the prescribed time 
frame. This exceptional performance led to financial assistance to pursue PhD, which triggered my 
decision to resign from my job. It was during work on this doctoral degree that I realised what it 
means to care through the conception of an ethics of care. The reconstructed ethics of care that I 
am advocating for in AHE is exactly the caring encounter that changed my thinking about exclusion 
and enabled me to emancipate myself through exercising my voice.  
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7.4.2.1 How and who have I become? 
The events or moments that shaped who I am today are uncountable; however, there are major 
encounters that have changed my thinking and world views towards a richer and deeper 
understanding of who I am and what I can do as an independent thinker. First and foremost, I 
acknowledge the caring relationship, one that I had never tasted before, in which potentialities in 
me as a person were recognised. Through this relation, I realised that every human being has 
rational potentialities in spite of where they come from or the level of knowledge they might have. 
What is required is to recognise humanity in the otherness of other, that is in the self (carer 
educator) and in the other (cared-for student), to evoke their rational potentialities. I learned that 
human differences should not determine or undermine how people should care. Based on a 
socially constructed gender, sexual orientation, religions, nationality, social status and even level of 
education contribute to our inherent human capacity to care. Secondly, in his efforts to care, 
especially to evoke my rational potentialities, my carer educator created conditions for growth, 
namely regular meetings that expected well thought through positions and justified arguments 
through compassionate provocative engagements accompanied by meticulous and guiding 
feedback. Through belligerent but compassionate encounters, I learned to think critically and offer 
reasons for my arguments, which my carer at times highly commended. My carer educator’s 
inspirational words about scientific writing and argumentation may be summed up in this way: 
“Nobody can teach you how to write, but you can learn it by yourself through continuous reading, 
thinking and writing between 500 and 1 000 words daily, because practise makes for 
improvement.” This view connects deeply with Dixon’s (2004) standpoint that “nothing worthwhile 
is taught, but learned”.  
 
Interestingly, through this caring relationship I was introduced to various theorists who challenged 
my preconceived assumptions and narrow interpretation of fundamental concepts for this study: 
inclusion, equality and caring. I also encountered and engaged with the theorists such as 
Noddings, Benhabib, Nussbaum, Assié-Lumumba, Cavell, Young, Rancière, Butler, MacIntyre, 
Fay, Harding, Kwesiga, Tamale and others. These engagements and encounters pushed me 
beyond my comfort zone, which maximised my understanding. Equally, encountering the 
otherness of others, specifically the ideas of those exposed to various forms of marginalisation and 
vicious discrimination, in this case homosexuals, invoked in me a deep sense of compassion. 
Through this experience, I realised that my call for women’s inclusion was in itself exclusionary. It 
therefore was my responsibility as a citizen to advocate for a non-gendered ethics of care that 
could lead to substantive inclusion. From the aforementioned scholars, I also learned that 
patriarchal beliefs and gendered roles are socially constructed ideologies that are reinforced via 
different structures, namely cultural, religious or social institutions. I also realised that what matters 
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in caring relations is not people’s differences, but rather our shared and common values that shape 
our humanity. In other words, my identity as a person and what I do should not be defined by 
others, but what I need from others is to enact my humanity. The point is that, because we human 
beings are dependent beings in terms of our vulnerabilities, evoking one another’s rationality to 
become independent thinkers is an indispensable act of caring.  
Other conditions created to hone my knowledge in the field of philosophy of education, as well as 
to boost my confidence, were serving as a tutor, a marker and an assisting lecturer of the B.Ed. 
Honours students (both residential and distance education). In these processes I learned to 
engage critically with my colleagues, while being a compassionate imaginer, and to act responsibly 
to enable them to develop an argument and pursue critical thinking. I learned that caring action 
especially that which evokes students’ potentialities, is sometimes a painful exercise yet very 
rewarding in the long run. Here I can recall how some students were annoyed with me because 
they scored low marks. I encouraged them to rewrite their essays and, after clarifying their errors, 
some of them came to admit how naïve they were about writing an argument and how grateful they 
were to have reworked their essays, thereby enhancing their writing. One of the students 
demanded her “agency” through using whatever form of referencing she found fit. She called me a 
“gate keeper” when I explained to her what was expected of her and about the university’s 
referencing style. Surprisingly, this student was later to acknowledge my efforts, which she says 
paved the way for her to excel.  
 
From such encounters, my compassionate imagining was invoked and I learned how to engage 
with fellow students’ questioning and often dismissive attitudes. Since the carer educator 
encourages new students to seek guidance from others, especially former or senior students, I 
learned a remarkable amount by listening to other’s stories and managed to guide some students 
to think critically about the issue at hand. Again, the introduction to the discourse on patriarchal 
beliefs and power relations, especially my reading of Foucault (1980) on how such a dominant idea 
“normalises” all people, enabled me to identify how accountable I am towards the internal inclusion 
I am advocating in AHE. Such power in patriarchal norms works as a “panoptical camera”, whilst 
the critical social scientist Fay (1987) perceived power as a “dyadic” relationship between people 
and determined by both women and men, because the so-called powerless surrender their power 
to the so-called dominant, which makes them more powerful. From this viewpoint, I learned not to 
surrender my power, either through intimidation or demeaning interpretations, chauvinistic 
tendencies or gendered structures, but became aware of my citizenship rights and responsibility to 
propose suitable approaches to learning. This patriarchal debate helped me in understanding why 
women, especially single women and those viewed as different, are treated in a particular way that 
leads to internal exclusion, marginalisation and vicious discrimination. Such perspectives showed 
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me that oppressive structures and ideologies require our critical engagement, and if not 
deconstructive lenses as a way of transforming and emancipating the self as an individual and 
others through a voice.  
Through this caring relation, I managed to present my ideas at several conferences, like ESRRC 
and the KENTON Education Association of South Africa, and attended the international conference 
of the International Network of Philosophers of Education (INPE) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2012. 
At such conferences I was privileged to meet a variety of scholars, both local and international. At 
INPE I met some of the renowned philosophers of education, including Paul Smeyers and Penny 
Enslin. I also listened to a special lecture in memory of Terence McLaughlin, the philosopher of 
education who informed my M.Ed. thesis on minimalist-maximalist citizenship education. Another 
significant experience was serving as a member of the ESRRC Organising Committee from 2008 
to 2012. Through this encounter I gained a voice by engaging others on the running of the 
conference, and also presented ideas at different departmental functions, such as Brown Bags and 
Postgraduate Days, during which students and lecturers engage in deliberation and present our 
work. I benefited through an Exchange Programme with the University of Hamburg, Germany, 
during which time I worked with a prominent feminist scholar and historian of education, Professor 
Dr Christine Mayer, on the recommendation of my carer. During this exchange and under her 
supervision, she encouraged me to do some of my research at the UNESCO Institute of Education 
Library, the Asia-Africa Institute Library, and to work with her colleagues and students, all of whom 
were hospitable and compassionate. Encountering them and their otherness, I did not only taste 
what it means to be a cosmopolitan citizen, but also what it means to be human. 
 
7.4.2.2 What have I become?  
 
In doing research, in deliberating about information and data that are being 
gathered one is in fact changing one’s self … Perhaps the research process has 
changed the person that they are conscious of this change and therefore become 
aware of the changes in their choice of action and how it has affected their personal 
judgments. Is or should there be a connection between reflection and becoming 
consciously aware of the educational potential of the research? (O’Hanlon, 1994: 
282). 
Through this study I have become consciously aware of the potentiality of caring relations, 
specifically those that evoke one’s rational potentialities. Although it was a laborious and 
challenging journey, I learned that our act of caring should not be provoked by favours, or 
gendered or natural connectedness, but because of our human capacity to care, that is to 
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recognise humanity in the self and in the other, as Cavell (1979) puts it. I can now think 
independently, although connected to others, to invoke my humanity through a voice, rather than 
being a ”cheerleader” for men, according to Okeke’s (2004) view. I am aware that my identity as a 
black African woman does not have to be associated with trivial gendered roles, but rather should 
be recognised as being a human being with equal intelligence. My encounters with various human 
beings, either in person or through ideas, has helped me to carry out what my carer educator urges 
students to do – “fight against un-philosophical argumentation, hopelessness, complacency, and 
ignorance” (Shanyanana, 2011: xviii). The concept “ignorance”, according to the Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (2005: 741), is a lack of knowledge or information about 
something, whilst “complacency” entails a feeling of contented self-satisfaction, especially when 
unaware of the impending trouble that might ensue.  
Notably, I can confidently say that this study facilitated the process of moving beyond the 
boundaries of un-philosophical argumentation, hopelessness, ignorance and complacency. In 
other words, different views and encounters interrogated my ignorance and complacency in 
believing the following narratives: firstly, that women’s statistical representation in AHE does not 
necessarily promote gender equality and internal inclusion; secondly, that men are the only people 
responsible for women’s exclusion; thirdly, that women are better carers that men; fourthly, that to 
care can only be manifested through kindness to the internally excluded and to express sympathy 
with them by merely speaking for them, rather than creating conditions for them to attain a voice. I 
learned not to further conform or succumb for the sake of others’ approval, and to marginalising 
attitudes and gendered remarks, but rather to disrupt such parochial views through an 
emancipated voice. I am now mindful of who I am as a human being with rational potentialities, 
rather than being a gendered being. Therefore, I acknowledge that an authentic caring relationship 
should be between a carer educator and a cared-for student as “friends-who-love but do not expect 
to be loved-back”, as posited by Waghid (2010) from a Derridian position. From this inclination, I 
conclude this reflection with Nelson Mandela’s (1995) concluding words to his book Long Walk to 
Freedom:  
 
I have walked that long road to freedom. I have tried not to falter; I have made 
missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great 
hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment 
here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on 
the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom comes 
with responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not ended.  
The above words resonate with my walk on this journey in pursuit of knowledge, and the 
celebrated knowledge is my acquired emancipated voice. In conclusion, I embarked on this 
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dissertation with a huge backlog, but it has helped me to navigate through a major life 
transformation that can be attested to by the arguments that unfold in this study. Midway through 
writing this dissertation, I was finally rewarded with the strength to confront a personal demon of 
many years that I had been working hard to get the emotional strength to face. These concluding 
remarks connect to a recent interview with an eloquent young black female South African professor 
whom I have never encountered, Prof Pumla Dineo Gqola (2013), who averred that “writing is both 
transformative and emancipating” during her Book Lounge at the Open Book Festival in Cape 
Town in September 2013. Significantly, I can say that I came as a victim, but through writing this 
dissertation I have evolved an equal and active voice. I take Greene’s (1995) position that “I am not 
yet”, but in the “process of becoming” through my encounters and reasoning with others, as well as 
for others. Taking cognisance of the findings of this dissertation; let me offer a response to 
potential criticism of this work and suggest possibilities for future studies.  
 
7.4.3 Potential criticisms and possibilities for future studies 
Here I intend to respond to potential criticism that might arise from the findings of this study. In this 
process, I attend to ideas I might never have thought of or those I could not address here as a way 
of agitating and inviting further thinking and deliberation. Some critics might argue that my 
reconstituted ethics of care is rather idealistic. To this sceptic view I say that, through this 
approach, students need to exercise their critical thinking in understanding what caring means and 
why we need caring, especially in an institution and society engulfed by injustices. I believe that 
students need to develop some sense of compassionate imagining through provocative 
engagement with the dominant other to realise how pernicious their actions towards others are. My 
findings suggest that a caring relationship that creates enabling conditions for the excluded group 
to exercise their democratic rights through an equal voice is an inevitable type of caring in Africa. 
Another critic might ask why it is necessary to care for others and to keep insisting that people 
should care. My response is that, when you care you actually enact humanity, and then will not 
exclude others in the space of democracy. I argue that the mere fact that one is at university, which 
is a social institution, indicates that one needs to care, not just for students’ material needs, but 
about creating conditions that evoke their rational potentiality to assert a voice as independent 
citizens with equal intelligence in a democratic society.  
Another potential critic might legitimately inquire whether Noddings’ frame of caring is insufficient to 
address inclusion, considering its relational frame? My answer is that Noddings’ frame of caring is 
in itself worthwhile, but because the problem is internal exclusion, which requires people to 
exercise their rights as agents, it is restricted to giving the excluded a voice. The concern is 
whether I am not proposing a radical form of caring that may silence the internally excluded, since 
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there could be confrontation and distressful encounters; I argue that not all acts of caring need to 
be in the form of kindness, taking into account that power relations and authoritarian practices 
require disruption. In response to the question whether this reconstituted ethics of care is a form of 
essentialism; my answer is simply, not necessarily. However, what I call caring is what enables the 
internally excluded to assert disrupting voices in an exclusionary HE, and to challenge the status 
quo to realise substantive inclusion and equality. Profoundly, my voice is also a disrupting voice in 
an effort to propose an appropriate approach, as Butler (2004) urges us to do in educating 
democratic citizens to become compassionate beings and responsible and reasoning carers for the 
internally excluded groups, which may engender substantive inclusion.  
 
To rest my case, let me draw from Minow’s (1990: 20) problematisation of whether it is necessary 
to understand our differences of care: 
 
When does treating people differently empathize their differences and stigmatize or 
hinder them on that basis? And when does treating people the same become 
insensitive to their differences and likely stigmatize or hinder them on that basis?  
The above paradoxical quotation stimulates uninterrupted deliberation in an effort to move beyond 
the impasse. As a way of opening the democratic iterations to continue, other studies are 
encouraged to explore whether a reconstituted ethics of care could potentially emancipate the 
privileged groups in efforts to engender a complete and authentic transformation. Hence, I invite 
others to engage in democratic iterations towards engendering substantial inclusion in a 
cosmopolitan society.  
 
7.5 Concluding summary of the dissertation 
The study started by contesting the space of women in AHE and raising questions that gave 
impetus to educational research in this area. The aim and objective were to explore the inclusion of 
women in HE in Africa, as well as how an ethics of care could assist in addressing their exclusion. 
Chapter 2 traced the historical account of HE in order to acquire an understanding of what shaped 
current education in Africa. I examined three epochs in relation to the involvement of women in 
AHE, specifically to understand current educational discourses. The chapter asserted that there 
had been higher learning in Africa before Western colonial education. These two education 
systems each had its distinctiveness: the former relied on non-formal oral education and 
storytelling, while the latter used the formal, written form. In both the pre-colonial and colonial 
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epochs, women were assigned trivialised gendered roles namely: rearing babies and caring for 
their husbands, children and the elderly. Women therefore were not offered equal rights as citizens 
to participate in public spaces. Upon independence, African states adopted Paul Freire’s (2004) 
emancipatory approach, which transcends the pedagogy of the oppressed towards pedagogy of 
hope. The intention was to educate citizens towards self-reliance and respond to local needs, 
especially widening education for the oppressed and ill-treated groups, including women.  
 
Although social institutions in African states have initiated strategies such as the NEPAD policy 
and affirmative action to ensure the fulfilment of the MDGs, especially goal three, which requires 
women’s empowerment and equality, HE remains male dominated and excludes women. Chapter 
2 also showed that HE is confronted by complex and competing demands; that is the local needs 
and the global movement of neoliberalism, which emphasises the commodification of knowledge 
for the market economy. Yet, AHE focus on responding to global recognition has left such 
institutions without agency to address local needs mainly inclusion of women. Chapter 3 explored 
the conception of inclusion and equality, exhibiting that AHE’s use of gender as a yardstick is 
(in)commensurable with the idea of equalisation of voice. It also showed that the African 
philosophy of Ubuntu tallies with a conception of inclusion and equality. Therefore, I have argued 
that the way women are treated and internally excluded manifest a limited understanding of 
Ubuntu. I have argued that AHE should move beyond Ubuntu as inclusion based on 
communication, capabilities and gender, to inclusion that recognises human voice in an inclusive 
democratic AHE, where the currently excluded groups exercise their equality and experience 
humanity. Chapter 4 offered evidence of women’s experiences of inclusion, which revealed that, 
although the number of women in African HE has increased, their level of representation is still 
relatively low, while those who have managed to attain representation encounter subtle forms of 
internal exclusion. This demonstrates that, despite competing international demands, there are 
other ideologies that influence the way people treat one another that silence women's contribution 
to democratic engagement.  
Chapter 5 explored how patriarchal beliefs, male chauvinism and authoritarianism emerge as 
conditions that perpetuate women’s internal exclusion. I argued that, if AHE is to transform its 
practices and nurture democratic citizens, all people need to be emancipated. Chapter 6 explored 
a conception of an ethics of care and advocated a non-gendered ethics of care that may advance 
substantive inclusion. Noddings’s sympathetic notion revealed that caring is relational between two 
people, the carer and the cared-for. Yet her approach is restricted and limits the autonomy of the 
cared-for agent. I used Slote's notion of empathy, which recognises people’s autonomy, in order to 
fill Noddings’s gap. Nonetheless, both perceptions are limited in addressing internal exclusion. In 
exploring other views of caring, I adopted MacIntyre’s account of caring, which evokes 
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potentialities in which human beings need to recognise their dependence on one another due to 
their vulnerabilities and rationalities. I have proposed a reconstruction of an ethics of care by using 
a Rancièrean emancipatory approach that perceives people as equal intellectuals. I have argued 
that this approach has the potential to disrupt the exclusionary practices in and status quo of AHE. 
In my attempts to give meaning to this form of caring, I have utilised the cosmopolitan norms of 
iterations and hostipitality, compassionate respect and humanity. I argue that, when people engage 
in provocative and distressful iterative encounters with compassionate respect, they invoke one 
another’s humanity. My conviction is that compassion should not be limited to mere sympathy, but 
rather should create enabling conditions to assist the cared-for to become independent reasoners, 
thus acknowledging humanity in the self and the other by creating conditions to evoke the 
rationality of the cared-for to attain a voice. I defended a non-gendered reconstituted ethics of care 
that encompasses compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning. I called for HE, 
especially teaching and learning and governance and management in university education, to 
foster a reconstituted ethics of care in order to become compassionate, responsible and humane. 
The point is that one cannot change the situation in one day, but I have demonstrated how a 
reconstituted ethics of care through educational encounters at university could gradually 
encourage people to learn and experience caring, both conceptually and pragmatically.  
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